The prelude of an Asian Era has begun. About 100 years ago, Japanese scholar Okakura Tenshin, Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore and Chinese scholar Liang Qichao all called for Asianism. A century has past during which numerous thinkers have conceived of Asia's rise. Now, the Asian Era is coming. The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on November 15 brought together ASEAN nations, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia and New Zealand into one of the most diverse and populated trade blocks on Earth. It marks a new age for Asian regional cooperation that features multilateralism and trade liberalism. In terms of the global recovery process during the post-pandemic era, this new configuration can accomplish many things. By 2025, China's GDP is expected to catch up with or even surpass that of the US. India may surpass Germany to become the world's fourth-largest economy. European countries will be falling into a depression unseen in 500 years since Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan started his global voyage in 1520. The US' status as the world's largest economy will be nearing its end. For the first time, three Asian countries will be among the four major economies in the world. From the perspective of national governance, East Asian countries, which put emphasis on order in their culture, show more efficiency in fighting against the pandemic, compared with European countries and the US, which purportedly value freedom more. Therefore, Asian countries are also revitalizing their economies faster than other parts of the world. It is anticipated that by 2030, Asia will, "contribute roughly 60 percent of global growth." Asia's revival and the rise and fall of great powers in the region over the past five centuries is a different story. Asian leaders do not aspire to construct an "Asian alliance," let alone build an "Asian empire" to replace the US. Nor to do something as grandiose as to "save the world" like some missionary. By contrast, the goal of leaders from Asian countries, especially East and Southeast Asia, tends to focus on domestic affairs. They strive to satisfy the needs of the public in light of their national situations. Asian countries advocate "learning by doing" and excel in exploiting external capital, talents, experiences and lessons. Since the 1990s, East Asia has maintained peace and cooperation for three decades. It has seen the fastest growth in terms of investment and trade. Japan and South Korea have made full use of state capitalism to promote export-oriented economics. ASEAN members have solidified and become an important part of the multi-polar world. Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has learned how to allocate global resources. Among the seven continents in the world, Asia is the largest, has largest population and the oldest civilizations. It is also the continent with the most complex ethnicities, religion, geography and history. So far, this complexity has prevented Asia from establishing any community associated with "integration." There is no single currency like the Euro, nor is there a unified intra-continental political organization like the European Union, African Union, or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. It lacks an economic integration organization like the North American Free Trade Agreement. Even the Asian Games, in which all members on the continent are supposed to take part in, had been incomplete by the absence of Turkey and Israel. No one expected that this puzzle of many places would gradually become a respectable entity unto itself. However, we can expect that the code of conduct of Asians will become increasingly respectable in the post-pandemic era. Asian values that are more conducive to human development will find growing global appeal. This will be the case with countries like China, Japan and South Korea as these Asian countries demonstrate they can strike delicate balances between the government and market, mercantilism and justice, rights and responsibilities, freedom and self-discipline - as well as individuals and society. As Indian American scholar Parag Khanna says in his new book, The Future Is Asian, "in the 19th century, the world was Europeanized. In the 20th century, it was Americanized. Now, in the 21st century, the world is being irreversibly Asianized." There are another two books that I also recommend. One is The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, written by Kishore Mahbubani, former dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore. Another is Easternization: Asia's Rise and America's Decline From Obama to Trump and Beyond written by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times. The "Asian Era" will increasingly be understood and embraced globally. Chinese people are driving progress in their own way. Since 2013, China has put forward the Belt and Road Initiative and the vision of "a community with shared future for mankind." We have every reason to believe that China is advancing the "Asian Era" in the right direction. Surely, the prologue to the "Asian era" has been a long one in the making. Yet this reminds me of the spirit of perseverance of Yu Gong, a figure from an ancient Chinese story called The Foolish Old Man Removes the Mountains, or Yu Gong Yi Shan in Chinese. In the story, the 90-year-old Yu Gong's perseverance and hard work to remove the mountain in front of his house along with his descendants moves a God, who finally orders the mountains separated. I believe Asian countries also have Yu Gong's spirit. The "Asian Era" has started and will for sure have its ultimate arrival in the annals of history. The author is professor and executive dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China.

Relations between the US and its allies have been under constant strain since the end of the Cold War. This strain worsened under the Trump administration, and has changed in some fundamental ways.

The first change pertains to international affairs. During the Cold War, the US maintained a stable alliance system with its Western allies to hem in the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, there was no longer a need for a staunch US-Western system of alliances. Indeed, European countries and Japan were no longer willing to obey the commands of Washington as their sense of sovereignty and strategic autonomy was on the rise. Meanwhile, the US was no longer willing to shoulder the military burdens as it did during the Cold War, causing a long-lasting dispute between them. After the financial crisis of 2008-09 then after 2012, China's robust economic growth seemed to have set off alarm bells in Washington. It began construing China in a negative light in much the same way it did with the former Soviet Union. However, many European countries and Japan, despite having the similar ideologies and values with the US, did not share the same military and economic strategies in the US strategy of containing China. The second change took place with US domestic politics. The Republican Party has a long tradition of advocating isolationist foreign policies. Its philosophy seeks to "act for itself and not for others." Indeed, during WWI and WWII, the Republicans opposed US participation in the League of Nations or joining the anti-Fascist movement. They have also been the leading voice to undermine US international relations with unilateral action. During the presidency of George W. Bush, he enforced unilateralism in the Iraq war, and strained relations with US allies such as Germany and France. It took his successor Barack Obama some major efforts to restore the broken alliance. When President Donald Trump took office, he continued Bush's neglect of the alliance system, and has gone far beyond that. This greatly undermined the US international image and the ideological foundations of the alliance system it had worked so hard to create since the end of WWII. After Biden takes office in January, he is expected to restore US relations with the allies and reinforce multilateral mechanisms. He may reiterate his support for the European Union, and try to rejoin the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. He may even reengage with Tehran to regain control of the Iran nuclear issue. But no matter how hard Biden tries, he will still face many challenges. To begin with, Biden will find it hard to change the reality that the US, Europe and Japan lack a common enemy. Only China seems to be "qualified" to play the role of their "enemy." Yet China shares many goals and similarities with the West. China has made continuous efforts to reform and open up. It recently signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and is working on the promotion of the China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. It seeks to further integrate with the world's economic system, and has found an efficient approach to defuse the US strategic isolation pressure. Moreover, Biden won't be able to dispel US allies' doubts about Washington. The US is no longer what it was. Trumpism not only is a product of Trump himself, but has won broad supporters from across the country. If COVID-19 did not occur, Trump would definitely have been reelected. Trump lost the election, yet he still won nearly half of votes. US allies won't place their hopes of totally improving ties with the US as the pandemic controls remain unpredictable. Last but not the least, Biden has limited domestic political resources. He has not won both the US Senate and the House of Representatives by an overwhelming advantage. His adjustments in US foreign policies will turn out to be bumpy. The world has changed, the US has changed, and the way the world sees the US has also changed. Once the friendship between the US and its allies is hurt, it can be partially repaired. But it cannot be restored to its original state. The cracks will not go away. The author is a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University. 

"America First" is the core policy of the Trump administration. It pursues economic nationalism and de-globalization, rejecting multilateral trade mechanisms and only emphasizing US' own unique trade advantages. It refuses to undertake global responsibility, yet expects other countries to serve it. It denies the core position of the United Nations in the international system but tries to maintain the country's monopoly based on its own selfish greed and arrogance. This policy stance intends to create a chaotic international pattern that ignores existing rules and destroys the closely connected international system formed over the past few decades. It thus allows the US to be less restrained and more unilaterally interventionist in international affairs. The Trump administration's four-year practice of the "America First" policy has arguably brought disaster to the US and the world. Withdrawals from the Paris Climate Agreement, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council and many other multilateral agreements and institutions have seriously struck down important efforts that all countries have made to address major challenges facing humanity and different regions. The trade wars that Trump started with other countries in order to enhance US domestic economy and solve employment problems by setting trade barriers have failed. Actually, it has compounded US economy's current recession, dampened employment prospects and dismantled a sustainable status quo that will be difficult to reassemble. Upholding the "America First" policy has also allowed Trump to reject international cooperation in the anti-COVID battle - thus causing the US to become the worst hit country in the world with more than  266,000 fatalities. The "America First" policy has led to widespread dissatisfaction both at home and abroad. It destroyed US' international credibility and worsened existing domestic problems. Biden's victory was based on a complete rejection of the "America First" policy. And his administration will be fighting tooth and nail to regain international respect and to advance US interests. Still, domestic politics may severely hamper this. First of all, Biden will return the US to actively participate and lead international multilateral institutions to solve its internal and external problems. The Biden team will also likely join international operations to combat the COVID-19 - something that the US must face domestically too as a first priority. Secondly, Biden will embrace globalization and open the domestic market for more international trade flows. In fact, Trump's disastrous trade wars will see a turning point under Biden administration as his team might work out some feasible ways to end them. Besides, he will try to promote the benign development of international trade as much as possible through more active interchanges with other countries. Thirdly, Trump' foreign policy towards China will be adjusted. Objectively, Biden team has an urgent need to cooperate with China on many issues, even though competition still exists between the two powers. Issues such as solving pandemic challenges, economic recovery and climate change, which are all top priorities for Biden once he assumes office, have to be addressed through international cooperation, especially with China. Pursuing cooperative efforts with China will be a key element of Biden's future global strategic planning. It will be a far cry from the Trump administration's morbid commitment to a total lose-lose approach to China. Trump's "America First" policy lacks consistency and strategic thinking. It clearly bears the characteristics of Trump himself as selfish and unpredictable. The mess that Trump caused with the "America First" policies in both domestic and foreign affairs will make it hard for Biden to mop up. Still, Biden will be able to go along with current patterns of globalization, overtaking Trump's blind and lame attempts at governance. Overall, the US is at a crossroads with its domestic political and social divisions. These will set limits on any plans no matter who governs. But the "America First" policy has proved more harmful to the country than good. Biden's time will make it possible for the US to have new ideas to solve its own problems. Some of these might be able to restore the damage done to US image and participation on the world stage. The author is professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University.

Military cooperation is supposed to be a normal part of China-Nepal bilateral interactions, yet it is always placed under the spotlight. The reason lies with India's sensationalist press. Border tensions between China and India have not yet been defused. Meanwhile, New Delhi is confronting border conflicts with Kathmandu. Nepal's troops have shown resolute determination to safeguard its sovereignty with no sign of compromise. Indian Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane thus paid a three-day visit to Nepal earlier this month with an unspoken goal: to reduce pressure from the Nepalese side. As a result, New Delhi gets uncomfortable to see any developments in China-Nepal defense cooperation. There was a time when most of Nepal's arms deals were made with India. Starting in the 1980s, when Kathmandu started to purchase weapons from Beijing, New Delhi was furious, imposing a trade embargo on Nepal. Such moves also unveiled one of India's pain spots. Developing military cooperation is of great significance for both China and Nepal, which have no territorial disputes. Yet due to its unique geographic position, Nepal used to be a transfer stop and refuge for secessionist Tibetans in exile. Strengthened military and police cooperation with Nepal will help secure China's border security and stability with the Tibet Autonomous Region. By deepening military ties with China, Nepal can also maintain its own national unity and political stability. Nepal has relied heavily on India for military matters and its southern part is home to a large number of Indian descendants. Quite a number of Nepalese troops received training in India. Besides, India tends to interfere in Nepal's domestic affairs from time to time. All these factors are unfavorable factors for Nepal's national stability — hence the country hopes to pursue an independent diplomacy. China and Nepal signed an agreement regarding 150 million yuan ($22.8 million) military aid to the Nepal Army during Nepalese Defense Minister Ishwor Pokharel's China visit in October last year, according to media reports. Media reports also note that, "a protocol for the same [deal as October 2019] is expected to be signed during Wei's visit." Such military assistance will help Nepal consolidate its own defense power, and play a positive role to resolve the issues mentioned above. When Indian media outlets hyped up this meeting, they tended to hint that Wei's visit is coming closely on the heels of the trip made by India's Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, and also by General Naravane. It should be made clear that such a high-level visit must have been planned long before. The timing could be a coincidence. It may be more possible that India temporarily decided to carry out high-level visits to Nepal right after it learned about China's relevant arrangements. India, which regards South Asia as its own sphere of influence, has been highly vigilant against the region's cooperation with China. It has made use of media reports to manipulate local people's public opinions. These include spreading rumors about the so-called China threat theory and that China is "slowly invading" other countries. This has lamentably influenced other countries' foreign policies. Indian politicians maintain close personal ties with political figures in its neighboring countries. Due to the long-term British colonial rule, India and other South Asian countries have formed inextricable relations in politics, economics, culture and religion. New Delhi has been utilizing these ties to influence its neighbors' politics and societies. In the 2015 Sri Lanka presidential election, the country's long-time leader Mahinda Rajapaksa was winning at the beginning. But due to the maneuver of Indian intelligence services, Rajapaksa suffered a shock election defeat overnight. This can prove how much influence India has over regional countries. Some South Asian countries attempt to escape India's deep influence. But in the meantime, they dare not offend New Delhi. Former Nepalese prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal made his first official visit to China in 2008 after assuming office, breaking a tradition of new Nepali leaders making New Delhi their first foreign port of call. But not long after that visit, he was toppled by India. Then Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa once described India as his relative and China as a friend, implying that Sri Lanka was closer to India than to China. In South Asia, New Delhi is a hegemonic force that keeps small countries frightened. But such domineering behaviors are bound to encounter a dead end. As South Asian countries began to deepen their cooperation with China and as they have more realistic considerations on their interests, India's moves in the region are being tested. Naravane's visit to Nepal was a vivid example that the Indian government will continue prior policies of putting neighboring countries under its thumb. The author is secretary-general of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, visiting fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China and distinguished fellow of the China (Kunming) South Asia & Southeast Asia Institute. 

As global attention turns to the Biden team's future China policy, Jake Sullivan, US president-elect Joe Biden's national security advisor nominee, briefly mentioned China when talking about beating the coronavirus pandemic in a Friday interview with Politico.

He said the way to ensure the pandemic does not happen again is "by sending a very clear message to China that the United States and the rest of the world will not accept a circumstance in which we do not have an effective public health surveillance system, with an international dimension, in China and across the world going forward." We note that neither Biden nor his key team members have spoken explicitly about the US' future China policy. Sullivan was vague and tentative in his comments on Friday. It seems the Biden team recognizes that how to deal with China is a major issue for the US when they face a sensitive choice between continuing to be held hostage to "Trumpism" and breaking away from the destructive policy inertia of the previous administration. The US and Western media generally took Sullivan's statement as a sign that the Biden administration would pursue a tough policy toward China, reflected by what the opinion groups are predicting about the Biden administration's diplomatic orientation. But Sullivan is also believed to have the intent to break with the traditional definition of US national security. He noted that the "major focus" of the Biden National Security Council (NSC)'s work, at least initially, will be on beating the pandemic and restructuring the NSC to make public health a permanent national security priority, according to Politico. He also emphasized the dangers of climate change. Such a shift in focus would clearly be far more objective than the Trump administration's national security priorities. In fact, few Chinese expect that the Biden administration will become strategically "moderate" toward China. Most believe the anti-China bias among US elites is so entrenched that it will shape Washington's China policy in the long run, which means the future of US-China relations is likely to be gloomy. However, China-US relations go beyond the simple friend-foe identification. It involves a range of issues that can be solved only through interactions. Trump's failure to control the epidemic determined his election loss. Biden must contain the coronavirus to fulfill his election promises, and ensure the Democratic Party wins the midterms, thereby laying the foundations for victory in four years. To control the pandemic, vaccines alone are not enough. Cooperation between the US and the WHO and major powers, including China, is key. The US attitude toward China will be shaped by two factors: the growing strategic hostility toward China based on the collective weakness of human nature and geopolitical thinking; and the US practical need to cooperate with China to safeguard its own interests. Trump's foreign and national security team has constantly promoted and indulged in the first, regardless of the importance and legitimacy of the second. We hope the Biden team will at least be realistic and pursue a responsible balance. How COVID-19 started is, above all, a matter of science and the study of it should never be politicized. The unexpected outbreak in China's Wuhan did reveal the loopholes in the city's governance, but the city's lockdown sounded a deafening alarm to the entire world. The much more serious situations seen later in the US and Europe indicated they have bigger loopholes in their public health governance. It goes against common sense to turn the spotlight to Wuhan and accuse China now. Trump's labeling the coronavirus as the "China virus" and asking China to take responsibility for the pandemic is a political calculation aimed at absolving himself from the ineffective response to the epidemic. We hope the Biden administration will get rid of the "Trump trap" of "China responsibility theory" and face up to the real reason for its worsened epidemic situation. This is the basis for the US future victory in fighting the virus. China is perceived by some Americans as a "strategic adversary." But China is a needed partner for the US to address pressing problems. Let the practical needs of the two countries, not ideology, determine the trajectory of China-US relations. This should be the simplest and most executable option.

Indian National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval visited Colombo on Friday and Saturday to participate in the fourth NSA Level Meeting on Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation hosted by Sri Lanka.

However, Doval's visit was also to deepen India's cooperation with Sri Lanka. India sees China's coordination with Sri Lanka as somewhat breaking into India's sphere of influence. Furthermore, China-India ties have been gravely undermined because of their border tensions. In this context, India intends to exploit its advantages in geopolitics, culture and religion to rope in Sri Lanka to contain China, counter the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and consolidate India's influence in South Asia. The Diplomat magazine on Saturday said, "Even though Sri Lanka has rhetorically committed to an 'India first' approach when it comes to security, the fine print indicates that Colombo will engage with other major powers - read, China for its economic development". China and Sri Lanka are good friends and partners who always support and help each other. The two countries have deepened their economic cooperation under the BRI framework. By contrast, the story of New Delhi-Colombo ties is that of ups and downs. The two have frictions in areas such as the Tamil issue. Successive governments of both countries have tended to adjust policies toward each other based on the updated situations. In recent years, India has repeatedly wooed Sri Lanka. In response, in order not to offend New Delhi, who acts as a hegemon in South Asia, Colombo has made overtures to please New Delhi. For example, Sri Lanka's foreign secretary Jayanath Colombage said in August that Sri Lanka will adopt an "India first approach" as its new diplomacy plank and protect India's strategic security interests, an attempt to ease India's concern over China's growing presence in Sri Lanka. The island country is of great strategic importance, connecting the Strait of Malacca and the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Sri Lanka lies in the Indo-Pacific region, which has drawn global attention. Hence, Colombo has become a target for not only New Delhi's, but also Washington's machinations. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in October visited Sri Lanka, where he groundlessly slandered China and attempted to drive a wedge between China and Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa responded that Sri Lanka is not caught in a "debt trap" by accepting help from China. India, by ganging up with the US, is piling geopolitical pressure on small countries. Sri Lanka, like others involved in the fierce geopolitical competition, is pleased to have maintained long-term and close ties with China, which has never interfered in its internal affairs. On the other hand, the wooing from the US and India has indeed exerted considerable pressure on these countries. They cannot afford to pay the price if they offend either the US or India. They try their best to strike a balance between great powers. Qian Feng, director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times on Sunday that the pressure on Sri Lanka from the US and India may to some extent wield an impact on its ties with China. From Bangladesh and Nepal to Sri Lanka, India recently seems to be busy with resetting, restoring and strengthening ties with its neighboring countries. Qian said that against the backdrop of ongoing border tensions with China, India hopes to expand its influence, in a bid to gain more strategic capital and room to maneuver with China. South Asia plays a big role in the China-proposed BRI. China should continue to deepen its cooperation with regional countries on the basis of win-win principles. Qian said that India should not continue the geopolitical confrontation, but expand "China-India Plus" cooperation, which leaders of the two countries agreed to in 2019. This will be conducive to China, India and the whole South Asian region.

Western countries, especially US public opinion institutions, are launching an unfair reporting campaign around the COVID-19 vaccine, intentionally or unintentionally, questioning the progress of the Chinese Xinguan vaccine and exaggerating the progress made by American and Western pharmaceutical companies. The positive news announced by US drug maker Pfizer and other companies have even strongly boosted the stock market. But the fact is vaccine progress made by American and Western companies is on the same level as that of Chinese companies. But the vaccines of the two sides have been treated completely different by American and Western public opinion. The research and development of Chinese vaccines is progressing very fast, and China has five COVID-19 vaccine candidates in Phase 3 clinical trials. The problem is that China has generally controlled the epidemic, thus, the country lacks conditions for Phase 3 clinical trials. The trials must be carried out in foreign countries with severe epidemic situations, which requires additional coordination and has caused a delay. Due to the urgency of the epidemic, all countries have accelerated the pace of research and development, as well as the progress of putting vaccines into practical use. Under normal circumstances, it takes several years for a vaccine to be fully developed. But some American companies are already applying for the vaccine's commercialization. While ensuring there are no side effects, China has also expanded the scope of urgent use of vaccines among medical staff and other susceptible people. Some US public opinion institutions have supported the accelerated use of domestic vaccines, and the capital market has enthusiastically embraced such acceleration. All of these have formed a "deification movement" around American vaccines. But they have shown a completely different attitude toward Chinese vaccines. They said China's vaccinating of some susceptible people shows its "irresponsibility" because it may risk their safety. They have also deliberately related the expansion of vaccination with the fact that Chinese companies have not yet announced data of Phase 3 clinical trials, using a "montage" to create the impression that China is deliberately using substandard vaccines. Will China disregard the health and lives of the general public for profit? How dare the American and Western public opinion institutions spread such doubts. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19, China has carried out the most resolute campaign of suppressing the virus and has saved many lives. However, the US fight against the epidemic has been dismantled by various interests. The Trump administration has preferred to protect the stock market rather than people's lives. We suspect that American pharmaceutical companies, public opinion institutions and the stock market have links with politicians because they have also been driven by interests. Attacking Chinese vaccines enhances such interests. It is the call of the common interests of mankind that China's vaccine will accelerate its success and play an important role in the new stage of global prevention and control. Beijing has repeatedly announced that China will make its vaccines a global public product. This is of great significance for ensuring the global supply of vaccines and preventing one or two Western vaccines from seeking a monopoly. Vaccines must be affordable for people in all countries. China's vaccines are an important force to ensure fairness in the next stage of pandemic prevention.

No matter how good the vaccine is, it is impractical to use it alone to subdue the highly contagious COVID-19. With its organization, China has won the key battle in containing the epidemic, and we have done the best in the world. There is no way China will fall behind in vaccine research. Those who badmouth China's vaccines will eventually become the laughing stock again.

The so-called US-Taiwan version of the BRI is a pseudo-concept. Indeed, the US has reached agreements with 17 countries and regions to expand partnerships on infrastructure investment in third countries, trying to act against the BRI. However, the plan is more of a political move than an economic one, because it lacks funds. Second, it is a plan designed to counter the BRI, rather than a plan based on market demand. It is completely a political hype. Whether it is the US or Taiwan, they are very unlikely to really pay to improve infrastructure or connectivity in Latin America or anywhere else. Taiwan is not the only one that has reached such an agreement with the US. Stressing the "US-Taiwan version" is in itself a hype. Neither the US nor Taiwan has any real intention to invest in a "belt and road." Their hype is intended to serve political purposes. For the US and Taiwan, it is not important to increase connectivity, but to enhance their political ties. This is their real political purpose, not cooperation on an economic project. Su said that the US and Taiwan's plan stipulates the use of capital raised from the private sector to "ensure greater transparency." There is no basis for this, because most private sector players will not invest for the US and Taiwan's political purpose. Because their so-called plan is essentially a political project, not an economic one, will the private sector invest in the plan for the sake of politics, not market? Since their plan is a political project and not based on the laws of the market economy, some of its goals are opaque. When the so-called transparency includes political goals, it becomes like a castle in the air and would make no sense. The US and Taiwan's act will not have any substantial impact on the BRI, because their plan is not a substantial economic plan at all. But it aims to improve the so-called US-Taiwan official relations. This is the crux of the problem. China should now adopt an independent approach to Taiwan secessionists. Concentrating on doing its own things well is the most important task in fundamentally cracking down on Taiwan secessionist forces. If China takes countermeasures on every outrageous step of the US and Taiwan, then it may lose sight of its major task - to increase its own strength. If China does not handle its own things well, then it will not have strength to achieve reunification. This is a long-term struggle. Joe Biden is about to assume office. But it is American politicians' common practice to contain China's rise and split China. In other words, almost no American politician wants to see peace in China. Therefore, no matter who comes to power in the US, increasing the mainland's strength to fight against Taiwan secessionists will be an eternal theme. But it's worth noting that compared with Donald Trump, a non-establishment and non-traditional politician, Biden will not act so madly on the Taiwan question. However, hindering cross-Straits peaceful communication and reunification will always be a US strategy. The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Li Qingqing based on an interview with Yang Xiyu, a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies.

As president-elect, Joe Biden formally introduced a national security team on Tuesday, as talks of repudiating Trump's populist "America First" foreign policy are on the rise. Why not? The four years of the scathing America First foreign policy have alienated America's allies around the world, leaving the US friendless on the world stage. The country no longer has an image of being benign and compassionate. What's more, Donald Trump's zero-sum thinking, brinkmanship-style trade war, and bully-diplomacy approach to China-US relations nearly threw the entire world into a new Cold War. Many countries felt as if Washington was forcing them to take side - and no one wanted this. It may be true that Trump's America First foreign policy and strongman approach may have earned the US some material benefits by making allies pay more or give it greater foreign market access. One might say the US is now feared more than ever. But this came at the complete expense of its soft power and the good will of the world over. Against this backdrop, Biden has made his disgust with Trump's America First foreign policy well known. Just days before the election, he said, "Tragically, the one place Donald Trump has made 'America First' is his failed response to the coronavirus." He added, "On top of Trump embracing the world's autocrats and poking his finger in the eye of our democratic allies, that's another reason respect for American leadership is in free fall." Biden vowed he will return to the Paris climate accord, rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, come back to WHO, and resume US leadership on the world stage. He also made it clear that his administration will resume goodwill and repair tattered transatlantic ties and relations with US allies as a top foreign policy priority. His nominations suggest so: Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield are all veteran diplomatic or security officials with liberal internationalist bents. His national security team illustrates his seriousness in breaking with Trump's turbulent and nationalist foreign policy and trying to "return to normal." The only question to ask is: Can Biden pull it off? So far, a Biden administration has to climb over at least three obstacles to jettison Trump's America First foreign policy. The first obstacle is the changed domestic landscape that was fired up by Trump's unapologetic America First policy. Biden admits that after four years of Trump presidency, the political landscape in the US has changed a lot, and it's on longer business as usual. Despite its obvious narrowness and shallowness, America First has considerable strong domestic support, especially with the working class people in the Rust Belt, the Middle West and the South. The more than 74 million votes Trump harvested in the election is a reminder that any attempt to sweep away Trump's legacy may meet considerable opposition and resistance in the near term, going into the 2022 mid-term elections, and the next presidential cycle in 2024. The second obstacle is the conservative Republicans, especially those in the Congress. In addition to Trump's more than 74 million votes, congressional Republicans also gained in the House and have a 50-48 advantage over the Democrats in the Senate at present. Everyone is waiting for the January 5 runoff election in Georgia to see who will capture the Senate. Still, many of these Republicans moved in lockstep with Trump over the past four years. They will fight hard against any attempt to throw away Trump's foreign policy legacy. As an early indication over what may come from Republican opposition to Biden's foreign policy agenda, Senator Rubio, who sits on both the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees, has called Biden's national security team, "polite & orderly caretakers of America's decline." The third obstacle will be to what extent Biden's international approach really strips away Trump's America First flavor and convinces domestic and international audiences that it's a viable alternative. During the campaign, Biden declared that he would pursue a foreign policy for the middle class. If implemented, he will defend the US middle class by making sure they have good-paying jobs and overall wellbeing. He also mentioned that the US will not seek endless foreign wars and the first priority is to get its own house in order by fighting the pandemic and restoring the economy. Those insinuations are not at all internationalist per se. They carry a strong dose of nationalism. In this case, how can Biden convince allies abroad and liberal internationalists at home that his foreign policy will really jettison Trump's legacy? Or will this merely be a sugar coating for further heavy-handed American interventionism in other countries' domestic affairs? The author is professor of Center for American Studies, Fudan University

So how will the new team play the "leadership role" that they have been anticipating? Will it continue Donald Trump's US-China confrontation? Or will it push for a broad participatory framework for managing differences? These are clearly two different paths. There are two geographical concepts to describe Asia and the Pacific: "Asia-Pacific" and "Indo-Pacific." The term "Asia-Pacific" was widely used before the Trump administration. But after Trump took office, the use of "Indo-Pacific" replaced it. Both terms are currently imbued with political meanings, but there are subtle differences. The "Asia-Pacific" involves economic and cooperative connotations, while the term "Indo-Pacific" is directly associated with geopolitical competition and alliance confrontation. The two concepts were both mentioned by different US administrations. The Obama administration coined the new term: rebalance to Asia-Pacific, a strategy that targets China, as he noted in his latest presidential memoir. The TPP that he initiated is also a key part of this rebalance to Asia-Pacific strategy. However, the largest pillar of the idea of Asia-Pacific concept is still APEC, which holds annual summit and talks about cooperation and openness. It largely balances US geopolitical maneuvers in the region. Therefore, people can feel more the constructive side about the "Asia-Pacific" concept. By contrast, the term of "Indo-Pacific" has been very rudely transformed from a geographical into a geopolitical concept by the Trump administration. Though the term is often put after an adjective of "free and open," it is mostly used for China-targeted issues. The backbone of the Indo-Pacific concept is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, India and Australia. Whenever they hold meetings or conduct military exercises, all media reports relate the events to China. There is no economic cooperation organization corresponding to "Indo-Pacific," but only the military exercises and intelligence cooperation agreements that have played a role among the four countries. Taiwan authorities have repeatedly vowed to become part of the "Indo-Pacific strategy," showing naked antagonistic ambitions. By forcibly replacing the term "Asia-Pacific" with the term "Indo-Pacific" over the past few years, Washington has sought to divide the region, promote an anti-China alliance, and create a geopolitical climate in which all countries in the region must take sides. Except for a few forces willing to follow the US in order to increase their regional presence, most countries are very resistant to the pressure to take sides. They do not want to see the situation in the region evolve like this. Moreover, the "Indo-Pacific strategy" actually has not benefited the US. The vast majority of Asia-Pacific countries have no interest in becoming "Indo-Pacific countries." They perfunctorily respond to US' attempt to form cliques, and meanwhile try to get some benefits from the US in return. India is the US' main target to woo. But New Delhi's attitude toward China depends more on the situation of the two countries' border conflict - and not fudged US promises. The Biden team should abandon Trump's reckless pursuit of the Indo-Pacific strategy, which runs counter to regional realities. They also should stop stirring up the region with the concept of the Indo-Pacific. After all, it lacks the support of economic cooperation and merely promotes confrontation. A binary system in the Asia-Pacific region between China and the US is certainly not welcome and will encounter opposition and barriers. That is not what the Washington elites want to see. The Asia-Pacific region embodies cooperation and competition. Simply defining China as a rival and focusing strategic attention on containing China will only cause long-term costs to the US itself. Washington needs to engage in serious strategic communication with Beijing. The two need to explore and create an unprecedented win-win situation for both countries. Dialogues of this nature will produce far better long-term outcomes for both countries - unlike the current confrontation. It is a historic responsibility for the Biden administration to do this. By doing so, both China and US will reap rich rewards. So will the rest of humanity.

 

Since US President Donald Trump took office, he has been adhering to the "America First" doctrine. This has seen him launch trade wars against other countries including US allies, and pull the US out of international organizations and treaties. His foreign policies are defined by strong unilateral characteristics, having dealt a heavy blow to US diplomacy and its international image.

As a leading figure of neoconservatism, Robert Kagan, senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, has fiercely criticized the Trump administration's diplomatic policies, especially its attacks on US allies and democratic values. Kagan described the US under Trump as a "rogue superpower." According to a 13-nation Pew Research Center research report released this September, "Since Donald Trump took office as president, the image of the United States has suffered across many regions of the globe." In the UK and Japan, which are loyal allies to Washington, ratings for the US are at record 20 year lows. Clearly over the past few years, the "America First" policy has turned into an "America isolated" reality. Particularly, the Trump administration has deepened the cracks in transatlantic relations and thus triggered an endogenous crisis in the liberal international order. As Richard N. Haass, president of Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in his article titled Liberal World Order, R.I.P., "the weakening of the liberal world order is due, more than anything else, to the changed attitude of the US." Joe Biden, once served as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is now seeking to restore US' global leadership as the president-elect. He wants to repair the damage the Trump administration has done to US' international reputation and undo the negative effects of "Trumpism." It will not be easy, however, for him to make the US return to its past path of upholding the "liberal international order." The incoming administration might not directly usher in a new "Biden era" soon, but will instead have to manage a messy continuation of the "post-Trump era." "Trumpism without Trump" will continue to exert an important influence on American foreign policy. In the 2020 presidential election, Trump has been defeated, but he still won more than 72 million general votes. This indicates that domestic and foreign policies of Trump are supported by a large proportion of the American people. The so-called "America First" guideline has had a profound impact on the society. Moreover, the "Trump Doctrine" has also left a deep imprint on US diplomacy. Biden also will now have to face off with "progressive" forces in the Democratic Party, represented by Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, who do not want US foreign policy to return to the path characterized by free trade, foreign intervention and so on. In fact, a new generation of Democrats, such as Jack Sullivan, who is among Biden's main foreign policy team, have also undergone a profound shift in their view of international affairs and US foreign strategy. They do not favor a simple return to the "liberal international order." Fundamentally, the crisis of the liberal international order is closely related to profound challenges arising from domestic disharmony that has arisen in the US and Western countries. The deep divisions in US society in relation to political parties, ethnicity, and class will be difficult to heal in the future. Thomas Carothers, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the 2020 US presidential election, "brought to a brutal head how politically polarized the US is." He predicted, "more polarization ahead." Washington's top priority is to tackle the inequality at home, rather than return to the so-called liberal international order. Daron Acemoglu, Institute Professor at MIT, echoed this sentiment saying, "Median wages have been stagnant for about 40 years, and the real earnings of many groups, especially men with low educational levels, have fallen precipitously." The US under Biden may have to discard nostalgia for the prior liberal international order. The core of the liberal international order has been gravely undermined. It will be difficult for the incoming Biden administration to eliminate illiberal populism in the US. Other Western countries seem incapable of achieving this as well. The author is a senior research fellow at the Charhar Institute and an adjunct fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China

It is often said that politics these days is all about giving signals. If that is the case, China has recently given two potent signals that bear on the future of world trade and globalization.

On November 15, it signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 14 countries after eight years of talks. Encompassing a population of 2.2 billion people and a GDP of 29 percent of the world economy, RCEP can well be considered the largest such trade deal that has ever been signed. Also, at the virtual APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur, President Xi Jinping announced China's interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), often referred to as the TPP11, which includes six members of the RCEP, plus a number of countries in the Americas. President Trump, of course, famously ditched the TPP in January of 2017, in one of the first acts of his administration. More recently, he also snubbed both the virtual ASEAN meetings (whose 10 members are part of the RCEP) and East Asia Summits to which he had been invited. The signals could not be clearer: While China presses ahead with Asia's regional integration, the US is otherwise engaged. The very fact that the three economic heavyweights of East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) have joined such an economic group despite their ongoing differences is historical. The same goes for having Australia (and New Zealand) within the RCEP. Asia and Australasia are moving ahead with regional economic integration, while the North Atlantic countries continue to wallow in protectionism and arcane disputes about how to finalize Brexit. The latter has consumed by now four years of the European Union and the United Kingdom's attention, and shows no sign of coming to an end soon. From a broader perspective, the fact that India at the last moment decided to drop out of the RCEP is also revealing. For the past three years we have been peddled the story that the very notion of the Asia-Pacific (on which entities like APEC were founded, as the Cold War ended) was obsolete, and should be replaced by that of the Indo-Pacific. The latter was in many ways the maritime response to China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All sorts of figures in terms of cargo crossing the Indian Ocean and reaching the Pacific were bandied about as part of this sales job. The jewel in the crown of all this was the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, also known as the QUAD), that includes the US, Japan, India and Australia, whose foreign ministers met on October 6 in Tokyo with much fanfare. Hailed by some as the equivalent of an "Asian NATO" in the making, the QUAD has been built up as a major shift in the region's architecture. By definition, India is at the very center of this construct, and must play a key role in it. There were high expectations that India would take up this role with great brio and impetus. Yet, you can't really have at the center of any such construct a country that marginalizes itself from the broader Asian regional integration project. This confirms, de facto, the continuing validity of the notion of the Asia-Pacific as the region where the action is, and the reality that South Asia is not yet ready to join it ( much as India refused to join APEC in 1990, when invited to do so; neither is India part of the CPTPP). Yes, there is something to the idea of the Indo-Pacific, but it will be a long time before it comes into being as a geopolitical and geo-economic entity. Right now, it is mere wishful thinking. We are thus witnessing the return, in full regalia, of the Asia Pacific to the center of world affairs. If China were to join the TPP11, and we could look at the possibility of a merger between the RCEP and the TPP11, that would be a real game-changer. It would certainly move us further along to what Kishore Mahbubani has referred to as the Asian Century. As President-elect Joe Biden assembles his foreign policy and national security team, there is much talk of reviving alliances and multilateralism. There is little doubt that the single most important step he could take in that regard after taking office would be to join the CPTPP, whose earlier version as TPP the US spent close to a decade negotiating and promoting. Yet, it tells you much about the climate in today's Washington, that most observers consider that only a far-fetched possibility. The action in today's world is in the Asia-Pacific, but on the shores of the Potomac the eyes are firmly fixated on things such as the spat between France and Germany on the meaning of European "strategic autonomy." Good luck with that ! The author is a professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, a Wilson Center global fellow and a non-resident senior research fellow at the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) in Beijing. 

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has said that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) started with a vision of connectivity and openness. In his virtual address at the Country Strategy Dialogue on Pakistan organized by World Economic Forum on Wednesday, the prime minister said that through enhanced road connectivity under CPEC, distances within his country have shrunk, and the planned modernization of railway lines in the next phase of CPEC is expected to help connect the region. "Pakistan's special strategic location connects it to the world's biggest markets, as well as the energy corridor. So we are really very well placed and CPEC is a great opportunity for us to move forward from here." The prime minister said that at the second phase of CPEC, the scope of the project has been extended to industrialization, digitalization and agricultural development. CPEC, a corridor linking the Gwadar port in southwestern Pakistan with Kashgar in northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, highlights energy, transport and industrial cooperation.

After China officially acknowledged Joe Biden's win, the world's attention has turned to the interactions between China and the Biden administration, and where the interactions will lead China-US ties to. Are China and the US falling into the "Thucydides's Trap" during Biden's term, with the worst scenario of outbreak of war, or will the two countries reset their relations? While some Chinese and international scholars agreed that the competition will still remain the theme of the bilateral relationship, there will be new mode of interactions, which can be defined as either "cooperative competition," "managed competition" or "bounded rivalry." Biden's campaign team said that they appreciated the congratulations of President Xi Jinping, after Xi on Wednesday congratulated Biden on his win in the US presidential election, the Hill reported. The interaction between the world's two largest economies came when China-US relations have changed from being one filled with twists and turns to one that has plunged into a complete free fall during Donald Trump's presidency. Some Western media have been calling for a new China policy for Biden who called China a "serious competitor" and believe the US needs to get tough with China. Other American media, citing scholars, said there was little chance of the bilateral ties returning to Obama-era levels of engagement as they believe China, now strong enough to threaten the US and its allies, is a different China than the one the Obama administration ever faced. Against this backdrop, a term has been cited more frequently among international political and academic circles - the Thucydides's Trap, coined by Graham T. Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, which describes a deadly pattern of structural stress, in which a war is likely to occur when a rising power challenges a ruling one, similar to the Athens-Sparta war. In a recent interview with the Global Times, Allison reiterated his theory, articulating China is a "genuine Thucydidean rival" of the US, as "its rise is rapidly shifting the tectonics of power - threatening not only the influence but the very identity of a nation that has led the world for an American Century." Exactly because of this changing dynamics, as Martin Jacques, former senior fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies at Cambridge University, put it, "the declining power - the US - seeks to hold on to its 'exorbitant privilege' as the dominant power and therefore resists the challenge of the rising power" - the term has become growingly eye-catching, noted experts. Cui Liru, senior fellow of the Taihe Institute and former president of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the Global Times on Thursday that such change is fundamental and structural. "Compared to several years ago, when cooperation played a leading role in China-US ties, competition has now dominated the relationship, a strategic competition between the two has already been formed," Cui said. And he added such a trend will unlikely be reversed during Biden's presidency. As experts share the consensus that China-US ties are developing into a Thucydidean dynamic, some said there is still a chance for China and the US to avoid falling into the trap. Yang Xiyu, a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, told the Global Times on Thursday that the Biden administration will provide a temporary stable period for bilateral ties, although uncertainties remained. He said that if Biden works with China to properly manage disputes while focusing on cooperation, such as on climate change, public health and economic development, such positive interactions will lead the bilateral ties to a predictable stable period so that the Thucydides's Trap could be avoided. "China has no intent to jump into the Thucydides's Trap, and neither does Biden," said Yang. Some analysts also said relations between the two powers are more complicated than the "Thucydidean" narrative. They stressed that if taking globalization, coordinative joint works of the two over the past decades and their intertwined interests into consideration, they will almost certainly avoid direct confrontation. It is true that the rise and fall of powers is accompanied, as a rule, by serious tensions and conflict. But that does not mean war is inevitable, Jacques told Global Times on Thursday. "The idea that two nuclear armed superpowers will fight like Athens and Sparta is silly, even as a metaphor," Amitav Acharya, distinguished professor of International Relations at American University, told Global Times on Thursday.

Direction of future tiesTrump seems to be determined to lock China-US ties in a new cold war in the final weeks of his presidency, but this won't be Biden's approach, experts said. Yang said that Biden would find ways to reset Beijing-Washington ties, after US interests have been seriously undermined under Trump's China policy. Yang believes China and the US under the Biden administration are trying to define bilateral relations to non-cold war relations, although the road will be bumpy. "It was not China that broke with the previous policy, it was the US. So the US is thinking about what its new attitude toward China should be," said Jacques. Unlike Trump and most of his consultants, who are treating China as a "foe" or an "adversary," Biden sees China as a "serious competitor." This is quite different, noted Cui, adding this would result in different US approaches when interacting with China. Shi Yinhong, director of Renmin University of China's Center for American Studies, said US trade ties with China will likely be improved, progress will take place in diplomatic and military dialogues between the two sides to prevent a possible crisis, and in principle, Beijing and Washington might be more jointly dedicated to multilateralism and global governance. "But we should be cautious," Shi told the Global Times, adding given the overall US attitude toward China, among policymakers and ordinary people, as well as the structural changes between the two countries and on the global arena, "there is no reason to look to China-US relations optimistically," especially on human rights, the South China Sea, Taiwan question, and high-tech competition. "Biden is a very weak president. He may be softer toward China but any fundamental change is very unlikely," warned Jacques. He explained that the shift in US policy toward China had deep roots and was bipartisan. It involved a fundamental reconsideration and rejection of the assumptions behind the engagement strategy, and "Trump built powerful support for his anti-China policy… The present US attitude toward China is the new norm. We should assume it will last a long time," Jacques noted. Fu Ying, former Chinese vice foreign minister, published an article in The New York Times on Tuesday titled, "Cooperative Competition Is Possible Between China and the US," proposing a way forward for the world's two leading powers. Cooperative competition is not necessarily a new concept, Cui said, but the timing of the publication - after Americans had elected their new president - the article is sending a message. "Beijing and Washington should prevent their ties from deteriorating further toward a confrontation neither side wants to see," Cui remarked. The weight of the message can be found in a separate New York Times article, explaining "why we published an Op-Ed by a Chinese official," written by one of the media outlet's editorial page editor, Kathleen Kingsbury. She stressed, "Ms. Fu is… much more important than her titles convey," and "is setting out the terms under which her government plans to work with a new Biden administration." Although most observers agree that future ties between China and the US will still be dominated by competition, they are finding new ways to describe China-US ties under Biden. Acharya told Global Times he would use the term "managed competition" or "bounded rivalry," rather than Thucydides's Trap, to describe future ties between China and the US, meaning rivalry or competition that will not go out of hand, to become war.

Some analysts have even called for the US to take countermeasures to protect its national interests and space security, claiming that China's increasing speed in space development has threatened international space security. Such voices show a Cold War mentality of the US and its long-standing prejudice against China. For a long time, the West has been deliberately targeting China, regarding China's space development as a security threat without any basis, but recognizing and encouraging the space development of other countries. This is an unreasonable and deliberate smear on China similar to the space hegemony competition between the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. But China is not interested in engaging in any kind of Cold War in space. China believes that space is vast enough to allow all the countries with the capability and power to make use of such space resources. All of China's space exploration programs are open and transparent and are solely for the peaceful use of space resources. China develops such projects on its own to upgrade the country's scientific and technological level and its ability to explore space. China is also willing to share with scientists around the world the related technology and results. The way China explores space is peaceful and does not involve any aggressive or military elements. In fact, it is not China that has militarized space, but the US. The US' ambitions for space hegemony are much too obvious. The US has created a space force, deliberately targeting other countries' space assets. In particular, US satellites have the capability of deterrence and attack. The country has clear military purposes. In October, NASA announced bringing seven countries into its Artemis Accords, an agreement to explore the moon and Mars together. Some believe this is the US space version of the "enclosure movement." The US wants to build space hegemony. The Artemis program is like building a small base above the moon which can be landed on at any time. This is the US plan to return to the moon and better control the moon. The US hopes to transform its scientific research capabilities in space into major military strength. Some of NASA's projects and technologies may be shared with the US space force. Many private companies may even participate in them. One reason why the US is hyping China's intention to replace US dominance in space is that the US is jealous of China's accomplishments. Another possible reason is that US arms dealers are pushing the hype to make more money. US space exploration programs have been advancing at a slow pace, while China has been moving faster and steadier and achieving a lot of success. In addition, the establishment of the US space force has opened a whole new market for US arms dealers, who intend to sell space warfare-related weapons to the US space force. So they are deliberately setting up an image of China as an "imaginary enemy," putting a "danger" sign on it to create the false impression that the US and China are competing for supremacy in space. This will scare the Pentagon and the American public, and create a sense of fear, which may in turn lead the US space force to purchase more offensive warfare-related space weapons. It is inevitable that there will be competition among major powers in the development of the space domain, but China will not participate in the Cold War-like competition initiated by the US. China is entering and exploring space solely for peaceful purposes. Instead, the US should reverse its selfishness, exclusivism and hegemony, and adopt a more tolerant mind-set in space technology cooperation, actively promoting international cooperation, not fighting with swords and guns in space, using its space forces and targeting other countries' space assets, especially satellite systems, for deterrence. Fundamentally, the US should abandon its hegemonic mentality. Otherwise, such unilateralism in space affairs will cause harm to its image, and the US' future promotion of cooperation in space will draw more suspicions and questions. The author is a Beijing-based military analyst. 

Given the Trump administration's insistence on the "America First" doctrine and isolationist practices of withdrawing from various international groups and treaties, there will be many ways for Biden to restore US global leadership. It will also not be very difficult for the US and Europe to create a more harmonious atmosphere than the Trump era. But the Biden team must answer one question: What do they want to "lead the world" for? If the Biden team wants to strengthen the US' rule on the world and unite allies against China by reinforcing foreign relations, especially ties with allies to consolidate the US hegemony, they will greatly deviate from international trends. What they will be doing will simply be just a replica of the "America First" ploy. To play a leading role, the Biden team must first help the world resolve real problems. It should prioritize urgent issues concerning international society instead of luring the world to address what America needs most. Leaders must make more contributions and promote public welfare, rather than bring everyone together for selfish private interests.

Besides curbing the pandemic, another overwhelming common desire of all countries around the world is to realize better development. As the risk of war has been greatly reduced amid global opposition against force, development has become a more urgent issue than security for many countries. The US needs to help other countries create better development conditions, and serve as a driving force. It should not stir up geopolitical conflicts everywhere and force security confrontations that could be avoided. The US also needs to resume its support for globalization. It should consult with other countries about the rules of globalization and not arrogantly place its own interests above the common interests of the world. Globalization has led to complicated and close entanglements related to national and international interests. The US can only "lead the world" to move forward based on the integration of the interests of all countries, not to pull back globalization through subversive tearing.. Biden's team will be litmus test judged based on how constructive they are with the China-US competition. China-US relations concern the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world. Major US allies all have extensive cooperation with China. If China-US relations don't further fragment, they will have room to defend their own national interests. Strengthening alliances with the US does not mean they have to cut off cooperation with China. A majority of countries don't want the world to slip into a new cold war. The Biden team needs to face up to the international situation — it's not the same as a few decades ago. The US will have to explore new ways to manage differences, seek coexistence, and win-win strategies with countries including China and Russia. It needs to avoid recklessly intensifying major power confrontation as the Trump administration did. America needs to realize that it has to build up a bottom line for world peace, making all countries feel assured. In other words, a greater US role in the world should bring more peace and predictability. It should avoid making further turbulence and strategic confrontations with the world. Only by that, can the US' propositions be more accepted. The US often accuses China of trying to replace the US' dominance in rulemaking. China has never had such a zero-sum mind-set. With the expansion of China's economy, it is China's inalienable right to participate in rule making with other countries. The process of formulating rules cannot be exclusive. No matter how it might be done, efforts to isolate a large society and economy like China are doomed to be futile.  

Following news of US president-elect Joe Biden's choice of Antony Blinken as the secretary of state, Indian media hailed the nomination. Blinken is a long-time foreign policy expert who advocates close ties with New Delhi. In fact, certain sectors of India are elated because they think this means bad news for China.   In reality, this shows that India is very uncertain about its relations with the US when the new administration comes into office.India has faced great challenges with its domestic and foreign affairs in recent years and openly participated in egregious actions, including devoting itself fully to the so-called Indo-Pacific Strategy, conducting the Malabar military exercise, and creating major issues with China. New Delhi thought it could form a so-called alliance with the US. But now it has to face a new US government whose China policy may be restarted with amicable accords. This is indeed incredible pressure for India. While Blinken showed some of his ideas about the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy during his term as deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, it is groundless for India to think that India's status can get promoted in the Indo-Pacific region based on a belief that Blinken will regard India as an important part of US' new strategy in the region. It is true that US' emphasis on India increased during the Obama years. But it only increased minimally, and produced nothing extraordinary. Apart from Obama's endorsement of India for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, there is not much else to note.  Although Obama's support was largely appreciated by India, it was more like a gesture of the US government that won't make any substantial difference to reality. In fact, the Americans do not like anyone to serve on the permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By hyping up Blinken's nomination, Indian politicians and pundits only show how worried they are that US-India relations will become unstable once Biden assumes office. India is now fully betting on the US. So it will be awkward for India if it doesn't get much benefit now. India, of course, will be flexible to deal with such a situation. If US-India relations do not make enough progress as expected under Biden, then New Delhi is also likely to reverse course and re-establish better relations with China. The US' policy toward India has been consistent over the past 20 years. Since Bill Clinton's official visit to India in 2000, India has long been regarded as a reliable partner of the US. It has also been considered as a card to restrain China. This is a consensus between both countries. So there won't be much change even after Biden takes office. This Washington consensus is welcome in New Delhi. Still, India will try to strike a balance among multiple powers and hope not to offend anyone too much. New Delhi is aware that getting too close to Washington will potentially offend both Beijing and Moscow. That is why India kept its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and yet participated in the US indo-Pacific strategy. However, due to deteriorating China-India relations this year, New Delhi has quickly become closer to Washington. This will truly test its foreign policy. If it sees China as an enemy, then it needs a bigger backer. Whether the US will still be the key supporter remains a question that New Delhi actively thinks about. After all, India knows its influence in the global community is very limited and its contributions to the US are slight. For a long time after the Cold War, India had no place at all in US foreign policy. For the US, India's major role today is to rival China. It will be of no importance to the US whatsoever if this role diminishes. The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Xu Hailin based on an interview with Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies.

 China's Foreign Ministry called India's recent ban on 43 Chinese apps a clear violation of market principles and WTO regulations, and urged Indian government to reconsider the discriminatory move before it does even more damage to bilateral cooperation. According to Zhao Lijian, spokesperson of China's Foreign Ministry on Wednesday, India has taken prohibitive measures against Chinese apps on four occasions since June this year. The actions have severely damaged the legitimate rights of Chinese enterprises. The Chinese government always requires Chinese businesses operating overseas to comply with local laws and regulations, Zhao said. India banned 43 more smartphone apps on Tuesday including those linked to Chinese tech giant Alibaba, after New Delhi announced reforms to its foreign direct investment (FDI) regime. India has banned more than 170 Chinese apps, under the pretext of protecting its national security. The 43 apps, a majority of which are linked to Chinese developers include Alibaba's e-commerce app Aliexpress, AliSuppliers mobile app, Alibaba Workbench, Alipay Cashier and DingTalk, an enterprise communication and collaboration platform which has been popular during the COVID-19 pandemic. India's technology ministry justified the ban citing the "sovereignty and integrity of India." A spokesperson for the e-commerce app Aliexpress told the Global Times on Wednesday that the Indian market represents only a fraction of its international operations, and the ban has "limited impact" on its business, which covers 220 countries and regions across the world. The Chinese embassy in India reaffirmed China's opposition to India's ban on Chinese apps under a new national security law made public on Wednesday, calling for a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory business environment. There is no threat between India and China, both countries have a great opportunity to trade and access each other's markets, the embassy said, adding that the Chinese government's position was for both parties to return to negotiation and bring the bilateral relationship back on track.

The US General Services Administration informed Democratic candidate Joe Biden on Monday that the administration of US incumbent President Donald Trump is ready to begin the formal transition process.

This indicates that the US will commence to "correct" its policies of the past four years. The incoming Biden administration is expected to adopt a different course in comparison to the Trump administration. This includes seeking international cooperation in the battle against COVID-19 pandemic, returning to the Paris Agreement, and discussing the possibility of rejoining the Iran nuclear deal. We have witnessed the dramatic change of US policies during these turbulent years. Such changes have apparently undermined US national interests, and these cannot be completely healed by the upcoming adjustment. Even if the nails can be pulled out, the remaining holes in the wall will be hard to repair. Furthermore, it remains unclear what these new adjustments will mean in the long-run, and whether another round of dramatic changes will take place four years from now. The US tends to achieve a kind of balance by dramatic swing and confrontations. By contrast, continuity is the greatest strength of the Chinese political system. The two centennial goals were proposed decades ago and have been improving. China is the only country that has achieved a consistent and long-term national strategy. Avoiding making disruptive mistakes is something China must be determined to do. China's biggest supervisory power is bound to be self-generated within the Party, and how to make it highly effective is a challenge. For this reason, it is important for the Party and government to listen to the voice of the people and seek inspiration for self-reflection during the process of having frictions with others. In recent years, China has not closed its door in a rage during its conflict with the US. But it instead insisted on opening up wider to the outside world. It has taken a very mature attitude to fight against the external forces and meanwhile conduct self-reform. China's strong will and ability to improve itself has been fully demonstrated during the trade war and the anti-pandemic fight. The battle was challenging at the beginning but later achieved decisive results. This greatly enhanced the confidence of the Chinese people in the face of the complex international landscape. The ultimate focus of the game between the great powers is the competition in the institutional capacity. China will surely do better and keep its development speed faster than that of other great powers for a long time to come. The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times.

The US has long wielded enormous influence in Asia since it entered the Philippines through the Spanish-American War 122 years ago in 1898. Now, we must ask: Has its influence in the region decreased as its own power declines? What will happen to the regional architecture in Asia as America weakens? For the Biden administration, maintaining US hegemony remains the primary goal of its global strategy. This will ensure that US influence in Asia does not decline rapidly — which is of critical importance for Biden team. For the US to achieve such goals will not only depend on its own power, but also its relations with allies and partners in the region. This also involves its influence and authority with regional institutions.The strategic resource for US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region comes first from its own power. Economic power, in particular, is the fundamental source to support its foreign strategy. It also, to a large extent, determines the US government budget—especially the defense budget. The economy in the US has been severely hit by the pandemic, and it is uncertain whether it can maintain its strategic investment in Asia for some time to come. In addition, global strategic layout of the US will also affect its strategic resources in Asia. In global strategic layout of the US, there is a certain correlation between Asia and Europe as the country faces dilemmas stabilizing the West and moving into the East. Moreover, partnerships with Asia-Pacific allies are also important resources for the US. Under the Obama administration, the US tapped its "stock" of resources in the region, by strengthening ties with traditional allies and making "incremental" efforts to expand partnerships with others. The US has tried its best to coordinate all kinds of resources to compete with China in the region. By increasing its strategic resources, it can offset elements of its relative decline. It also intends to isolate China or restrict the expansion of China's influence in Asia. However, relatively speaking, uncertainties exist about how US' partnerships with its Asia-Pacific allies will support its regional strategy. The uncertainty depends on the allies' own strength and their relations. Also, US can affect institutions in Asia. The international system is characterized by "non-neutrality." Great powers tend to dominate and exploit the international institutions to serve their own national interests. Different from other prior hegemonic countries, US dominance is also called institutional hegemony. Control over international institutions has become a crucial pillar of US hegemony, and Asia is no exception. The incoming Biden administration is expected to return to multilaterialism, attaching more importance to international institutions. In general, US' impact on Asian regional institutions is most prominent in the domain of security, but relatively weaker in terms of politics and economics. Lastly, the US has established its authority in the region. Different from coercion, the ability to build authority over other countries rests on others' willingness rather than on persuasion or debate. After years' of attempts, Washington has established and accumulated some authority in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the US sometimes does not need to resort to its hard power to affect regional affairs, as it can be achieved merely by its authority. As a result, the US' relative decline has not significantly undermined its regional leadership. Even if its hard power continues to fall in the future, the US can still exert its influence by virtue of its long-standing authority in the Asia-Pacific region. China, the US, Japan, Russia, India and ASEAN are the main six forces that are influencing the configuration of power in Asia. China as a major regional country has enjoyed a geographical, historical and cultural edge here. With China's growing national strength and influence, it has played a greater role in shaping regional architecture and order. Japan also pays great attention to its own influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has a strong desire to seek Asian dominance driven by its pursuit to become a major country. For Russia, although Asia is not its strategic focus, Moscow is not willing to only be an onlooker given the increasing global strategic importance of Asia. Therefore, Russia has also been increasing its strategic input in Asia over the past few years. Because of the implementation of India's Act East policy and US' Indo-Pacific Strategy, India's influence in Asia has also increased. In addition to the five powers, ASEAN also plays a crucial role in the Asia-Pacific region. As a coalition of small and medium-sized countries, ASEAN's leading role in regional cooperation is very obvious. It has become one of the most important forces that have remodeled the Asia-Pacific region over the past 20 years. In conclusion, though the US is only on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region, it influences the regional configuration through multiple ways, including strengthening its alliances and expanding partnerships. It is conceivable that America will become relatively enfeebled in the future from internal disharmony. But its dominance over Asia is not going to wane any time soon. Nonetheless, America may find it more and more difficult to take charge of Asia. Looking ahead, Asia is more likely to enter a multi-polar era rather than a bipolar system of confrontation between China and the US — let alone a unipolar system in which China replaces America. The author is secretary-general of the International Security Study Center at China Foreign Affairs University.

US president-elect Joe Biden announced on Monday key figures for his cabinet, naming Antony Blinken as his secretary of state. The US General Services Administration office informed Biden on the same day that the administration of US incumbent President Donald Trump is ready to begin the formal transition process. Now, the US power shift and policy adjustment have become unstoppable.

Biden said fighting the raging COVID-19 pandemic will be the immediate priority of his new administration. He also said he would immediately return the US back to the Paris accord. He has promised to rejoin the Iran nuclear agreement if Tehran abides by the deal. These intentions to embrace multilateralism are worth welcoming. In terms of how to deal with China, Biden's team has not released much information after the election. Furthermore, what members of his team said reveals different tendencies. These can be interpreted in multiple ways. We believe, even though overall China-US ties have dramatically changed in comparison to four years ago, we cannot make any conclusions on the most important bilateral relations. However, there are many possibilities for the future. The key lies in how determined the Biden administration will be to make new commitments to multilateralism — hence demonstrating whether its stated desires to return to the international rules that were broken by the Trump administration will be real or merely empty rhetoric. In fact, can international relations shake off the current major shocks or not hinges on how China-US relations will proceed in the future. The US' relationship with its allies might be relatively easier to repair. After all, this nominally means balancing its interests and getting back to proper negotiation mechanisms and following general guidelines. Over the past four years, there have been no structural shocks to US-European relations, nor in US relations with its Asia-Pacific allies. The free-fall decline of China-US ties has affected the entire international relations system, however. This has harmed even technological advancements, such as 5G. Moreover, the reversal of the China-US relationship is not rooted to any major event between the two sides. That being said, subversive changes to Washington's principles and mind-set toward China have transpired. The core of the change is the unilateral mind-set of the "America First" policy. This mentality influences all US foreign policies. But China has become a focus of this US pressure. Europe came next. US' Asia-Pacific allies are forced to respond to the US in a submissive manner. The Biden administration needs to restore normal competition in China-US relations. Through communication and by discussing rules with China, it also needs to make sure that the two sides' competition stays under control. Biden's team has expressed the strategic idea of attaching more importance to strengthen the US' competitiveness. Hopefully, they are not just saying this as lip service, but will really lead the US' national strategy in this direction. That is the fundamental path to actually "make America great again." If this can materialize, it may greatly reduce international conflicts. Otherwise, should the Blinken-led State Department continue Pompeo's unprofessional and extremely ideological China policy, the US' foreign policy will be restricted by the previous ruling team's political legacy. The world will continue to be split by the gap between China and the US. Other countries will be forced to become more deeply involved in a China-US conflict— but in new ways. One day the US will experience another transition of power, and this incoming Democratic government will discover that their adjustments were only done in vain. There are not many direct conflicts between China and the US. It's also not difficult for the two countries to establish effective management mechanisms to control problems. The US is unable to thwart China's development. Such US attempt is not only vicious political tricks, but also lacks the moral ground from the perspective of human rights. Most importantly, it's unrealistic at all, and faces many risks. The US' China policy will have a much broader room if Washington drops its crazy calculations to contain China's development. Take a look at several things that Biden really hopes to do, including pandemic control and climate change, to name a few. Regarding these issues, China is a partner that the US cannot circumvent. This reflects the true nature of China-US relations. Even if the US wants to improve its competitiveness, it cannot see China as an enemy. We think this point might be key for the Biden administration to make a difference: facing China-US relations with a pragmatic attitude. Time will prove this.

Human beings are encountering the gravest economic crisis and the deadliest life crisis since the end of WWII. To make matters worse, the strategic distrust between great powers has hit the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. Most Western media outlets have been deeply impacted by US President Donald Trump. While they typically make reports full of complaints, scold, and pass the buck, they seldom create feasible global solutions to the above-mentioned problems.

From this perspective, the meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and G20 which just concluded have become vital. The global battle against the COVID-19 pandemic has become protracted. Addresses by global leaders signal how the world's most powerful politicians are thinking about the future. I recommend all audiences to consider Chinese President Xi Jinping's speeches, whose pragmatic proposals have again been neglected by the Western media. First, China has called for international cooperation in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic based on the mutual recognition of health certificates and sharing vaccines. China has proposed a global mechanism on the mutual recognition of health certificates based on nucleic acid test results in the form of internationally accepted QR codes. This will facilitate the orderly flow of personnel, ensure the flow of goods, and restore the secure and smooth operation of global industrial and supply chains. China has formally launched a fast-lane arrangement with Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea to facilitate personnel exchanges. When many countries are closing or partially closing their borders, the highest priority is to restore mobility. China has joined and promoted COVAX, a global platform that supports the research and development, as well as manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccine candidates. China will strengthen vaccine cooperation with relevant countries through the COVAX program and it honors its commitment to putting out COVID-19 vaccines for the global public good. Secondly, China wants to promote the development of a contact-free economy like online shopping, online education and telemedicine. COVID-19 has fueled the digital economy boom. Of course, digitalization also involves many challenges. China proposed the Global Initiative on Data Security, held international conferences on artificial intelligence, promoted rules and regulations on global digital governance, explored criteria and principles of digital currency, and has made efforts to fully implement the APEC internet and digital economy roadmap. It also initiated prospects to host a workshop on digital technology-enabled poverty alleviation. As a leading country in the digital economy, China did not hesitate to share its digital development experience with other countries. Third, China keeps supporting developing countries, and will increase the level of debt suspension and relief for countries facing particular difficulties. People living in poverty in the poorest countries have been hit the hardest by the pandemic. Few global powers are as pragmatic as China in considering assistance to developing countries. China itself is also facing its most difficult internal and external development environment in 30 years. But the country has still made efforts to put off debt repayment totaling over $1.3 billion, encouraged financial institutions to provide additional financing, and proposed convening a global conference on reducing food losses. It has also proposed a 2025 Global Summit of Women to address the global food crisis and women's difficulties. The fourth consideration is to enhance the response to the global pandemic based on biodiversity conservation. China proposes to further reduce the production and use of non-essential disposable plastic products, calls for a complete ban on the illegal trade of wildlife, and the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Historical experience has shown that pandemics stem mostly from an imbalance in the relationship between humans and nature. It is urgent to build a clean and beautiful world together and realize the harmonious coexistence of human and nature. Finally, China calls for strengthening global governance with the UN at its core and consolidating rules for economic globalization based on the multilateral trading system. As I argued in my previous article that global governance is in shock. The post-pandemic international system needs reform, including the WTO and the international financial system. The voice and the representation of developing countries should be enlarged and the role of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRS) should be expanded. But the reforms do not mean everything will be overthrown and rebuilt. Rather, it means a recovery of the previous authority and status of the UN, and a promotion of the free trade that has driven economic globalization for a long time. China has never wanted to overturn the current international system. Instead, it wants to move toward a more open, inclusive, balanced and win-win direction. China has opened up wider than the Western media has imagined. China hopes that the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) will be established at an early date. After the conclusion of the RCEP agreement, China will actively consider joining the CPTPP. Under movements for protectionism and de-globalization that seriously trouble the world today, China's policy of opening up is undoubtedly an antidote to the shock of globalization. It is also a catalyst for international cooperation, and a strong boost to world confidence. The world war against COVID-19 has been raging for 11 months. In some countries, the second wave is even more severe than the first one. Vaccine development is far from keeping pace with the virus spread. Humanity has to face the threat of a long coexistence with this menacing novel coronavirus. For those who misunderstand China, it may be helpful for them to listen to China's advice about the post-epidemic era. The author is professor and executive dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China.

 "Downplaying COVID-19," "inability in coronavirus fight," and "ducking responsibilities on others" have become the footnote of the West in 2020.

When people look back to 2020, they would find that one of the most unforgettable historical memories of the year is the West's image of a loser who vented its anger on others for the collapse of its confidence in the Western-style system. This has been repeatedly confirmed in the West's moves that continuously create antagonism and portrays China as their enemy and threat. A China handbook titled "China vs. Democracy: The Greatest Game" was issued at the annual Halifax Security Forum held virtually from Friday to Sunday in Halifax, Canada. In the handbook's foreword, Peter Van Praagh, the forum's founder and president, wrote, "The 2020 paradigm shift in people's attitudes toward China was a concrete change from the old conventional wisdom that an economically vibrant China would progress toward more freedom for its people, to the new conventional wisdom that the Chinese Communist Party is, in fact, the virus that endangers the world." Praagh sees the handbook as a contribution to building a "necessary common understanding" of "what confronts the democratic community of nations" and "what to do with regard to China." To achieve this goal, the forum prepared the handbook through conversations with more than 250 experts from around the world - but unsurprisingly, no expert who can represent the Chinese mainland's voice was included. Such a seemingly detailed appraisal is another tool for the Western camp to highlight their presupposed conclusion that China is a so-called threat to the democracies. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has led China to a prosperous path, bringing more welfare and freedom to the Chinese people. But the Western world has always refused to admit this. In their deep-rooted prejudice or what they call "old conventional wisdom," China should always be a vassal to the West, who contributes to the West's prosperity by being no more than a low-end world factory, a provider of raw materials, and a source of cheap labor. Only in this way would China's ruling party be fully accepted by the West. However, led by the CPC, China has become the world's second largest economy that doesn't need to take orders from the West. It is independent from the West's hegemonic control. Moreover, China has become a more dynamic and influential country that assumes more international responsibilities in the great trend of Western decline. This is the root cause why the West smears the CPC as "the virus that endangers the world." COVID-19 has shown to the rest of world how the West is totally lost in the pandemic. The Western system has had its hands tied before the pandemic, and all the complacent Western elites can do to relieve themselves is to stigmatize the CPC. Whether Western countries want to admit it or not, the myth of their system is a delusion, and their confidence in the system that they are proud of has collapsed. Utterly discomfited, they target China to shift attention. Western elites are not necessarily unaware of this. But only when people deal with the truth of their problems might they find solutions. Courage is needed, but the cowardice of Western elites has prevented them from getting the determination to uproot their problems. With political interests as priority, they seek to impair China by further spreading the political virus. However, will they look more decent by putting on the emperor's new clothes?

The US Department of State's Office of Policy Planning issued a 74-page report entitled "The Elements of the China Challenge" on November 17. The report plays up the "China challenge" and was believed to be a new version of George Kennan's famous 1947 article that had a profound influence on the US strategy to deal with the then Soviet Union. All these "dazzling" moves by the Trump administration is clearly an attempt to build its China policy into a signature diplomatic legacy before Trump steps down. The aim is to create as many obstacles as possible for the next administration's relationship with China. Based on Yu's interview comments, Trump's anti-China ambitions are very clear. The Trump administration has played both roles of hatchet man and referee on the issue of China. In so doing, it has made the China-US relations enter the worst period since the establishment of diplomatic ties. The Trump administration has had a disastrous effect on China-US relations and could hardly be properly construed by anyone as being a respectable "diplomatic legacy." First, there is a fundamental error in the Trump administration's strategic positioning of China as a threat and adversary - which Yu claimed has been one of the administration's greatest contributions. The two countries have never really positioned each other as adversaries. Every US government under either Republican or Democratic administrations had all understood the importance of developing stable and friendly relations with China. They had tried to put the relationship back on track after taking office if there had been any slippages. It is wise and rational to do so because win-win diplomacy is always the best way for the two's final goals — despite normal conflicts and differences. However, the Trump administration has rejected the past consensus. It has deliberately highlighted the differences between the two and portrayed China as an outlier to suppress. Such actions have been futile. It has not brought China to its knees. People like Yu should know that Chin's rise cannot be changed by any external forces, and the policies toward Beijing influences the US far more than it does China. And clearly these failed policies will make the country lose direction. Besides, Washington's hysterical crackdown on China has discredited the US around the world, even in the eyes of its closest allies - whom were also bullied by it. Yu takes delight in talking about how the Trump administration's China policy is advanced with the times, and advocating sanctions as a means to apply results-oriented approach. This runs completely counter to the US-led liberal international order. It tramples on the basic norms governing international relations. Over the past four years, Washington has repeatedly set new limits against China, fanned flames of fear and lies, and tried its best to smear China. It initiated the tariff war and engaged in diplomatic sanctions. These actions have not only severely damaged China-US relations, but also shaken global and regional stability. Most countries have now clearly understood the US' intention to create a new cold war. The majority are unwilling to take sides, let alone join the US to openly contain China. The Trump administration's diplomatic philosophy of "America First" has ruined its reputation in each and every country in the world. When Joe Biden was reported to have won the election, most allies of the US quickly sent congratulatory messages expressing their willingness to work with the new administration. This is a clear indication of how the current government has alienated itself from the international community. The invalid China policy of Trump's administration is becoming the best illustration of its failed train-wreck diplomacy. With less than two months to go, the Trump administration should stop smearing China and give up its pointless self-justifications. The right choice for the two countries is to return the driving seat over to people who can safely guide the development of sound bilateral relations. The author is an assistant research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies

Yu's views raised in the interview exposed the loopholes and double standards in Trump administration's underlying guidelines and their pride and prejudice in the perception of China and the Chinese people. These, on the whole, determined Trump's chaotic and extreme policy toward China. Yu mentioned that the Trump administration has made it clear "the simple but important concept that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is not the same as the Chinese people." He added that, the CPC does not represent the Chinese people. This is a prejudiced judgment against China. It's an obvious attempt to legitimize its hawkish China policy and put itself on a moral high ground. It proves that they actually do not understand the history of China and the country's current situation. The Chinese people's support for CPC is a result of nearly 100-year history of modern development. Surveys show that Chinese people are highly satisfied with their government. Chinese people have always judged the CPC by whether it has done practical things for the people to make them have higher living standards. They also weigh whether the national dignity and status has been constantly improving. On both accounts, the CPC has done a good job. China now has more than 90 million CPC members, and almost one in 14 in China are CPC members. It is impossible to separate the CPC from the people. Yu also said that when it comes to the CPC, the US must "distrust and verify," because the CPC is "basically dishonest." It is nothing but arrogance. It's a basic international norm that sovereign countries should develop equal relations. Without proof, on what grounds can the US distrust China and demand China to verify what it says? If China raised the same demands with the US, would the Americans accept it? The US has become accustomed to treating some states as pawns in a hegemonic manner. But this won't work if it wants to apply similar tactics with China, which is now a global power that has a larger population and much longer history than the US. The Trump administration has long trumpeted that China's development is a threat to global freedom and democracy. It has accused China of using other countries to serve its own interests. However, the "America First" doctrine that Trump has insisted on prioritizes the US' own interests when making domestic and foreign policies. Yu defended this by saying that as the US has a great, profound and far-reaching influence on the world, policies that give priority to US interests will not only benefit the US, but also the world. According to Yu's absurd logic, China's pursuit for its interests poses a threat to the world, while the US seeking "America First" serves the world. How self-contradictory this argument is. In international politics, every country safeguards and enhances its own national interests. This is normal. Why can the US do this but not China? The Trump administration accuses China of reaping benefits from other countries with globalization. For instance, Pompeo said during his October visit to Sri Lanka that the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a kind of debt-trap diplomacy. When he was uttering these words, was he thinking that all countries that have cooperated with China are fools as he believed who are willing to step into China's "trap" and sacrifice their own interests to please China? Was he hinting that only cooperating with the US is a smart choice? In fact, this not only displays the US' double standards, but also indicates that anti-China hawks such as Yu have fallen into an absurd state of mind as they gaze at China's development. Chaos and extremism have run throughout Trump's China policy over the past four years. This has not only undermined China-US relations, but also hurt the US' interests. Unfortunately, the Trump administration mistakenly believes it's safeguarding the US interests. The Trump administration is obviously attempting to shape the shift of the US' China policy as its biggest diplomatic legacy. It hopes the next government will continue the current policy and will be unable to subvert it even if adjustments have to be made. But if we look back a few decades from now, Trump's China policy is most likely to be the target of criticism and condemnation. It will never be considered heroic as what the Trump administration is boasting. Moreover, a Biden administration will not handle China-US relations with the same mind-set as the Trump administration did. As Biden has identified China as a "serious competitor," this will determine Biden's China policy, returning it to a relatively normal state of affairs - to a dynamic where disagreements coexist with cooperation. The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Wan Lin based on an interview with Xin Qiang, deputy director of the Center for US Studies at Fudan University.

At present, the US is still undergoing severe epidemic surges that are nearly out of control. This will inevitably affect its leading international role. However, Biden and his team have sent a clear signal to the world that "America is back." This will be reflected in multilateral diplomacy in particular. The attitude of Southeast Asian countries toward the new US government might best be described as "both expecting and nervous." Over the past four years, the influence of the US in Southeast Asia has shown an obvious downswing. For example, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore interviewed more than 1,000 academics, policymakers, business people, civil society leaders and the media from Southeast Asian countries in 2019. The results showed that 73 percent of the respondents believed that China's economic influence "reigns supreme" in the region. In terms of politics and strategy, 45.2 percent of the respondents said that China was the most influential, while only 30.5 percent voted for the US. This change is closely related to Trump's indifference to multilateral diplomacy and his emphasis on the "America First" agenda. For instance, his decision to withdraw the US s from the TPP and frequent absence from ASEAN Summits have cast doubts on the credibility and commitment of the US government. Compared with the Trump administration, the new one led by Biden will likely make significant changes. We may see a more active US at multilateral diplomatic activities held by ASEAN. This is what Southeast Asian countries love to see. But at the same time, it will put more pressure on China's diplomatic front. However, it will not be easy for Biden to completely eliminate Trump's negative "legacy." China has not only signed the RCEP, but it has displayed a positive attitude toward the CPTPP. This move shows that regional economic cooperation will not stop because of the absence of the US. In addition, ASEAN and China are each other's largest trading partners. Such structural factors cannot be easily reversed. Although Biden has said that he may renegotiate about TPP, he has never made a promise to "return" to TPP/CPTPP. This is related to the trade protectionist force in the US which has been steadily increased under the "America First" doctrine over the past four years. The US' policies toward Southeast Asia have demonstrated its inherent characteristics of "excessive militarization" for a long time. American scholar Brian Harding noted that, "US engagement continues to be well resourced on the defense side, with diplomacy under-resourced and economic engagement lacking focus." Statistics from 2008 to 2016 show that China provided $42.3 billion worth of loans for infrastructure construction in Southeast Asian countries. The US only provided $1.1 billion. Whether or not the Biden administration will be able to mobilize sufficient resources to bridge this huge gap remains to be seen. But this is certain: The US will invest more in Southeast Asia on security issues, and the South China Sea disputes will continue to be a major issue for the US to mobilize the regional countries. As a popular candidate for US Defense Secretary, Michele Flornoy holds the opinion that the US must upgrade its deterrence against China. In her view, the US needs to become able to sink all Chinese military vessels, submarines and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours. What will Southeast Asian countries do in the face of renewed US security investments in the region? Some countries have already been forced to improve the relations with either China or the US. Yet other countries are still trying to resist this pressure altogether. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has repeatedly stated on different international occasions that Singapore does not want to take a side. Whether the US can successfully organize an "anti-China alliance" based on the South China Sea issue depends, to a certain extent, on China itself. If China can handle the disputes with neighboring countries more prudently, and accelerate the negotiations to sign the COC, it will be able to resist intervention from the US and its allies. The author is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University.

The so-called "Tibetan government-in-exile" is a separatist political organization seeking to achieve "Tibetan independence."

Even though it was the first time the head of the "Tibetan government-in-exile" paid a visit to the White House in six decades, given his much lower international influence, Sangay's visit to the White House would be less influential than the Dalai Lama's. Washington primarily hopes to show the US' support for the "Tibetan government-in-exile" and hopes to signal that it wants to be more proactively involved in Tibet-related issues. The Tibet question concerns China's core national interests. Washington's arrangement of the meeting is a grave interference in China's internal affairs and undermines China's national interests. In recent days, the US has significantly ramped up its meddling with China's internal affairs. For example, it is reported that the cabinet-level head of the US Environmental Protection Agency Andrew Wheeler will visit the island of Taiwan in December, the third visit by a senior US official since August. The US and its Five Eyes allies groundlessly accuse China's top legislative organ's disqualification of members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council of being "part of a campaign to silence critics." These moves are doomed to be in vain. China's internal affairs will not tolerate any interference from any other country. Beijing has the determination and capability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is noticeable that news of the meeting was released by the "Tibetan government-in-exile." As of press time, there has been no official narrative from the White House on the meeting. The Trump administration may be observing China's response, in order to plan what to do next. Given that there are many anti-China politicians in the Trump administration, Washington will not play down the visit and will hype it up at some time. The meeting can be seen as a new step taken by the Trump administration to stir trouble with China during the transition period. There have been many signs that the Trump administration will continue to take some extreme measures to jeopardize China-US relations. The Trump administration intends to create as many obstacles as possible for the next administration to shape the latter's China policy. The Tibet question is one of them. Many scholars from the international community believe there should be no blind optimism about the incoming administration of Democratic candidate Joe Biden. After all, the two parties are on the same page in terms of their China policy. It is expected that the Biden administration will continue the basic notion of the Trump administration when it comes to the Tibet question. Furthermore, as Democrats tend to underline the significance of so-called human rights and values, the Biden administration will raise the weight of human rights and ideology in its China policy. After Biden takes office, issues related to Tibet, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong are expected to become pivotal on the agenda to deal with China. Former US president Barack Obama hosted the Dalai Lama four times at the White House. As almost all Biden's advisors on China policies come from the Obama administration, the possibility that the Biden administration will take more aggressive moves on Tibet cannot be ruled out. China should remain vigilant toward that. Apart from diplomatically expressing the firm opposition against the US' meddling with China's internal affairs, China should also proactively demonstrate to the outside world the progress it has made in Xinjiang, Tibet and other regions over these years, make the international community aware of the real situation and development in these regions, and invite more foreign people to pay a visit there. The malicious slander from the US and some Western countries will be broken up by the facts.

The US government under President Donald Trump's "America First" policy, has shirked its responsibility to provide international public goods, and has even failed to fulfill its obligations to allies. This kind of pure "realpolitik" has brought it widespread criticism from the international community, and damaged its soft power and global influence. The Trump administration has roughly withdrawn from UNESCO, WHO and the Paris climate accord, abandoning these important multilateral agencies and agreements and giving up its existing power and influence. The US government's frequent trade sanctions against its allies have made Japan, South Korea and the EU very uncomfortable. Trump has also abandoned US' long-standing Middle East ally the Kurds,  dissatisfying many of his important allies in the Republican Party. As a result, Trump's "America First" policy and its emphasis on unilateralism have damaged the global influence of the US. A more specific analysis of its impact on the Asia-Pacific region is needed. US'  withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is short-sighted. It has not only damaged relations between the US and other potential TPP member states, but also derailed a new set of international rules that the TPP envisioned as a check and balance on China, which was envisioned by former US president Barack Obama administration. Trump thought that China could be forced to give in under the pressure of a trade war, which didn't achieve its expected goal. At the same time, the Trump administration reopened trade negotiations with South Korea and Japan, imposed trade sanctions on Vietnam and India and required its allies to spend more on US overseas military presence. These moves have hurt ties between the US and its allies and weakened US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Trump government continues to promote its Indo-Pacific Strategy, strengthening strategic and security relations with Japan, India, Australia, and Vietnam, having revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) of the US, Japan, Australia and India, and promoted it to the ministerial level. Overall, there has been a serious decline in the influence of the US in the Asia-Pacific region. US' soft power and influence are based on the concept of a so-called community of democratic nations. American elites have always believed that relations between the US and its allies should be those between "friends" or "family members," who are close to each other, rather than seeking self-interest. However, the Trump administration's policies have brought their relations backward to the calculation of pure interest, and even betrayal, thus substantially damaged the strategic reputation of the US. So, after Joe Biden comes to power, can he restore US' influence in the Asia-Pacific region? Three points can be confirmed. First, Biden has made it clear that after he comes into power, the US will quickly return to the WHO and the Paris climate agreement, and compete with other major powers for influence within these international organizations. The US may return to the TPP or restart the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations with the EU. It can be imagined that US' allies will welcome Biden's approach, as their common interests and values are far greater than differences. Second, Biden clearly mentioned that China is still US' main opponent, and the US needs to unite its allies to fight against China. In that case, Biden will quickly resolve existing frictions with US' allies and repair the US alliance system. Third, Biden will continue to promote the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. This core of strategy was put forward in the Obama era. He will rely on the "QUAD +" mechanism to establish an alliance system to contain China. It can be expected that US' influence in the Asia-Pacific region will recover. However, the anti-globalization and protectionist trends in the US are still powerful, and the call for American soldiers to come home is still high. Frictions between the US and its allies will also exist for a long time. Therefore, the restoration of US influence still faces many constraints. The author is research fellow at the National Academy of Development and Strategy and professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China. 

The US used to involve itself in many important issues across different continents and oceans. However, it is unable to participate in some processes that are of extraordinary importance in the Asia-Pacific region, which reflects the decline of US power. The US now lacks absolute superiority, and no long possesses its former advantages. This ineptitude in the near and long run will hold Washington back from putting its nose everywhere. Regional cooperation in Asia is conducive to local countries building more balanced and equal relations with the US. Washington is an ally of several Asian countries, but such alliances are unbalanced, with the US being the dominant power in those bilateral ties. However, in organizations and pacts formed in Asia by Asian countries themselves, no one is leading the others. All are equally participating in their agreed upon mechanisms of dialogue and exchange. This demonstrates Asian characteristics, and RCEP in particular is vivid proof of this. Under such regional frameworks, Asian countries can develop their relations with other countries and conform to their own pace and models of growth. Meanwhile, as such "Asian models" mature, they will deeply influence Asian countries' interactions with the outside world, including the US. This will further fortify the direction of a multipolar and diversified world and help establish fairer and more just international relations, all the while enhancing Asia's autonomy. When we talk about Asia, which has not been a continent of only Asians since WWII, the US is an indispensable factor. For historical reasons, many Asian countries don't want the US to leave the area. This is largely a dialectical matter. On the one hand, Asia is increasing its autonomy. But on the other, the US will continue to maintain a presence in the region despite of a declining leadership role in the region. Asia is a diversified region. Many regional organizations have been established on other continents. This global engagement mirrors the diverse nature of Asia. Against this backdrop, it will be a disaster for any outside country to dominate Asian affairs. The US is no exception. Although Washington has long wanted to build its leadership in Asia, it has never fully managed to reach its goals. US' Asian policies have been far less systematic than those directed at Europe or the Americas. In late 2017, some people in Australia, Japan and Singapore feared that if the US "retreats from its leadership role" in the Asia Pacific, then "the peace and prosperity underwritten by the US-backed rules-based order since WWII would be severely undermined." During that time, Washington has indeed seen its influence weakened in the Asia Pacific. Yet peace and prosperity in Asia has been unaffected. Generally, Asia has been on upward trend over the past decades despite some twists and turns (such as the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and frictions between Beijing and New Delhi and Beijing and Tokyo). Asia as a whole, and East Asia in particular, has maintained peaceful and prosperous trends. This stands in stark contrast to the rest of the world, which is undergoing massive instability.

The Asian phenomenon has not been interrupted because it is based on rules.

RCEP is a further consolidating of rules-based peace and prosperity, especially in terms of creating sustainable wealth. It also enhances a rules-based order undergirded by multilateral respect. RCEP has revealed Asian wisdom. With its enlightened philosophy, Asian countries can see that the US still has ambitions to establish an Asia-Pacific alliance network with Washington as the leader. Currently, the exclusive collective security system in Asia pushed by Washington has divided the region into two camps, and dragged them into zero-sum security competition. When one camp is opting to strengthen its military power to make itself feel safer, the other camp feels threatened. This has made Asia, the most dynamic region in the world economy, increasingly trapped by the security paradox. RCEP was signed and sealed after eight years of effort, showing the inclusiveness of Asian characteristics. Asian countries should actively explore their regional security cooperation, including the establishment of an inclusive security structure in which every country can equally participate, to pull themselves out of the paradox trap. Asia needs an inclusive security structure that is sustainable and reliable. One that leads to real peace and stability. The author is a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a keynote speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Dialogues via video link, in Beijing, capital of China, Nov. 19, 2020. (Xinhua/Li Xueren)

Chinese President Xi Jinping said at Friday’s APEC summit that China will “favorably consider” joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal that the US left under the Trump administration in 2017. Speaking at the online 27th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting on Friday, Xi said China welcomes the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that forms the world’s largest free trade area, and will favorably consider joining the CPTPP. Chinese analysts said joining the CPTPP could offer a huge opportunity for China's service industry, high-tech industry and digital economy. "It could also mean an end to the suppression of Chinese companies such as Huawei and TikTok when they conduct business abroad,” Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think tank, told the Global Times on Friday night. Xi’s comments came after the RCEP, a historic free trade agreement, was signed by 15 Asia-Pacific countries, forming the world’s largest free trade area. Compared with the RCEP, the CPTPP pact covers a smaller population and accounts for a smaller share of global trade but it has higher standards in some aspects such as environmental protection. The CPTPP is a free trade agreement formed after the US withdrew from the TPP. It covers 498 million people worldwide, and the total GDP of the signatory countries accounts for 13 percent of the global economy. The TPP was considered to be one of the most important achievements of the Obama administration, but Trump abruptly withdrew from it after taking office.

Ministers from 11 countries gathered in Chile's capital to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on March 8, 2018. (Xinhua/Jorge Villegas)

Wang explained that the CPTPP is based more on services, high technology, intellectual property rights, and industries such as the digital economy, and the statement by Chinese President Xi showed the country’s determination to further expand its opening-up, as well as its desire to join the global economy and regional economy, and promote Asia-Pacific economic integration and cooperation. China, during its economic transition and climb up the global value chain, is also eyeing significant improvement in those areas. China holds an open and active attitude toward joining the CPTPP, Gao Feng, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce, said on Thursday, reiterating calls for open, transparent and mutually beneficial regional free trade arrangements. China welcomes any regional free trade pact that is in line with WTO rules and that is favorable for pushing economic globalization and regional economic integration, Gao told a regular media briefing in Beijing. Still, analysts said joining the CPTPP will require lengthy and vigorous negotiations. The RCEP took eight years to reach fruition.

In a week that saw multilateralism triumph in the world, after the signing of the world's largest trade pact accounting for about one-third of world’s population and global trade, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) yielded fruitful results by launching a vision for the next two decades, underlining the irreversible trend of multilateral cooperation, of which China has been one of the most important driving forces.

On Friday, a substantial outcome came out of the APEC with the announcement of the APEC Putrajaya Vision 2040, fostering the vision for an open, dynamic, resilient and peaceful Asia-Pacific community by 2040, according to the 2020 Kuala Lumpur Declaration. During a virtual meeting on Friday at the 27th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s commitment to multilateralism and building an open world economy, and said China will “favorably consider” joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). US President Donald Trump also attended. Video footage of the meeting exposed a protectionist Trump, who was the only one of the 21 APEC leaders to appear without a backdrop logo wall bearing the APEC theme. Leaders of the Asia-Pacific region – the world’s primary growth engine – launched the vision that will serve as a key framework that will guide the multilateral platform in the years to come. “We must stay as determined as ever to support the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core, promote free and open trade and investment, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all,” Xi said via video link. Xi said China welcomes the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that forms the world’s largest free trade area, and will favorably consider joining the CPTPP, successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal. TPP was considered to be one of the most important achievements of the Obama administration, but Trump abruptly withdrew from the deal after taking office. Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, said the statement by the Chinese president showed China's willingness and open attitude toward regional multilateral mechanism as “China will try to join any multilateral mechanism it can join and contribute its bits.” “Because of China's status as the world's largest developing nation and the region’s growth engine, China would become a major force to promote the CPTPP if it joins, which is also promoting a shared destiny,” Li told the Global Times on Friday. Wang Yiwei, director of the institute of international affairs at Renmin University of China, told the Global Times on Friday that China is in a period of strategic opportunity. China’s positive declaration of favorably considering joining the CPTPP is important to safeguard the multilateral trade system amid the pandemic, while the US pursues unilateralism. China is now the most powerful leader of globalization. Under the backdrop of the COVID-19, China’s advocacy of multilateralism will activate the connectivity and vitality of important trade platforms like the RCEP, Wang said. Multiple wins for multilateralism Prior to the APEC meeting, 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region signed the RCEP – the world's largest trade agreement – on November 15, offering fresh momentum for multilateral regional and global cooperation in trade and investment. Speaking at the APEC CEO Dialogues on Thursday, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said the success of RCEP “at this pivotal moment will reinvigorate regional economic integration and multilateral trade.” Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said in a video on Friday that while continuing to promote WTO reform, Japan will aspire for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) through the early conclusion of RCEP agreement, and the steady implementation and expansion of CPTPP. With the launch of APEC 2040 Vision, APEC leaders have sent out a clear message on their commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation, analysts said, noting that such cooperation is essential to fight the pandemic and for a sustainable economic recovery. APEC's GDP contracted by 3.7 percent in the first six months of 2020 and is expected to contract by 2.5 percent for the whole year, or equal to an output loss of $1.8 trillion, according to the APEC Policy Support Unit. However, East Asia is the world’s first region to bring the virus relatively in check and signs of economic recovery are already being observed in many parts in the region, with China as a leading force in that recovery. The 2040 vision would replace the Bogor Goals and serve as the primary reference point for the region in the coming decades. Chen Fengying, a research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the Global Times on Friday that a joint statement by APEC could be a vital mechanism for dialogue in the Asia-Pacific by continuing to champion free and open trade and investment, even though many of the past goals of APEC were not met or accomplished on account of rising protectionism and unilateralism. "A positive message to the world would show that the Asia-Pacific is one of the most vital regions for world economic growth," Chen said. Weakening US influence The US only fielded a low-level presence at last weekend's virtual East Asia Summit, when RCEP was signed and the US Chamber of Commerce said it was concerned the US was being left behind. Faced with criticism for ignoring its allies in Asia, Trump showed up at the Friday meeting, having tweeted a few times roughly at the same time as the APEC meeting about the US election results. Netizens were quick to find out in the video frame that he was the only leader who appeared without a APEC backdrop. He Weiwen, a former senior trade official and an executive council member of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, said that Trump's appearance was more of an existence-validating show-up for the outgoing US president, as he is by no means interested in APEC and actually stands on the opposite of APEC. Given the US' narrow-mindedness, other Asia-Pacific economies have been more willing to accept regional cooperation without the US, especially when it comes to preventing economic recession amid the global pandemic, Song Guoyou, deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, told the Global Times on Thursday. Unlike Trump, president-elect Joe Biden will probably attach more importance to the APEC as he is more accommodating to multilateralism and regional economic cooperation, given the fact that the APEC mechanism was strengthened during the era of former US president Bill Clinton, also a Democrat, Song said. Even if the new US administration wants to pick up multilateralism again, the priority initially will be Europe, not Asia, He said. "Only when the US returns to Asia-Pacific regional cooperation mechanisms can we talk about its leadership in the region," Song said, noting that Asia-Pacific countries' economic independence and self-awareness has awakened. “Will the US regain its lost influence? That will depend on whether US policies are aligned with common interest in Asia and adhere to multilateralism," He said.

The regulation involves India's neighboring countries, including China. This news, if true, will once again confirm the basic logic that one should "not swim against the tide." It shows that New Delhi, once overwhelmed by nationalism, has begun to turn back from the road of "harming others but not benefiting itself." Prior to April this year, investments in Indian companies with foreign investment accounting for less than 49% could go through the "green channel" without need for review by the Indian government. However, since then, the Indian government has announced that it has strengthened its scrutiny of investment in India by “all neighboring countries with land borders” on the ground of preventing these countries from indulging in speculative mergers and acquisitions when valuations of domestic companies are down due to the epidemic. Considering the economic strength of other neighboring countries in South Asia, India's intention to target China and suppress Chinese capital was obvious. After the border row on the China-India border in May, India successively issued a series of restrictive economic measures against China. These included the blocking of customs clearance of Chinese cargo containers in Indian ports, the banning of a large number of Chinese apps, and the suspension of infrastructure projects with Chinese enterprises. India even gave up joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in order to protect its national economy. There have been voices in India that the country would not join any trade agreements that included China. India has irrationally cut bilateral economic and trade relations unilaterally with China through these moves, proactively promoting the de-sinicization of the industrial chain. The retaliatory practice was fermented with the previously hyped up "China threat theory." This escalated anti-China voices among ordinary Indian people, and seriously dampened the confidence of a large number of Chinese investors. It lamentably hindered the momentum of economic and trade cooperation between China and India. As the world's only two large countries and emerging economies with a population of over 1 billion, the actual benefits brought by China-India economic and trade cooperation to the them are obvious. From 2013 to 2018, China was India's largest trading partner. India is also China’s largest trading partner in South Asia.  The development of the two countries is highly complementary. The trade volume between China and India has grown to nearly $100 billion ($92.68 billion in 2019), an increase of about 32 times in the past 20 years.. Among them, the continuous increase in Chinese investment is recognized as "accelerator" that boosts China-India economic and trade cooperation. It moreover magnifies the confidence of the Chinese business community to speeding up India's high-quality opening up, including simplifying administrative approval procedures. In all these cases, India unilaterally cut bilateral economic and trade relations irrationally, and promoted the "de-sinicization" of the industrial chain. The retaliatory practice was superimposed and stirred up on the basis of the previously hyped "China threat" theory. The confidence of a large number of Chinese investors has been shaken, and this has seriously hindered the momentum of China-India economic and trade cooperation. The author has been invited to participate in a number of video conferences of Chinese and Indian companies for quite some time. From the beginning to the end, all one heard was arguments for either "suspending" or "stopping", or "reducing the numbers of people" and "withdrawing", which all projected hopelessness and negativity. In 2019, more than 1,000 Chinese enterprises invested about $8 billion in areas such as e-commerce in India's industrial parks. Of the 30 Indian startups with a market capitalization of more than $1 billion each, 18 have accepted Chinese investment. Many of them are familiar to the Indian people as e.g. in local online payment, delivery, shopping, education and entertainment platforms. It can be said that in the six years since Modi took office, India has achieved rapid growth in attracting international investment, and has the largest number becoming the country with the highest inflows of FDI projects for many years in a row. Its ranking in the World Bank's Doing Business survey has risen sharply, even reaching the best in history. (But) the side effect of India's political declaration suppressing Chinese investment is to discourage many potential international investors, and this kind of blatant intervention to break market rules runs counter to the Modi government's efforts to further improve the domestic business environment. The impact of India's political slogans to suppress Chinese investment discouraged more potential international investors on the whole. This blatant intervention to disrupt market rules runs counter to the Modi government's efforts to further improve the domestic business environment. India's adjustment of FDI rules has a direct connection with the COVID-19 and the difficulty of its economic recovery. It is also inseparable from the changes happening in international environment. There are many important indicators that the Indian economy has worsened owing to the country's own structural reasons and the impact of the pandemic, setting the slowest pace of growth in 11 years.  The annual negative growth may be 10%.  India originally hoped that US and European companies would increase investment in India, but the results have been very limited. This year it introduced stimulus measures, to try to attract international companies to “abandon China and enter India”, but with little success. This is because factors such as India’s land system, infrastructure, exchange rate fluctuations, and effective market demand are not enough to make India’s business environment attractive. There are also US and European multinational companies that have suffered from this epidemic. Their top priority is to retain cash and reduce investment, rather than expand (investment). They can hardly make up for the vacuum created by India's suppression of Chinese capital.  However, in order to realize its "National Infrastructure Pipeline," India plans to invest $1.4 trillion in infrastructure over the next five years, focusing on road and railway transportation, energy supplies, and communication facilities. It goes without saying that Chinese companies have amazing advantages in these areas, particularly with logistics, infrastructure and technology. If India blindly imposes restrictions on Chinese investment and Chinese companies participation in infrastructure projects, it will inevitably make realisation of this plan more difficult, and also reduce a huge number of potential jobs. The Indian historian and strategist, Zorawar Singh, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times in July calling for India not to "disengage" with the Chinese economy. In his perspective, "brandishing the economic card cannot be indiscriminate and policymakers must be conscious of the repercussions on domestic livelihoods, India's modernization efforts, and geopolitical goals". The Modi government needs to listen more to these rational and objective voices and do more to restore the Chinese investors' confidence. It is still not too late to remedy this situation. (The author is Director of Research at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Tsinghua University, and Senior Fellow at the Taihe Think Tank)

Photo: Pakistan's Ambassador to China Moin ul Haque (center) presents civil award of Pakistan upon "Hilal-i-Pakistan" to Song Tao (left), head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on Thursday.

Song Tao, a senior Chinese official, was awarded "Hilal-i-Pakistan" by Pakistan's top diplomat in China on behalf of Pakistani President at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on Thursday. In recognition of his outstanding services toward Pakistan and for strengthening Pakistan-China relations, Ambassador Moin ul Haque presented the award to Song Tao, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee (IDCPC). The award statement said Song "has been a great friend of Pakistan and an ardent advocate of Pakistan-China friendship. In his capacity as Minister IDCPC, he has been instrumental in promoting the sustainable and healthy development of Pakistan-China exchanges in the spheres of people-to-people contacts and party-to-party linkages." He is highly appreciated for playing a key role in fostering greater mutual understanding between the CPC and various political parties of Pakistan, thereby contributing to consolidating the all-around social consensus on the Pakistan-China All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership and jointly building a closer Pakistan-China Community for a Shared Future in the New Era. Meanwhile, Song was also the force behind moves to strengthen political support for realizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)'s potential as a game-changer for Pakistan's socio-economic development. Under the theme of "working together to promote economic development and improve people's lives through high-quality CPEC cooperation, Song co-chaired a virtual conference together with Chairman of Pakistan's Senate, Sadiq Sanjrani, in August wherein he vowed to continue strategic communication. In his keynote speech, Song reportedly thanked Pakistani President Arif Alvi for sending the congratulatory letter to the virtual event, noting that party-to-party cooperation between China and Pakistan was increasing and that the CPEC had entered into a new era. Officials from the IDCPC and officers of the Embassy of Pakistan also participated in the award ceremony

The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group (consisting of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) issued a joint statement in the name of their foreign ministers on Wednesday in which it accused China for disqualifying four legislators in its Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. "China's action is a clear breach of its international obligations under the legally binding, UN-registered Sino-British Joint Declaration," the statement said. This was not the first time the five countries took united action against China. In fact, this tiny group, originally designed to share intelligence, has already turned into a loudspeaker for the US' anti-China campaign, as well as a fan club that sets an example for other Western countries how to show loyalty to Washington. There is nothing but a cliché in this latest statement, which can hardly resonate in the Western world. The Five Eyes is more like a criminal gang in which the US calls the tune and its pawns go fight for it or applaud it. The "little brothers" dare not poke the bubble even if what Washington demands is unreasonable. As time goes by, this has become the "political correctness" in the group. Canberra has been brutally reshaped by Washington. China-Australia relations used to be good - China has been the largest trading partner to Australia, which is one of the most favored countries by Chinese tourists and students. There is no reason for Australia to have more hatred toward China than many US allies in Europe, even if it doesn't agree with China in some aspects due to ideological differences. However, Australia has become one of the Western countries that have gone too far on the anti-China path. Countries such as Australia have repeatedly attacked China over human rights and openly interfered in China's internal affairs relating to Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Canberra has accused Beijing of "penetrating operations," but could only provide evidence out of thin air. They don't even see the paradox in this regard: Australia follows the US suit to try to reshape China while groundlessly blaming China for attempting to change Australia itself. Is Canberra so stupid with just a one-track mind? Or is it irrational or shameless? Many Westerners believe their unilateral intervention in China's internal affairs is "justice." Human rights seem to be an almighty excuse for them. They even define China's promotion of people exchanges as "penetration." The ideological difference is really amazing. It makes some Western people see very rude things as simply natural and reasonable. The US is leading the Five Eyes alliance to counter China, building up a false appearance that they can overwhelm China with numerical strength. But the combined population of these five countries is just more than 460 million, which is one third of China's 1.4 billion. Another of their illusions is that they think they are the world, while they are only a "handful" of the world. They have long been steeped in self-righteous thought and arrogance, and have a natural displeasure and resistance to the rise of emerging economies. It is impossible to bridge the value differences between China and the US as well as the Five Eyes alliance, which is also the realistic embodiment of the diversified values of human society. When a conflict happens, it just happens. From a larger historical perspective, as long as the conflict does not lead to catastrophic consequences, it can also be a way for different civilizations to coexist and interact with one another. China has no reason to compromise with an organization with such racial superiority like the Five Eyes alliance. The way that China governs should be based on a principle to promote its development and progress, rather than on criticism and finger-pointing from other countries. China is capable of defending its independence in national governance. To manage frictions between China and the West in terms of values, China also has the power to force those interventionists to confine themselves to talking but exercising restraint in actual actions. In most cases, their so-called sanctions are just for show. Take a look at what is happening in the Five Eyes countries. The US and the UK are both among the countries hit hardest by COVID-19, and both have deep domestic conflicts and long-term uncertainties. Canada and Australia, with their small populations and vast land resources, are more like "Western slackers" than the European countries who have strong crisis awareness. They all need to see where their crisis lies and who their real enemies are. Otherwise, they will always have a misconception that China is poisoning them whenever they are not feeling well. How absurd such a logic is!

I have to say this, at least to some extent, this is a misconception. There is no country in the world that feels absolutely comfortable. In terms of ruling groups, the Trump administration must be the "most comfortable" one, but it is foolhardy in the eyes of the world's elites. If we take a look at China from perspectives made outside of the country, few people regard China as a "punching bag." Generally speaking, the world is half-civilized, and the other half goes by the law of the jungle. Yet all countries need to be able to take temporary setbacks. In my view, China, as the world's No.2 economy, is doing quite well balancing its "setbacks" and managing to "stand tall." The proof of this assertion is: by strategically forging ahead, China has managed to keep growing stronger. What has been the core interest of China in the past decades? Development. And what do many US elites hate the most? What is it about the world order that they don't accept the most? The answers are the same. China's rise. Our grand goal is constantly being achieved. This make them swear and feel down. In the past, it was elite and upper-middle class Westerns who lived the high life with posh suites, cars, and traveled around the world. We Chinese at present are also living this way. What earth-shaking changes! No country has succeeded in standing in the way of the Chinese to live improved lives. As individuals, there are some ups and downs in our daily lives. But as collective Chinese, our lives for decades have not been miserable at all. In terms of territory in the past few decades, not an inch of land has been lost. The Chinese army has not taken a step back on the China-India border, the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and the Nansha Islands in the South China Sea. Western public opinion has influenced some other countries to collude with the likes of Washington in particular to demonstrate against China. But these are only shrill narratives, designed only for show. To be sure, China has not suffered any issues of territorial loss for decades. Sure, the Trump administration has been cracking down on China, and this has created many troubles. But what has it actually achieved? The US' trade deficit with China has risen, instead of fallen. While China quickly recovered from the outbreak, the US became the most affected country in the world. Chaos did not happen in China, but the "Black lives Matter" campaign is unfolding like a revolution in the US. The power gap between China and the US has clearly narrowed, not widened, over the past few years. As for Taiwan, there are two points I want to say. First, the Taiwan question has already been relatively "shrunken" due to the expanding pattern of China's strategic interests. Second, despite all the fuss that Taiwan regional leader Tsai Ing-wen's authorities have made, the Chinese mainland's actual control capacity in the Taiwan Straits has unprecedentedly increased. China has historically taken the Taiwan question into its own hands, much as it did when Beijing was encircled in 1949. But of course, China can't just get what it wants, nor can China teach one a lesson whenever it wants. In that case, isn't China becoming the world's "public enemy"? China's development has been achieved through numerous win-win and all-win strategies. This is a way that avoids and resolves disputes and conflicts, one step at a time. The process of doing big things is always difficult. You have to be tough when you need to be tough. But you also need to have a soft side. Difficulties in doing so are not about being oppressed. Quite the contrary, they represent a strong ability and wisdom. The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times. 

This location could perhaps be based out of Singapore. The USNI said Braithwaite announced his intention on Tuesday while delivering a speech at the Naval Submarine League's annual symposium. "The Chinese have shown their aggressiveness around the globe… Not since the War of 1812 has the United States and our sovereignty been under the kind of pressures that we see today," he said. Meanwhile, China's "aggressiveness" is just a sufficient excuse for the US to expand its navy forces. Whoever takes office in January will spare no effort to advance the American navy. US political elites are on the same page in their efforts to maintain maritime hegemony in a bid to counter the pressure from the so-called challenge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Washington hopes to achieve a stronger navy to counter China, maintain the freedom of navigation and prevent other countries' from over exploitation of the sea. The 2021 Index of US Military Strength, issued by Heritage Foundation on Thursday, graded the US Navy capability as marginal trending toward weak. In terms of the shipbuilding capability, the index underlines that China's navy grew by more than 27 percent to 335 warships from 2007 to 2017. By contrast, the US Navy had contracts to build 79 ships as of March 2020. A Pentagon report generated in August said that China now has world's largest navy as Beijing expands its military influence. The US' hype about China's navy forces is exactly obviously an exaggeration. From the perspective of both quality and quantity, the PLA is still behind the US Navy, whose capability is still expanding. Washington's narratives oversimplify and overstate Beijing as a threat. The US navy's 1st Fleet operated from the immediate post-World War II period to the early 1970s. If a new numbered fleet is established, the US will clearly be enlarging new naval forces. Adding a 1st Fleet will ramp up the scale and strength of the US Indo-Pacific Command. A new 1st Fleet might have a capacity similar to that of the 7th Fleet - with an aircraft carrier strike group and an amphibious strike group. Braithwaite suggested that putting a new numbered fleet near Singapore would be "right out of the chocks." But this would be a troubled choice as the country's Changi Naval Base is not large enough to accommodate two big strike groups mentioned above. Besides, the base is too close to China, and thus will bring security concerns to the fleet. Therefore, the Changi Naval Base might be qualified to be a temporary option. Moreover, Singapore will consider the influence of such deployment and its relations with China - the city-state will not necessarily agree this US move. As the new 1st Fleet will focus on the Indo-Pacific region, putting it at Guam or Hawaii might be feasible to cover all waters together with other three fleets - the 3rd Fleet deployed out of US western coast, the 7th Fleet deployed at Yokosuka, Japan, and the 5th Fleet anchored at Bahrain. A new numbered fleet will impose sharp threats to the Indo-Pacific region and further intensify the challenges China will face. If the US Navy's combat forces greatly increase, it will put greater pressure on China. Anyway, China will always have to face huge threats from the US. We should maintain a strategic determination and steadily develop China's military power according to our plans, including neutralizing the powerful US Navy. But we don't seek a naval arms race. We can use asymmetric tactics to contain the US Navy from growing wildly. This will be valuable for China. Therefore, building asymmetrical combat power and focusing on economic development are all what we must do now. The author is a Chinese military expert and commentator.

The US President Donald Trump's administration has become increasingly aggressive on the Taiwan question in recent months. He has also escalated the trend since the November 3 election.

It will be only two months before Trump leaves office on January 20 if Joe Biden is officially confirmed to become the next president. It is within reason to predict that the Trump administration may show his "final madness" to China across the Taiwan Straits. He could blow up in anger, buckling under the combined pressures of failed pandemic policies, crippling economics, and the raw humiliation of losing the election. He may stifle Biden by targeting China with a crisis at the last minute. There are several possible actions that the Trump administration might take in his final days. These include introducing bills or policies to support the Taiwan regional authorities or secessionists, selling more advanced arms to the island, sending US military planes or ships to the Straits, and arranging for more high-level official visits. Of all the senior officials who might pay a visit to Taiwan, US State Secretary Mike Pompeo is being considered most possible and being heatedly discussed. A Pompeo visit will greatly encourage Taiwan secessionists and seriously deteriorate cross-Straits relations. Trump has repeatedly played the Taiwan cards in his defiance of Beijing. This has led to widespread speculation whether or not he will play the "ultimate" card in his final acts of madness, for example, to recognize Taiwan as a "country" or establish further official relations with the island. If this ultimate card is played, a "Taiwan Straits crisis" will definitely reach a boiling point. But the possibility that Trump uses this card is not high, as this would be operationally difficult and frustrating for him to execute. The administration is now in a caretaker state and is actually facing constraints from the Congress, American society, the Biden camp, and even opposition within the Republican Party. He cannot do whatever he wants regarding policies toward China or the Taiwan Straits. However, making a personal statement of support for Taiwan and provocation to Chinese mainland is still rather likely for Trump or Pompeo to do. It is conceivable that they could deliberately enhance Taiwan's international status, and publicly backing its entry into the World Health Organization and even the United Nations. Such easy to say statements are within their control and cannot be restrained by others. Once they make such a public statement, it will inevitably lead to an extremely tense confrontation between China and US. This unsavory scenario could greatly escalate the Chinese mainland's military activities near the Taiwan Straits. For Biden, if he inherits Trump's legacy of turmoil across the Straits, he will continue to adopt a vague strategy. This might mean curbing Taiwan's pro-secessionist policies, but also criticizing China over human rights issues and for "intimidating" the island. He will not show full support for the Tsai authorities, but he also won't stop using the Taiwan card against the mainland. Biden may also continue some of Trump's existing policies that caused friction with China. However, in general, Biden will make more efforts to strengthen cooperation and communication between the two countries than Trump did. In the face of possible coming days of "final madness" from the Trump administration, the DPP authorities will be more cautious about how to play along with Washington. After Pompeo claimed that, "Taiwan has not been a part of China," many voices on the island said his statement does not show love for Taiwan — but it actually harms the island. How Taiwan deals with its relations with a caretaker administration over the next two months will also need to take Biden into consideration. It will therefore not entirely follow the baton of Trump and Pompeo - except maybe for diplomatically worded lip service. The Chinese mainland will prepare for the worst-case scenario. It will guard the bottom line, and make corresponding military preparations in the Taiwan Straits. Surely, strengthening communication and cooperation with the new US administration for the sake of both countries is totally necessary. But if Trump does make a "mad last move," the mainland will definitely counterattack hard and never compromise. The author is deputy dean of Graduate Institute for Taiwan Studies of Xiamen University.

The US election drama has been on for a while. It seems now the dust has settled. The significant number of votes for Trump shows he has a large following. How will this affect the new administration's domestic and foreign policy? Will the new administration's foreign policy be fundamentally different in comparison to the Trump administration's? Amitav Acharya, distinguished professor of International Relations at American University, Washington DC and the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance, shared his perspective with Global Times (GT) reporters Yu Jincui and Lu Yuanzhi over these issues. GT: It's been reported that Democratic candidate Joe Biden has won the presidential race with 306 electoral votes to Trump's 232. Does this result meet your expectations? Biden and Trump respectively won the most and second-most votes in the history of the US. What does this indicate? Acharya: To be honest, Biden's victory actually exceeds my expectations, because I did not believe in predictions about a Biden/Democrat landslide, due to what happened to Hillary Clinton's campaign four years ago. Even though Biden had led in national polls, the electoral college is a different thing. And I saw telltale signs of widespread Trump support in the US. Of course, Biden was more cautious than Hillary Clinton and avoided big campaign mistakes, like Clinton's infamous "basket of deplorables" comment about a segment of Trump's supporters. Biden had no baggage like Whitewater, Bill Clinton impeachment, or major ongoing controversies like that over her use of a private email server. Hillary was also unlucky and was really doomed by the unexpected way then FBI director James Comey handled her email controversy days before the election. The controversy about Biden and his son's financial dealings was not going to stick, especially given even the much bigger and more visible financial and ethical lapses about Trump and his associates. Yet, Trump's electoral performance, where he got over 72 million popular votes, an increase over his 2016 performance, is significant. He retains a substantial cache of followers, not just his core base of ardent followers, but among male voters nationwide, and in the Republican party in general. This means he remains a major force in US politics. GT: Trump up until now refuses to admit the result. What uncertainties will this bring to the power transition? There is a view holding that Trump's refusal to concede reflects the fact that US society is politically divided enough to bolster Trump's contempt for the president-elect and the US political system is degrading. How do you view this? Acharya: The transition is already disrupted a bit, especially since the Biden transition team is not getting funding and other privileges that is due to a President-elect by the Federal General Services Administration headed by a Trump appointee. But it is still in the early days into the transition. More important, Biden is not getting the highly classified intelligence briefs, which creates concerns about US national security preparedness, although that may change soon The greater damage is to the US body-politic, Trump's refusal to concede is actually less significant than his loud and repeated claims of widespread electoral fraud, his rantings about the election having been stolen from him, for which no real proof has been provided. Such claims are strongly dismissed by state officials in charge of elections. The sort of accusations and conspiracy theories floated by Trump are calculated to undercut the legitimacy of the Biden presidency, but they also undermine US democracy both domestically and internationally. Many international observers are dumbfounded by statements and actions by a sitting president and likely to blame not just him personally but also see it - fairly or unfairly - as a fundamental issue with the US political system. I agree that Trump's actions degrade the US political system. GT: Nearly half of the voters in the US have supported Trump, how will this affect the Biden administration's domestic and foreign policies? Biden vows to unite the US. Can he bridge the current division of US society? Acharya: Trump is not going to fade away. Health permitting, he  may well run for the 2024 presidential election, mouthing the same conspiracy theories about electoral fraud in 2020 and claims of the presidency having been stolen from him. This means the fracture in the US body politics, which is not just ideological, but also a class divide, and a rural-urban polarization, would become deeper and more long-term. The Biden presidency, which may be one-term given his age, could not heal such deep fissures against a continued Trump-led populist onslaught. And things would worsen should the Republicans hold on to a Senate majority after the January Senate elections in Georgia. Biden's progressive and conciliatory agenda would be stymied by the obstructionist strategies of the Senate leadership. Biden would have little choice but to resort to increased executive actions to carry out his domestic agenda, which would in turn be heavily criticized by the Republicans and widen the gulf between the executive and legislative branches of the US government. In terms of foreign policy, Biden has more leeway. He would move quickly to reverse some of Trump's more extreme policies such as the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization and more challengingly, may even revive the Iran nuclear deal. Biden would pursue a more multilateral approach, and restore US relationships with NATO and allies such as Germany. More important, he would restore, to a degree, lost US credibility and reputation internationally. While some of his international policies and actions would be controversial, the tone and manner of the Biden foreign policy would be fundamentally different. GT: The past few years have seen a dramatic deterioration of China-US relations. How much does Trump play a role in the process? Compared to the Trump administration, will the Biden administration's China policy be fundamentally different? Under a Biden government, in which areas will China and US see eased relations? And in which areas will the conflicts continue or even be intensified? Acharya: I would urge caution in jumping into any conclusions about how the Biden administration will turn out for China. I was actually in Beijing in November 2016 when Trump got elected and I distinctly remember some Chinese analysts expressing hope, even enthusiasm, about Trump's victory, that he would be good for China. Such analysts considered the Democrats to be too ideological and protectionist in trade (which they tend to be), whereas Trump's background as an entrepreneur was supposed to make him more pragmatic, businesslike, and result-oriented. He was someone that China can do a deal with. Look how things have turned out. Unless one thinks in a zero-sum way that the damage to US international standing from the Trump presidency is a plus for China, I do not see how the current global economic and political situation is better for China than what was the case before Trump. A Biden administration is likely to tone down the kind of ideological rhetoric that the Trump administration has recently adopted, condemning, in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's words, "China's virulent strain of communism" and insisting that "the world cannot be safe until China changes." But there would be limits to how far Biden can change US China foreign policy, at least in the short term. There are some well-known and deep-rooted factors shaping US policy towards China which cut across the Republican-Democrat divide, especially negative perceptions of China in areas of trade and technology transfer, and China's policies towards maritime territorial disputes. But unlike the unpredictable and inconsistent Trump (who alternately highly praised and aggressively condemned China over its handling of the corona virus pandemic in a matter of a few weeks), we might see a more steady and predicable US position and policy towards relations with China. The US might go from a Cold War rhetoric to a "cold peace" approach that could leave room for a business-like relationship, allowing the two countries to sit down for negotiations, no matter how tough they might be, to stabilize their relationship. This I believe is good for the US, for China and for the international community as a whole. And a US administration that is less hostile to globalization and trade, more supportive of international cooperation, and more moderate in its dealing with the international community, is as a whole good for China, even if continuing criticism of China in the US persists. It is also likely that US and China will restore or even increase cooperation in climate change and global health, even as economic relations remain tense. GT: How will Biden's victory change the future of the US and the world? You said in your book that, "The age of Western hegemony is over. Whether or not America itself is declining, the post-war liberal world order underpinned by US military, economic and ideological primacy and supported by global institutions serving its power and purpose, is coming to an end." Do you still hold such view? Acharya: I stand by my prognosis about the "End of American World Order," made first in the 2014 edition (updated in 2018) under the same title. The victory of Biden has increased the relevance of my earlier analysis and prognosis. To be sure, as president, Biden would pursue a more internationalist foreign policy. He would go some way into re-embracing what some analysts call "Liberal Internationalism" or the Liberal International Order (LIO), an order where Western and US-created rules of international relations prevail. I would expect much talk in the US in the coming weeks about President Biden reviving the LIO. However, and this is important, I don't think the LIO can be revived in the sense of being restored to its pre-Trump state. There are several reasons for this. First, the crisis and decline of the LIO predates the Trump presidency. As I had written in the first edition of "The End of American World Order (2014)", two years before Trump's victory, the LIO was already undermined by long-term structural factors, especially the global economic and technological power shift away from the West and to Asia, as well as the emergence of ideas and approaches to governance and economic growth which challenged Western free-market and liberal democracy model, including state-led economic growth models in East Asia. Trump was thus never the cause, but a symptom or consequence of that decline. As I had also predicted after Trump's 2016 victory, he has since pushed the LIO closer to the precipice, so to speak, with his policies against economic globalization, multilateral diplomacy and promotion of liberal democratic norms and values, which are bedrocks of the post-war LIO. Moreover, there has been a significant rise in populist sentiments in both the West (including Europe and the US) and other parts of the world as a backlash against rampant globalization. And the steady proliferation of radical non-state actors, including extremist groups, also threatens the LIO and would continue to do so. Biden can restore some elements of the Liberal International Order, such as multilateralism, but any talk of a LIO 2.0 is farfetched. Any such revival of the LIO would be limited. It would be "sub-systemic" rather than the dominant and defining model of international relations. It would have to compete and co-exist with other types of attempts to develop international and regional cooperation and order-building, including that by China, Russia and some of the regional powers and associations. The idea of "Liberal hegemony" is a dead thing. This does not, however, mean the US would not have a critical role to play in world affairs. But its role, as well as that of China, would be shaped by the reality that we are witnessing; the long-term, but unmistakable, emergence of a pluralistic world. COVID-19 has undermined two conventional ways in which international relations experts view the world. The first is that the world is going to be dominated by one, two, three or four powers, or their ideological systems. In fact, the world is neither "multipolar" nor "bipolar" (US-China). A "bipolar" or "multipolar" order means that there are two or more Great Powers ("power" being defined in terms of military and economic capabilities) in the international system, and more importantly, it is they who would decide major outcomes in world affairs. COVID-19 has shown that smaller and medium sized countries have done better jobs than most big powers, whether in the West or the Rest, in controlling the pandemic. And there are also other consequential actors, including corporations, international institutions, social movements and people directly themselves armed with social media. Second, COVID-19 has also shown the true nature of global interdependence. The world is not "polycentric" which implies multiple centers of gravity somehow isolated from each other. In reality, linkages among nations are increasingly complex, shaped not just by trade or investment flows, but also by common vulnerability to rising transnational threats, from climate change to pandemics. Against this backdrop, both the US and China should take a global approach to building world order, keeping in mind not just their own national interests or their bilateral relations, which would remain competitive, but the interests of other nations. This means each time one side adopts a policy to compete with the other, it should consider how this might impact other nations, and avoid policies that would damage common interests. Trump for all his rhetoric to "make America great again" not only failed to do so, but also made America look decidedly "un-great," rather petty and vengeful on the international stage. The Biden presidency cannot make the LIO "great again," because it is irrevocably past its glory days. But the Biden administration has a decent chance to restore and rebuild the US' image and influence, and contribute significantly and immediately to restoring global health and economy ravaged by COVID-19.

The remarks came after the Economic Times reported on Tuesday, citing government officials, that India is considering a plan to allow up to 26 percent FDI from countries with which it shares a land border, including China, without government scrutiny for sectors that are on the automatic route. The decision is expected to expedite over 100 proposals that have been stalled after India's FDI policy was amended in April, requiring the Indian government's approval mandatory for FDI from border countries, the report said. India's new Foreign Portfolio Investors launched in April amid the pandemic, sent a clear message of an unfriendly attitude toward foreign investors and slashed the confidence in Chinese businesses. Tuesday's report could be a sign of improvement in China-India relations, but caution remains considering Indian's one-sided provocation on the border and the blatant squeezing of  Chinese businesses in India, experts said. For now, only the media has reported that Indian authorities are considering the matter, which has not been officially confirmed, experts said. "India should take this step, as its irrational stance on Chinese investment is shooting itself in the foot and cannot be sustained, which is reflected in the slump of the Indian economy," Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times on Tuesday. This year, India raised restrictions on Chinese investment, especially after the border confrontation, and all sorts of unreasonable retaliatory measures against Chinese investment and enterprises, a move that not only jeopardizes India's efforts to revive its economy but also hurts Indian consumers, experts said. Sha Jun, executive partner in the India Investment Services Center of Yingke Law Firm, told the Global Times on Tuesday that it is high time India's pent-up demand for foreign investment be released. "The backlog of projects seeking FDI approval is expected to be approved a few weeks after the new policy is announced," Sha estimated. India has demonstrated the trend that it is increasing localization requirements for foreign investment, especially Chinese investment, which poses more challenges to Chinese firms operating there, according to Sha. "Chinese firms should put more energy in the talent pool and cultural adaption there." India's restriction on FDI is expected to be removed gradually according to assessments of different industries. "Industries that are likely to see wider access are real economy related such as machinery, energy, and automation, while industries related to privacy protection and national security such as telecommunications and finance may not be on a fast track," Sha said. A source with the Chamber of Chinese enterprises in India, surnamed Huang, told the Global Times on Tuesday that India's proposal to ease restrictions on foreign investment is very likely due to the country's severe economic downturn caused by the pandemic. "It's inevitable India will open up foreign investment in order to stimulate its economy," said Huang. Chinese investment in India has been on a downward trend this year, and it is unclear whether this trend will continue, said Huang, noting that it's up to companies to decide whether to further invest in India based on their own needs and risks. Although lack of official confirmation from the governmental side, people still welcome the message from the report by the Indian news outlet and consider it a possible signal that could ease China-Indian tensions. "We welcome a positive attitude from India, which can also turn into a sign of improvement of China-India relations," said Qian, hoping the change in policy will mark the beginning of India's return to rationality, and that India's openness to foreign investment will continue. "It's a win-win situation after all," Qian said. "At present, it is only a piece of news in the media, and we still needs to see if the Indian side intends to implement new detailed rules. Hopefully it will turn out for the better," said Huang. Meanwhile, given the remaining uncertainties in bilateral relations posed by the Indian side, there is still a long way to go to heal the wounds in bilateral relations, experts said.

The US media outlet which first disclosed the report even compared it to an article published in 1947 by US diplomat George Kennan that had a profound influence on the US strategy to deal with the then Soviet Union. There is no new wording in the report, which can be seen as a collection of malicious remarks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other anti-China US politicians and senators. Right now, only a little more than 60 days are left for the current US administration. An official from the State Department explained that the report is not meant to constrain the next US administration. But the fact is the Department of State fears that the Biden administration will adjust US-China relations, and the release of the report is part of their efforts to consolidate the current extreme anti-China path. But most Chinese scholars who have read the report believe it is an insult to Kennan by labeling the report as Kennan-style. Kennan, then US charge d'affaires in Moscow, sent an 8,000-word telegram to the Department of State detailing his views on the Soviet Union. At least, there was no special political motive in Kennan's report. But the latest report is trying to leave a legacy for the extreme anti-China policy adopted by the Trump administration and fawning on Pompeo, which is evil in essence. The impulsive and capricious governing style of Donald Trump leaves sufficient room for politicians like Pompeo to give free play to their ambitions. The Department of State has become the governmental organ that has the most serious clashes with China, outperforming the CIA and the Department of Defense. Diplomats are supposed to be communicators, but Pompeo and his team have chilled the communication atmosphere with China. In the China direction, today's US Department of State can close its door. Surrounded by such deep hostility and prejudice toward China and the wild ambition of the secretary of state, how could the Department of State's Office of Policy Planning make out anything objective about China? Their observation ability, cautious attitude toward research, and sense of responsibility for history have been severely squeezed. They are just currying favor from their seniors and manipulating extreme paths, pretending to be "thoughtful." There must be some problems in the China policy adopted by the current US administration. The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union and today's China-US relations are from different times. The Trump administration has resorted to the Cold War mind-set to deal with China. The situation in the US and the US relations with its allies have already become awkward. How could the US stand the test of history? Pompeo and his team misunderstood what the Chinese really wants and what the world really wants from China-US relations - it boils down to a zero-sum mentality. Chinese diplomatic and academic circles look down upon the Pompeo team, which lacks professionalism, and acts like a group of gangsters suddenly taking official positions. They not only have messed things up, but also hope to build their nonsense as legacy. Pompeo's choice of opportunists like Miles Yu as advisor in particular has increased Chinese people's doubts over the "amateurism" and "immorality" of the Pompeo team's China policy. Most people in the world understand that China is not the Soviet Union. But the current US government, particularly the Department of State, don't. The US' China policy is very much like "drunk driving" internally while on the international stage it's like sailing against the current. The Soviet Union took the initiative to cut off ties with the US when suffering from US containment, while China has always been a defender of China-US relations. China's huge economic strength and resilience to promote mutual benefit and win-win cooperation has made it very difficult to fight a new cold war against China. Pompeo's efforts to create a China-US confrontation run counter to the interests of the American people. He puts world peace in peril, but will not be followed by the whole US and the Western world. No report can make up for the US' China policy, nor will it leave any historic legacy. The document released by the US State Department's Office of Policy Planning will end up being pieces of wasted paper.

US Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Wednesday that China's navy is no match for that of the US in terms of strength. He further explained that even if the US stopped building new ships, it would take China years "to match our capability on the high seas."

We very much agree with this assessment. There is indeed a wide gap in the naval capability of the Chinese and US navies. Since both countries are building new ships, it is unrealistic to think the gap would be narrowed in a short period of time. The question is, why is Washington still so nervous and keeps clamoring about the so-called China threat when it is aware of the situation? Washington's ambitions are too big. It seeks to permanently maintain the current gap between the two navies and hopes to rely on it to deter and intimidate the Chinese people, exercising its hegemony toward China. The US is sensitive to any increase in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s strength. But China has never had any intention to compete with the US militarily on a global scale. It is not in line with China's interests. China is aware it cannot defeat the US navy in the event of a conflict in the South Pacific or the Indian Ocean. For what would China seek such competition? However, in China's adjacent waters, or the regions that concern China's core interests, the US navy is destined to gradually lose its dominance. The PLA should have the confidence to defeat the US military in these areas when a conflict occurs. This is an unswerving goal of the Chinese society to support the country's military buildup. In our opinion, this is not too much at all, and this is what China can do, and must do. Esper and other US elites are disturbed by China's goal to complete the modernization of its national defense and armed forces by 2035, and to build a world-class military by 2049. But we believe we should not wait until 2035 to realize a strong and effective deterrent against the US military in China's offshore waters, and should suppress the US military's arrogance in China's offshore waters as soon as possible. No matter how much money the US military gets and how many new ships it builds, Chinese society will support their government to boost China's above-mentioned capacity building with greater efforts. We are not unfolding an arms race with the US. We will invest more in this regard between China's sovereignty and US hegemony, so that China won't be bullied by the US in our coastal waters, and to safeguard China's national security. No matter how much money it needs, a vast majority of Chinese people will support it. The US needs to change its calculation formula when it comes to security. The South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits cannot be treated by the US on par with the Caribbean Sea. If the US wants to subdue China in the latter's offshore waters, Washington must know it will be costly. In the long run, it is an unbearable weight on the US. The US military enjoys overall strength. However, the US is far from being almighty. When the country pursues goals way beyond its capabilities due to its greed, it will turn from being a real tiger to a paper tiger. If it wants to be hegemonic around Chinese waters, it will find it beyond its reach. It will be a domain where US strength does not match its ambitions. China is still weaker than the US, but it is making down-to-earth efforts without engaging in military expansion. When China's interests extend toward the outside world, they are all achieved by common interests and a win-win approach. China will not confront the US or any other country on the world stage. At the same time, China will concentrate its strength on safeguarding its core interests. In that case, China will be as strong as the US in terms of core issues. Esper is accurate in the data he quoted and comparison between China and the US he made. But he is confused about the essence of being strong, and the conditions of transformation between strong and weak. Mighty powers in history always lost their way and declined because they failed to understand such relations. This generation of US policymakers seems to be committing the same error.

(N.B. This editorial was carried on the website of the English language Global Times a day earlier. The English version is reproduced below while the

version in Chinese is being translated.)

  Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has called on the incoming Biden administration to move quickly to restore lines of communication with China; otherwise, the world will slide into a catastrophe comparable to World War I. He believes that China and the US are "conducting their diplomacy in a confrontational way" and "the danger is that some crisis will occur that will go beyond rhetoric into actual military conflict." We think that all sides need to take Kissinger's words as a sobering wake-up call, especially the US, which has been taking the initiative to disrupt China-US relations in recent years. Everyone needs to think carefully about what Kissinger had said. Does anyone really want what Kissinger predicts? If the answer is "no," then now is the time to take action to stop it from happening. The most prominent conflicts between the US and China, in terms of trade, human rights, political systems, as well as issues over the South China Sea and the Taiwan question, are nothing new. But they have degenerated into irreconcilable conflicts. Globalization was supposed to provide more glue and lubricant for great-power relations, not the other way around. It is understandable for the US to be wary of China's rise, but the action of pushing the US and China toward a new cold war is deeply etched in the Trump administration's impulsive and unprofessional way of handling the disputes between the great powers. History provides many options for addressing the disputes at this stage, but the Trump administration has chosen the worst and most irresponsible way to put humanity at risk of what Kissinger warns of. China is very reluctant to engage in a conflict with the US and has been making efforts to maintain the two countries' normal relations. All the "decoupling" and confrontation between the two are initiated by the US. What is happening is that many Chinese are increasingly pessimistic, and believe that the US wants to stifle China's development and will continue to provoke China in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, and that some of America's allies in the region will cooperate with the US in doing so. To be precise, the Chinese people are also seriously preparing for a US-provoked war mentally and materially while striving for peace. As Kissinger said, China and the US need to restore lines of communication frayed during the Trump tenure. The two sides need to understand each other's strategic intentions and set rules and bottom lines in order to avoid catastrophic collisions after undergoing the trade war, shutdown of each other's consulates, expulsion of journalists and various mutual sanctions. Be it in academic circles or public opinion in both countries, most people believe China-US relations are likely to see a significant improvement. No matter whether such an analysis is reasonable or not, it's imperative to prevent the two countries from slipping into sharper confrontation, which is also in line with the expectations of both peoples. If Biden and his team heed Kissinger's suggestions, China and the US will meet each other half way and withstand the test of public will and history. We hope US allies will also heed Kissinger's warning and not go too far in assisting the US in containing China. Otherwise, once what Kissinger said happens, those allies will be like grass under the feet of fighting elephants. We want to tell the Chinese people that facing severe and complex situations, we need to have two strings to our bow. We are a powerful nuclear country, and we do not take the initiative to start a war. It will be an extremely difficult choice for any force, including the US, to impose a war on us. Such confidence may make us neither impulsive, nor timid, in face of threats. We should do our own thing seriously and strengthen our belief in peaceful development. We should not pursue the idea of teaching the US a good lesson. But there is also no need for us to be afraid of any provocation or pressure. China is such a powerful country. Is there anything we should be afraid of? China's trouble will also be the trouble of its challengers. We are willing to make sincere efforts to avoid troubles together. There is also another option for China, that is, to let nature take its course.

I want to clearly tell the US and Westerners that China really does not want conflict with the US, but many Chinese people are becoming more and more pessimistic. They believe that the US wants to stifle China's development and will continue to provoke China in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Some regional allies will cooperate with the US in doing so. To be precise, the Chinese are making physical and psychological preparations for a US-initiated war. I hope that all US allies will also heed Kissinger's warning and not go too far in assisting the US in threatening China. Otherwise, once what Kissinger said happens, those allies will be like the grass under the feet of fighting elephants. I want to tell the Chinese people that we must not be impulsive, naïve or timid. We are a powerful nuclear country, and we do not take the initiative to start war. It will be an extremely difficult choice for any force, including the US, to impose a war on us. We should do our own thing seriously and strengthen our belief in peaceful development. We should not pursue the idea of teaching the US a good lesson. But there is also no need for us to be afraid of any provocation or pressure. China is such a powerful country. Is there anything we should be afraid of? What will be, will be. China has the responsibility to strive for a bright future, and also has abundant power to let nature take its course. The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times.

(N.B. This editorial was carried in the English language Global Times too the same day on November 17th with the title "Japan-Australia agreement against China goes astray". There are some difference in the two texts that go beyond editorial or stylistic factors; these are shown below in strike-through format for the words/phrases of the English version not carried in Chinese, and in italics font for those added in the Chinese version but not carried in English.) Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and visiting Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison did not sign but said they have reached consensus on the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that has been negotiated for six years in principle. Some media called the pact a "breakthrough." It establishes a legal framework for each other's troops to visit for training and military operations, and greatly streamlines the procedures. It's widely reported by media that the RAA is of particular significance as it is the first  in-depth defense agreement for Tokyo since it signed the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement with Washington in 1960, and also the first one between Asia-Pacific countries excluding the US. Some analysts believe that Australia can be regarded as Japan's "quasi-ally" from now on. If Japan and Australia, both US allies, move horizontally toward a military alliance, it will form an important geopolitical trend in the region. Given that the Quadrilateral cooperation mechanism between the US, Japan, India and Australia is also active in the region, Japan and Australia moving closer in defense will lead to greater imagination. An "Asian NATO" has long been a vision pushed by Washington and followed by some US allies.

The RAA between Tokyo and Canberra is not about the defense cooperation in general terms. Japan and Australia are geographically distant from each other. This agreement clearly targets China and echoes is seen by the media as a direct response to the so-called "Indo-Pacific strategy" of the US' China containment strategy. The agreement further accelerates the confrontational atmosphere in the Asia-Pacific region and negatively affects each country's understanding of the regional situation. What's worse, it provides a new lever for the US to divide Asia. Since modern times, it is Japan that had invaded China and Southeast Asia, not that other way round. China did not expand its military to Australia, either. Only one country has invaded Australia in modern history, and that was Japan. Japan and Australia are developing their ties because of their strategic concerns over China. They work on the outdated military alliance and show a confrontational posture. Japan and Australia have embarked on old-fashioned quasi-military alliance efforts, almost overtly confrontational, simply because China has grown and they have strategic misgivings. They should understand the basic truth that "if you treat the other side as an enemy, the other side can really become an enemy". But they should know the potential strategic dangers of doing so. China adheres to peaceful development. It suggests developing partnerships but not forming alliances. Now, the US is using its two anchors in the Asia-Pacific region, namely Japan and Australia, to push forward the construction of an "Asian version of NATO." This has posed a severe question for China: How should China deal with it? China is facing a dilemma, a dissonance between reality and aspiration. The US, Japan and Australia are forcing China to explore deeper military cooperation with others. But if China goes too far as the US, Japan, Australia and India have, regional and even global division will intensify. China needs its own security as well as world peace and stability. The two aspects are closely related. Japan and Australia are Asia-Pacific countries. The region's peace and stability is not only China's demand, but also theirs. Isn't China's dilemma also a reflection of the self-interest contradiction of these two countries? The problem is, they are recklessly taking the first step to conduct deep defense cooperation that targets a third party, and have completely shifted the responsibilities of safeguarding regional unity to China while behaving irresponsibly themselves. This is not only unfair, but also very dangerous. China is unlikely to remain indifferent to US moves aimed at inciting countries to gang up against China in the long run. It's inevitable that China will take some sort of countermeasures sooner or later. When military confrontation in the region intensifies, as far as all countries in the region are concerned, China must have the strongest endurance. Countries like Japan and Australia have been used as US tools. The strategic risk for a tool to be damaged is certainly higher than that of a user. We suggest Japan and Australia exercise restraint on the way to ganging up against China. They should better not create confrontations with China under the instigation of the US, or follow the US in roping India in to contain China.The simple truth is that if they infringe on China's national interests and threaten China's security, China will not sit idly by and They will surely pay a corresponding price for treating China this way.    

   

The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, one of the world's largest regional free trade pacts, on Sunday has drawn great attention of US media. Mainstream American outlets such as the New York Times (NYT) and the Wall Street Journal quickly covered the news, describing the agreement as a "challenge" to the US. It is still unclear how the US will respond to this trade agreement. Biden administration will probably attach more importance to multilateralism. But it is not certain that he will choose to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). According to the NYT report, "Biden has said he would wait to negotiate any new trade deals." One important reason is that many who voted for Biden in the 2020 US presidential election are suspicious about US' participation in the Asia-Pacific multilateral trade mechanism. Due to the electoral system, it is very dangerous for politicians to fail to satisfy their voters' basic demands. Therefore, even if Biden prefers being part of the multilateral mechanism in the Asia Pacific, his voters, especially those from the Rust Belt states, could constrain his efforts. Based on domestic political considerations, Biden administration will be more hesitant to participate in free trade pacts like the CPTPP. Furthermore, to stabilize his administration, Biden might take measures similar to those of US President Donald Trump - by not joining any multilateral trade deals. This is totally possible. The core demands of Biden voters are jobs, healthcare (stopping COVID-19), and improved economic conditions. Regardless of previous or current US policies toward globalization, new trade deals seem to run counter to demands from some key voters. Hence, even though Biden wants to reemphasize multilateralism, it will not be an easy task. During the past four years in which Trump was busy pulling the US out of international deals and organizations, he has also, to some extent, convinced quite a lot of Americans of different classes that multilateral mechanisms like the TPP or CPTPP is harmful to the US. As a result, opposition to globalization resonates loudly in the US. It is criticized now for exposing American businesses to unfair foreign competition. Such a political legacy left by Trump will limit Biden's flexibility in maneuvering to join multilateral mechanisms. Biden was declared by US media as president-elect, but he won only some 5.5 million votes over Trump. Both of them had received more than 70 million votes. This reflects that Biden's base is not stable enough to allow him to do whatever he wants. Therefore, although Biden will consider multilateralism more, he has to make domestic affairs a high priority to stabilize his base. Foreign affairs will need to come after that. Evan Feigenbaum of the Washington DC-based think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said that the US is outside the CPTPP and the RCEP. These two deals will, as Feigenbaum pointed out, "set trade and investment standards in Asia for a generation." This, on the whole, is detrimental to the US' role and position in the Asia-Pacific free trade process. But due to still unsolved domestic problems accumulated over the past two decades, the US is so encumbered that it has to make a choice between domestic stability and its international influence. By citing some experts, the NYT said that RCEP "shows that the rest of the world will not wait around for the US." It intends to call for the Biden administration to weigh more multilateral matters. But the report weighs on the China-US competition whenever speaking about China. This zero-sum mentality actually shows that many US elites cannot be integrated with ordinary American people - they are highly divided. Mainstream American outlets like the NYT cannot represent what the majority of Americans are thinking about. Washington wants to lead the world in global trade and security, but simultaneously it is reluctant to assume responsibilities in the process of jointly building them right now. Consequently, as other countries continue to cooperate with world trends, the US is sitting aside. No country should be blamed for not inviting the US into multilateral mechanism. The US alone is to blame for its severe domestic problems and divisions. It has put itself into isolation. It is the one who holds itself back from embracing and benefitting from globalization and multilateralism that the rest of the world is partaking in. If this situation continues, the US' international influence is bound to decline. This is for sure. The author is professor at the Institute of International Relations of China Foreign Affairs University.

Why is this meeting being held? According to information from Taiwan, it is the concrete result of the US-Taiwan economic and commercial dialogues and intensive consultations. At the end of August, David Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, announced that the US would launch an annual economic and commercial dialogue with Taiwan. In September, during Krach's visit to Taiwan, it was said that the dialogue mechanism would be initiated. But in the end, it turned into an exchange of views on the relevant details of starting this dialogue. This is no more than a high-sounding announcement. The actual reason lies with two aspects: First, in this US presidential election, Taiwan was among the very few voices in the world that were optimistic about Trump's win, and have taken concrete actions to support him. On the very day of the US presidential election, Taiwan was still buying weapons from US arms groups, whom are top Trump supporters. Under such circumstances, Trump needs to take care of the efforts of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities and give Taiwan some support on the surface. Moreover, based on the historical experience of the formulation of US-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, this type of dialogue mechanism is often an opportunity for the US to take advantage of Taiwan. Second, the DPP authorities want to show its friendly relations with the US to the outside world. As far as the DPP authorities are concerned, they need to continue to utilize Trump administration's last 70 days to strive for the biggest promotion of the so-called substantive relationship between the US and the island of Taiwan, so as to cover up the mistake of anticipating Trump's victory they made. At the same time, the DPP hopes to establish a so-called mechanism with Trump to shape and influence Joe Biden's Taiwan policy. According to Taiwan's media, the US and Taiwan will discuss issues such as global medical security, science and technology, 5G network, supply chain, investment review, infrastructure and energy. This is no doubt just a show of hypocrisy between the DPP authorities and the Trump administration. From the level of participants and the news released before the dialogue, both parties clearly understand that no achievements can actually be accomplished. Representatives from Taiwan attending the talks in the US are only the deputy heads of the island's economic department. This is far lower than the previous dialogue channels between the US and Taiwan. On the US side, the one who is responsible for economic negotiations should be the Trade Representative Office, rather than the US State Department. The US appointment of Krach to lead the talks also means that the political nature of this dialogue is far greater than the substantive significance - it will be impossible to reach any concrete results. In addition, neither the US nor the island of Taiwan is part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest free trade agreement in the world, signed virtually on Sunday. Their economic dialogue is obviously of no practical significance. Although the final result of the US presidential election has not yet been concluded, it is widely predicted that Biden will become the next US president. Both Trump and Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen are very clear that Trump's policies will not affect Biden. Therefore, neither party will take this meeting seriously. Tsai cannot make any more mistakes given the fact that she made the wrong bet on the US election. The DPP authorities know that the Trump administration will soon step down. It is therefore very unlikely that the DPP will continue to maintain a long lasting and strong connection with Trump. Recently, the DPP reached out to contact the Biden team, hoping to establish a good relationship with it. It must also be pointed out that the DPP authorities' attempt to shape the Biden's Taiwan policy is likely to be wishful thinking. Nonetheless, the DPP's continuing role as a saboteur in China-US relations should not be underestimated. There will be ongoing risks from Taiwan to harness the US' pro-Taiwan forces to confront the Chinese mainland. Meanwhile, because a whole-of-government hostile strategy against China was formed in the US, Biden will probably carry on with it. This may enhance so-called US-Taiwan relations and play the risky Taiwan card against the Chinese mainland. The author is an associate research fellow of the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

The opposition Conservative Party of Canada has called on Ottawa to take a harder stance on China and Huawei technologies, according to Canadian media reports. Leader of the party Erin O'Toole said that in the face of a harsh response from China, Canada will need to work with its Five Eyes allies to counteract Beijing's influence. Washington has always been the backbone of its allies in their anti-China cause - especially these past few years under the Trump administration. Now, with a new administration about to be sworn in, whether or not the new president will strengthen the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to suppress China is worth paying close attention to. Biden is known for uniting and valuing US allies. He believes this will enable the US to achieve its diplomatic goals more effectively. Therefore, the Five Eyes alliance will undoubtedly be a platform that he relies on and supports. Analysts anticipate that Biden will strengthen intelligence sharing and cooperation and coordinating on China-related issues with the Five Eyes. To what extent the rest members of the alliance will coordinate with the US' suppression on China will be in part determined by the new administrations' specific policies. The Biden administration will not take its hands off China's technological boom. In recent years, there has been a trend for the US to encourage Five Eyes alliance members to find faults with China - anything found is exploited by the US for its own gains to bash Beijing. Some members in the alliance have been willing to act as Washington's little lackeys, notably Canberra and Ottawa. Given the feud between Canada and China over the Meng Wanzhou case and the arrest of two Canadians, Ottawa hopes to obtain more diplomatic support from the US. As for Canberra, its understanding of China has changed a lot: it now views China's influence overseas, especially in the southern Pacific, as a threat to its regional dominance. So it keeps pushing forward to confront Beijing with Washington's backing and blessings. London and Wellington, by contrast, have been relatively restrained. New Zealand did not join the rest four in a joint declaration condemning China's national security legislation for Hong Kong. The government under Jacinda Ardern is striking a delicate balance between China and its Western allies as it targets an export-led recovery from the economic damage of COVID-19. The UK, which is embattled by post-Brexit problems and the ranging pandemic, has recently been quiet about China. The US has been aware that the Five Eyes alliance is not enough to contain China's rise and it is eyeing more partners. In October, the Five Eyes alliance, together with Tokyo and New Delhi, issued a joint statement decrying end-to-end encryption, claiming that it prevents law enforcement. What they propose, however, would leave all device users subject to government monitoring, contradicting their accusation against Beijing that Chinese tech companies use encryption on commercial products with a secret backdoor. This shows that "national security" is just an excuse that Washington and its allies use to suppress China. There have been discussions about whether Tokyo and New Delhi will become a sixth and seventh "eye". Japan's Defense Minister, Taro Kono, told Nikkei Asian Review in August that, "Japan can get closer [to the alliance], even to the extent of it being called the 'Six Eyes'." Furthermore, media on the subcontinent also suggested that India "join the Five Eyes network" since "a network of intel sharing on China is crucial now." If Japan joins, it is more likely to take a free ride, as its counter-intelligence capability is relatively weak, and can hardly make effective contributions to the alliance. India's joining may provide some value to the alliance as it would enable the Five Eyes to share intelligence in South Asia. Nonetheless, whether India will give way to its claimed dominance in South Asia and risk its relations with both China and Russia remains questionable. The Five Eyes alliance is a by-product of the Cold War, and should have ended its mission a long time ago. It is still functioning because of the fixated Cold War mentality of certain countries. The international community should reject such a group. After all, this jeopardizes the existing international order and invites ideological confrontations. The author is an assistant research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies

Speaking at a virtual summit of the bloc of five emerging powers, Xi also reiterated that China will be more vigorous in integrating with the global market, taking the initiative in deepening global cooperation, and creating more opportunities and space for global recovery and growth. This came after the fourth BRICS Industry Ministers' Meeting on August 24, at which Minister of Industry and Information Technology Xiao Yaqing said that in order to strengthen practical cooperation with other BRICS countries, China is considering establishing a BRICS innovation base. BRICS countries should work more closely together to promote digital transformation, strengthen cooperation in 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), the digital economy and other fields, promote the digital transformation of enterprises, enhance the innovation capacity of enterprises, and promote sustainable economic and social development, said Xiao. Chen Xulong, researcher of the China Institute of International Studies, told the Global Times on Tuesday that the BRICS innovation base would focus on digital transformation and green energy innovation, including cooperation in AI, cloud computing and space cooperation, and medical technology, and projects would mainly be aimed at improving living standards. Against the backdrop of the pandemic, the BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - have entered a new stage of comprehensive cooperation that would not just focus on trade but on a wider range of issues to raise living standards and achieve an economic rebound, experts said. "More BRICS cooperation could be expected in the era of digitization, and high- and new-technology industry development, that the member states are very much in need of to achieve a rapid recovery from the pandemic disruptions," Song Kui, president of the Contemporary China-Russia Regional Economy Research Institute, told the Global Times. Among BRICS members, China and Russia have already cooperated in emerging industries including new materials, aerospace, 5G, robotic science, and application and navigation systems, and their cooperation will be further deepened. "For example, China's BeiDou satellite navigation and Russian's GLONASS will be further adapted to realize the depth of industrialization," said Song. The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership for the period up to 2025 determines the medium-term priorities for the development of the BRICS' interaction in trade, investment, finance, assistance to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, and the digital economy for sustainable growth, according to a report released by the Russian Embassy in China on Monday. Among the priorities, the investment and finance that come with the New Development Bank of the BRICS attaches great significance to future growth, experts said. With Russia holding the rotating presidency of BRICS this year, countries in east Europe, emerging developing countries, and SCO member states are likely to join, Chen said. More than 60 projects connected with the New Development Bank (NDB) have been approved for a total of more than $20 billion, according to the Russian Embassy's report. The bank announced on September 23 a placement on the international market of a five-year bond of $2 billion, with the proceeds to be used to finance projects to combat the consequences of the pandemic. Work is underway for the expansion of NDB membership. But experts warned of uncertainties posed by the global COVID-19 outbreak, and they said that unilateralism persists. The global outbreak has hampered the normal personnel exchanges and economic cooperation involved in the planning, which might cast some shadow on future projects, including the projects invested in by the bank, said Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. "In this context, the BRICS Summit this year could see less long-term cooperation, but more leaning towards dealing with the short-term crisis of the pandemic," said Zhao.

Malaysia will virtually host the 2020 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting on Friday. The meeting is expected to launch the region's Post-2020 Vision - the key policy document that is set to replace Bogor Goals, which reach maturity at the end of the year 2020. Bogor Goals, one of APEC's flagship initiatives, were announced in 1994 for members to move toward the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region no later than the year 2020. However, because each member differs in their economic development and have divergences between them, the Bogor Goals have not really been realized to their ideal potential. As a mechanism aiming at fostering economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, APEC is still functioning and is carrying forth its mission to continue to advance regional economics. All members have agreed to establish a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific as their long-term goal of regional economic cooperation. Therefore, they remain on the same page in proposing a new initiative - Post-2020 Vision - to set foster norms for the forum's future development. The corona virus pandemic has gravely hit economies in the Asia-Pacific region to varying degrees. Deepening cooperation under the APEC framework is conducive for their economies to recover and to lessen the impact of the virus. Tokyo-based Kyodo News agency has reported that APEC members, including the US, see Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade bloc, and the 11-party Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as steps toward realizing an APEC-wide free trade agreement called the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. Actually, the function of the two partnerships differs. RCEP is a regional economic cooperation framework based on solid connectivity of regional industrial and value chains. The birth of the RCEP is in proper accordance with economic laws. The TPP was originally launched by New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei. They sought to explore more space for development in the region under a concern that big powers such as China and Japan might take up regional dominance. In 2009, then US president Barack Obama found that the TPP could be exploited to restrict China in terms of economics - and even tear East Asia's overall economic structures apart. So he pulled in some regional countries such as Japan, Vietnam and Malaysia into the agreement with the main aim of targeting China. The move was nominally a high-level free trade arrangement. But in fact, it intended to form an economic structure that ruled out China altogether. The intension of Obama's promotion of TPP was very clear - to hedge against the RCEP, which was progressing with negotiations at the time. After the RCEP was signed this past Sunday, there was much discussion about whether or not a Biden administration would return to the TPP. The US now also seems to be considering the possibility of going back to TPP. The purpose will be the same: to contain China, weaken its overall influence in East Asia, and highlight America's leadership in the Trans-Pacific Region. If the US returns to TPP, it will form a competitive relationship with RCEP to weaken its structural capacities and integrity. The Trump administration has not yet confirmed who will attend the APEC meeting this Friday. Trump was absent from the 2018 APEC meeting. The US has shown less interest in APEC since the last days of Obama administration. APEC was an important platform for the US to dominate Asia-Pacific economies in its early days. However, with the economic rise of East Asia, the role of the US in APEC has been significantly reduced. Whereas Washington can no longer dominate the economy of East Asia, its interest in APEC is declining. But the country is still reluctant to give up - because this would be detrimental to maintaining America's reputation and leadership that it established during and following World War II. The US will soon usher in a new president in January. Biden is keen on regional multilateralism and is likely to take a more positive view of APEC than Trump. But in general, the US will not take it as seriously as it used to. The author is founding director of the Center for Strategic and Peace Studies at the China Foreign Affairs University.

While we don't know the details of the allegations made by Pakistan and what exactly has happened, China has always expressed firm support to the development of the CPEC. So it is certain that China will keep a close eye on how the issue unfolds in the future. Back in 2017 when India openly refused to be a part of the BRI cooperation, it expressed concerns over the CPEC, suggesting that it might influence the disputed Kashmir region, disregarding the fact that China has repeatedly stated that its position on the Kashmir dispute would not change because of the CPEC. Yet, despite the complicated geopolitical background, the CPEC is committed to promoting regional connectivity and common prosperity, and is a purely economic program focusing on cooperation in areas like infrastructure, social welfare, industry and agriculture. Pakistan's allegations came just one day after a military conflict with India in disputed Kashmir. Whether in the Kashmir region or in other regions, it should be an international norm for both sides not to attack local economic projects and civilians. Under any circumstances, both countries have the responsibility to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and projects. The Kashmir region is a longstanding source of regional conflict between India and Pakistan. The geopolitical turmoil has been a major hindrance to local economic development. China is a third-party country that has certain economic projects, mostly infrastructure, in the disputed region. While China has always expressed willingness to help Kashmir develop its economy through triangular cooperation with India and Pakistan, there is no denying that Chinese projects have faced difficulties from geopolitical factors in the past. The Kashmir region needs economic development, and India and Pakistan need to guarantee the safety of third-party projects there, otherwise it will be hard for the local economy to reach outside help and investment. If Chinese projects are also targeted in the regional conflict, there will be even fewer opportunities for the region to attract investment and obtain aid.  

Editor's Note: China and 14 other economies signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on Sunday to form the world's largest free trade zone, marking a historic win for multilateralism that would help regional and global economies cope with the COVID-19 pandemic and the rising protectionism.

Graphics: GT

This situation is a clear strategic setback for Washington. Since at least early 20th century, one of the most important goals of the US foreign policy has always been to prevent any consolidated anti-American center of power in Eurasia. US policymakers have perceived a divided Eurasian landmass as an indispensable prerequisite for the global US strategic hegemony. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger understood the critical importance of keeping Eurasia divided better than anyone else did. He was more efficient than any US leader before him in exploiting the growing rifts between Beijing and Moscow back in early 1970s. Can President-elect Joe Biden repeat Kissinger's success and resurrect the US-China-Russia triangle with the US at the top of it? Of course, almost 50 years have passed since the famous trip of Kissinger to Beijing in July of 1971. The world today is definitely very different from the world of the 20th century. The former bedrock theology of geopolitics may look old-fashioned and even antiquated. Still, let us consider the options that the US leadership has in trying to keep Eurasia divided. The first option would be to read Kissinger literally, that is to support the weaker US adversary against the stronger one. Today, it would mean that Washington should try to bring Moscow to the American side in its predestined confrontation with Beijing. After all, Russia is a communist country no more, and Russian leaders should be concerned about the growing asymmetry of power between their country and China. To play the weaker adversary against the stronger one was a stated goal of the Trump administration, which it failed to achieve. The US-Russian relations did not get any better under Trump. On the contrary, they fell to historic lows. It is highly unlikely that Biden can be more successful in pursuing this goal than his predecessor was. The US simply has nothing to offer to President Putin to make him reconsider his current close friendship with President Xi Jinping - be it in economic, political or strategic domains. Even if Biden were considering a new reset with the Kremlin, he would be hardly in a position to go for such a reset: The anti-Russian consensus in Washington is too strong and shows no signs of crumbling. It seems that the US-Russian relationship will be locked in a confrontational mode for many years to come. The second option for Biden in trying to resurrect the US-China-Russia triangle would be to play on the opposite side of the stage, seeking an acceptable accommodation with the stronger Beijing and putting the squeeze on the weaker Moscow. Turning Kissinger's geopolitical scheme on its head is certain to find a host of supporters and advocates in Washington. For them, Russia makes a far more convenient opponent than China. America would have to pay an exorbitant price for a full-fledged confrontation with China: a drop in their bilateral trade, which is very important for the US, severance of established global technological chains, a rapid increase in military spending, etc. The US-Russia confrontation will cost much less, given that there is very little economic and technological mutual dependence between the two states and Moscow is far less prepared to engage in costly military competition with Washington. However, is it realistic for Biden to count on a sweet deal with China? Such a bargain requires the White House to be willing to reconsider its fundamental ideas about the place the US holds in the system of international relations. The US will have to abandon its claim to global American hegemony similar to that of the times of Kissinger. Certainly, neither Biden nor his entourage is ready to do that. If a revolution in US' self-perception and its perception of the world ever starts, this is not likely to happen earlier than 2024 and, until that time, Washington-Beijing relations will remain complicated and tense. Even more importantly, just as Trump saw repeatedly throughout the four years of his presidency that it was impossible to tear Russia away from China, Biden will steadily see that China cannot be torn away from Russia. Beijing needs Moscow regardless of the current state of affairs and the prospects for China-US relations. China's leadership will be happy to act as an arbiter or "balancer" between Russia and America, but it will not actively support the US in its desire to corner Russia. In other words, if a US-China-Russia triangle could ever emerge, it would be a triangle with Beijing, not Washington on the top of it. Thus, the Biden administration will not accomplish a lot if it attempts to resurrect the US-China-Russia triangle. Under the current circumstances, a version of a "dual containment" equation appears to be the most likely approach of this new US administration towards Beijing and Moscow with China being treated more as a peer competitor and Russia as a global rouge state. To cut the costs of dual containment, Biden will try to mobilize US Western allies in Europe and in East Asia. It will also try to keep Eurasia divided by forging stronger ties to China's adversaries in Asia - above all, to India. By doing so, Biden will inevitably push the world closer to a new geopolitical bipolarity, instead of a modernized version of the US-China-Russia triangle. The author is director general of the Russian International Affairs Council.

Taiwan's economic authorities on Monday conservatively admitted that the island will bear the brunt of the RCEP in three sectors - petrochemicals, upstream textiles, and machine tools - as products from the island will face fierce competition from other RCEP countries, which shares a reduced tariff among one another.Lee Chun, deputy director of the Taiwan WTO and RTA Center of the Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, on Sunday warned that Taiwan may find itself ill positioned when it seeks to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia, where Taiwan's businessmen have invested a lot. Tariffs among RCEP members will be further reduced, which will cause Taiwan businesses a "painful adaptation period," according to Lee, Taiwan media reported. In 2019, Taiwan's exports accounted for nearly 66 percent of its GDP. According to data from Taiwan's economic sector, the 15 members of RCEP have a combined GDP of about $25.6 trillion, accounting for 29 percent of the world's total trade. And trade with Taiwan accounts for about 58 percent of Taiwan's total trade. Chiu Yi, a former Taiwan legislator and director of the Taiwan Institute for Economic Research, told the Global Times on Monday that reunification is the only way for Taiwan to join the RCEP, and the RCEP will assist cross-Straits reunification. Analysts said that although Taiwan businessmen operating in the mainland will benefit from the RCEP, it is the people in Taiwan who will ultimately suffer from the DPP's pro-American, anti-mainland line. In the first half of 2020, Taiwan's exports to the mainland (including Hong Kong) reached $66.8 billion, a 9.8 percent increase, making it the fastest-growing region among Taiwan's major export markets. The share of Taiwan's total exports to the mainland rose 42.3 percent, the highest in nearly a decade, Xinhua reported. On the island of Taiwan, workers are bracing for low wages, job losses and possible bankruptcies, Chiu said. Taiwan has been left behind by its main trade partners in the Asia-Pacific region, who are trying to lift trade barriers and open markets with one another. There is expected to be less room for Taiwan businesses to invest abroad, and the flexibility of industries such as petrochemicals, textiles and infrastructure will become worse, Chiu explained. "Taiwan's economic competitiveness will be weakened due to its being excluded from the RCEP, although many Taiwan businesses in Southeast Asia are able to access the benefits," Wang Yong, a professor at Xiamen University, told Global Times on Monday. He added that several Taiwan agricultural products now enjoy zero tariffs when delivered to the Chinese mainland, but the benefits will likely end as DPP proposes the so-called decoupling from the mainland. "Taiwan won't cut its economic links with the mainland," Wang said. Although Taiwan's "authority of foreign affairs" said Sunday that Taiwan is striving to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to seek economic cooperation under its "New Southbound policy," observers believe that the chance is also slim for Taiwan to join the CPTPP, as no country is willing to violate the one-China principle and damage its relations with Beijing, especially after the Trump administration withdrew from the TPP in 2017, the previous version of CPTPP. Chiu said the "New Southbound policy" is existing in name only, showing that Taiwan is increasingly isolated by the international community. Taiwan's exports to ASEAN memebrs accounted for 18.1 percent of its total exports in 2015, which dropped to 16.4 percent in 2019 and 15.5 percent in the first nine months of 2020, media reported. Chiu believes that the chances are also slim for the DPP authority to sign a free trade agreement with the US, as the new US administration, will prioritize to control the domestic epidemic, economic recession, social divisions, and healing European ties. Kung Ming-hsin, Taiwan's "official of development council" said on November 11 that there is no scheduled discussion on a bilateral trade agreement at an economic dialogue between the DPP authority and the Trump administration schedule on November 20, media reported.

The completion of the RCEP agreement has made many Americans and Europeans nervous. The island of Taiwan is also the same, but it totally deserves to be nervous. Aren't the Tsai Ing-wen authorities pursuing a New Southbound Policy? Let's see how Taiwan can bound toward south now after ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand have participated in this grand free trade zone without it. But for Americans and Europeans, it is odd and kind of neurotic for them to be nervous with headlines that say China "dominates" trade in the Asia-Pacific and "China wins." It was ASEAN who initiated the RCEP and brought it up to major neighboring economies. China just followed suit with the group into the talks until the talks were concluded. If one has to say China wins, then China must be way too strong so that it can win with a breeze. China has always pursued win-win, multiple-win and all-win outcomes. This is Chinese philosophy.  Americans do not believe it and always say that China's "win-win" means China wins twice. The West believes in the culture of power - focusing on who is the dominant role in whatever they do. But this is not the case with the Chinese people. We believe that the zero-sum games can be broken, and that everyone can win together. The bigger the snowball gets, the better China will become. Just look at how many countries the US is sanctioning. Now it is trying to "decouple" from China. This is lamentable because China has no economic enemies in the world. Washington has forced several US allies into awkward relation with China now - and they are all China's major trading partners. Even the island of Taiwan has close economic ties with the Chinese mainland - despite cross-Straits tensions.  Take a look at India. The country dares not join the RCEP. Once conflicts on border areas occur, India tends to drive Chinese enterprises out. For that, all I can say to India is: "You rock." The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times.

US Under Secretary of State Keith Krach, who visited Taiwan in September, will now attend the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue on Friday. Chen Chern-chyi, deputy head in charge of economic affairs for the Taiwan island, will lead Taiwan's delegation to Washington for the talks - which will be held both in-person and virtually, according to Reuters. The upcoming economic dialogue shows a step-up for the interactions between the US and the island. This trend continues to embolden the island of Taiwan given the high frequency of their recent high-level official exchanges. This might promote the illusion that if the island of Taiwan upgrades its relations with the US, then Taiwan may have more room on the international stage in the future. This fantasy is also contributing to greater tensions across the Straits. However, the dialogue is essentially a political pledge of the Trump administration, rather than a real economic talk that will bring practical good to Taiwan. A meaningful and substantial economic talk should be led by the US Department of Commerce or US trade representatives, not the US State Department. The State Department under Trump administration has become one of the biggest sources that undermine the one-China principle. This once again was proved by Krach's upcoming visit to the island. The dialogue takes place at a time when Trump's presidency might end in two months, which shows that the administration has gone to extremes. It is desperate to use the Taiwan card to pressure China. Both the timing and the intensity of the moves to irritate China are unprecedented - and anti-China sentiment has become hysterical. Since taking office, Trump's Taiwan policy has pushed the redline of the one-China principle to its maximum limits, surpassing any previous US administrations. Moreover, a tacit understanding between the US and China on the Taiwan question, which the two countries have together developed to keep a relation balance in the past, has been severely ripped apart by Trump's administration. Trump has played the Taiwan card to the bottom. In so doing, he has basically hollowed out the one-China principle and thus brought China-US relations to a historic low. Under a potential Biden administration, the redline across the Taiwan Straits, which has been seriously menaced by Trump, may be relaxed to some degree. But it is unlikely to be restored to the situation of the Obama era. The high-level official interactions with Taiwan and arms sales to the island in the future might become less. A Biden administration is also likely to publicly recognize the one-China principle, but the US still might not make much effort to rein in Taiwan secessionist forces. Taiwan has also taken a timely turn with the ongoing development of the US presidential elections. Taiwan's regional leader Tsai Ing-wen has publicly congratulated Biden on his election. Hsiao Bi-khim, the island's representative in the US, tweeted on Sunday that she spoke to Biden's policy advisor Antony Blinken to express congratulations to Biden and hopes for a closer cooperation between Taiwan and the US. Blinken is likely to be the future secretary of state in Biden's administration, according to certain analysts in US media. Hsiao's interaction with Blinken was meant to send a signal to the Taiwan public that the island also has strong ties to the Biden administration - even though it bet on Trump during the presidential election. Moreover, a call with Blinken, the potential future US secretary of state, was to show that Taiwan's relation with the US will not change, given that the State Department has long been an important role in promoting their relations. Hsiao's tweet mainly aims to maintain Taiwan people's confidence in relying on the US. However, the signal only tells Taiwan's wish and does not mean that it will come true. We have to warn Taiwan: It should be prepared for any possible consequence with either a high-level visit under the Trump administration, or official interactions with Biden's incoming team. Taiwan has always been and will continue to be a pawn of the US, no matter if China-US relations are good or bad. China-US relations have nearly hit its bottom under Trump. But it will definitely rebound one day. At that time, the so-called security interests and economic interests of Taiwan will face direct damage. This will be only borne by Taiwan people, not the Chinese mainland, nor the US. According to Hong Kong media reports, the mainland has drawn up a list of diehard Taiwan secessionist hardliners. They will be severely punished and held accountable for life in accordance with the Anti-secession Law, Criminal Law and National Security Law. If such a list were to be drawn up, it would have a big deterrent effect. More importantly, it shows that the mainland will never tolerate the Taiwan secessionist elements and will deal with them severely. It will firmly maintain the position of unification. The author is director of the Taiwan Research Center, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Affected by the continuous spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 12th BRICS (an acronym coined for the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit, originally scheduled to be held at the end of July 2020, will be held Tuesday via virtual conference. The form of the "cloud summit" reflects the severe impact of the pandemic on the BRICS countries, but also the hope for greater cooperation. In fact, the pandemic has not really hindered the pace of the BRICS dialogue. Under the vigorous promotion of the rotating presidency of Russia, the BRICS has planned to carry out nearly 100 online activities before the end of this year. As the most important BRICS events in 2020, the biggest highlight of the upcoming summit is how BRICS countries can now draw on each other's strength and help each other reach broad consensus and take effective actions on jointly promoting anti-pandemic cooperation, jointly realizing recovery and development, and ensuring global security and stability. Among them, Russia is crucial to the guidance of the meeting's agenda. At the same time, China's experience and proposals will also attract attention, as facts have proved that China has achieved major results in the fight against COVID-19. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated that "China is the only G20 country in which output is projected to rise in 2020." China and Russia will likely give full play to their respective advantages and act as "engines" in collaboration with other BRICS members to drive BRICS cooperation back to the fast lane. They will continue to become locomotives for global economic growth. At the same time, there is hope for all to create a more suitable environment for international peace, security and stability at the summit. In addition to fighting the pandemic, Russia put forward three major priorities in its presidency as early as the beginning of 2020. First, strengthening multilateral principles in global politics to promote the common interests of BRICS countries in international forums; Second, promoting cooperation in the fields of trade, economy and finance; Third, boosting cultural cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. First of all, under the pillar of political and security cooperation, there will be talks about how to take the opportunity of commemorating the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the 75th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations to further advocate for the establishment of a BRICS security community, and strengthen the "BRICS voice" and "BRICS action" to deal with international and regional critical issues. Second, under the pillar of economic, trade and financial cooperation, talks will address pandemic prevention and controls, looking at changes in the needs of economic and social development caused by the virus. It will seek to advance the implementation of the new "strategy for BRICS economic partnership." Third, in terms of people-to-people exchanges, the summit will raise ways to continue to enrich the content and form of cultural activities, look at how to effectively boost the depth of relevant exchanges, and create more popular branded products. Moreover, how Russia restarts the "BRICS plus" and "expansion model," resuming the dialogue between BRICS and emerging markets and developing countries, is also one of anticipated parts in the summit. It may promote the institutionalization of those dialogues. Against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, discussing how to save more people's lives, particularly the vulnerable groups, and protect their basic rights of sustainable development should be the top priority of the BRICS countries as they expand their dialogues with other countries. In today's era of profound changes unseen in a century, BRICS countries once again stand at the crossroads of history. The evolution of the international system and competitions between major powers has prompted some BRICS members to rely more heavily on BRICS cooperation. They have also stimulated certain BRICS members' speculative attempts to pick sides or to gain advantage from both sides in major power games. Yet despite the combined crises, the BRICS mechanism is functioning relatively well for creating meaningful dialogues. Whether or not BRICS countries can withstand new crisis, overcome fresh challenges and create new opportunities, will be the question that leaders of the five countries have to answer solemnly in the summit. The author is director at the Institute of Foreign Relations of the BRICS Research Institute of Sichuan International Studies University. 

(N.B.  This editorial was also carried on the website of the English language Global Times. The English version is reproduced below while the version in Chinese is being translated.)

During US President Donald Trump's final 10 weeks in office, he may sanction or restrict trade with more Chinese companies, government entities and officials for alleged complicity in human rights violations, or threat to US national security, senior US administration officials "with direct knowledge of the plans" told Axios, an American news website. US National Security Council spokesperson John Ullyot told Axios that "future US presidents will find it politically suicidal to reverse Trump's historic actions."

If the Axios' report is to be believed, then there may be two major goals behind the Trump administration's "final madness" against China. First, Trump may want to reduce the room for Joe Biden to improve relations with China, so as to consolidate the Republican Party's strategic containment against China. The shift in China policy is the Trump administration's biggest "diplomatic legacy," and they want to prevent a rebound in the China policy after they leave the office. Second, the Trump administration may want to prepare for the 2024 presidential election. If the Biden administration follows the current path in terms of the China policy, then they will have to put more effort into China-US confrontation. It would be hard for them to focus on the COVID-19 fight, climate change and other issues that the Democratic Party attaches importance to. The new administration will continue to live in the shadow of "Trumpism." Even if Biden makes technical adjustments to its China policy, the Republican Party can also criticize his "being weak" to China and stir up trouble in the 2022 midterm election and the 2024 presidential election. According to US media reports and other analyses, the Trump administration is most likely to create controllable conflicts that are often reported to the public, so as to reflect their tough attitude toward China. For example, Washington is good at finding fault on human right issues. Politicians, including US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, may utter more ruthless and extreme words to China. Last week, Pompeo said that "Taiwan has not been a part of China," which has broken the bottom line. But such moves have seen a decrease in the actual impact on China due to their high frequency. China is prepared for the risks of the post-election transition of the US government. Whatever Washington does will not be an unprepared encounter for Beijing. The Trump administration's new attacks on China will have a weaker international impact than it did before the election, as the world already knows that the end of the Trump administration is irreversible, and it intends to make such disruptions before leaving. For these intentional playacting provocations, Beijing can just ignore them. But for those attacks that might cause real harm, China will resolutely beat back and leave them in the lurch. The Trump administration is at its weakest no matter how tough they appear to be. The world knows that the Trump administration is going to make a mess and its support has hit its lowest level at home and abroad. Surely, we won't provoke them or kick them when they are down. But there's no reason to be afraid of their "final madness." Despite reports in the US media that the Trump administration is not going to make major moves in the Taiwan Straits in the last 10 weeks, China still needs to be cautious. The Chinese mainland has the most adequate preparation in the Taiwan Straits, and if the US and Taiwan collude to make a sudden and unacceptable move, the Chinese mainland will firmly hit back and make them lose completely. The US is a real tiger on the global stage, but when it comes close to China's coastal waters and touches China's core interests, it becomes a paper tiger. With just over two months left for the Trump administration, any attempt to flex its muscle or flaunt will receive embarrassment and humiliation. China is not a badge of honor for the US political elite to daub.

On Sunday, 15 Asia-Pacific countries concluded their negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), kicking off the world's biggest free-trade deal. The newly formed free-trade zone is set to encompass a population of 2.2 billion and roughly a third of the global GDP. It integrates 10 ASEAN countries, as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand into one giant market. The road leading to the final agreement has been a long and bumpy one, full of hard negotiations and setbacks - such as India's withdrawal from it last year. Yet most countries see great promise of economic prosperity in the deal and have chosen to embrace free trade while the menace of protectionism looms around most corners of the world. For countries like Japan, the need for open and reciprocal trade mechanisms has never been more urgent. With quite limited natural resources and a rather small domestic market, Japan is destined to develop an export-oriented national economy. Adding to this in this new era of globalization, many Japanese producers have been rationalizing and re-organizing their supply chains through international cooperation, and shifting their production abilities overseas. Frameworks that bolster and institutionalize trade among countries open the door to potential markets deserve to be cheered and celebrated by the Japanese business community - particularly the RCEP deal. In fact, Japan has been keenly involving itself in negotiations with multiple trade deals in recent years, and sometimes initiates them. Following the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which came into effect in the beginning of last year, Japan has also clinched the EPA with the UK. Moreover, the US-Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA) entered into force on January 1, 2020. In fact, long before these new partnerships took shape, Japan has been engaging in talks over trade agreements with over a dozen Asia-Pacific countries. What speaks most loudly for Japan's enthusiasm toward international free trade mechanisms is the active role it had played in the TPP talks after the Donald Trump administration pulled out. As a close political and military ally of the US, Japan did not follow Trump's path of economic isolationism - it rather made strenuous attempts to steer the negotiations out of a deadlock, and managed to reshape and revive the TPP as TPP 11 or CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). Whereas Tokyo has repeatedly manifested its inherent preference toward open trade partnerships, it is surprising that some of its policymakers and advisers are showing mixed feelings toward the RCEP. Some commentaries even claim that Japan is only accepting this mega deal with hesitation. What irritates these people is the concern that the RCEP may hand amplified regional influence to Japan's neighbor, China. As a country that lives off trade, Japan sometimes fails to guard its economic interests from irrelevant considerations. But the RCEP is just a trade arrangement. It is neither a geopolitical organization like the NATO nor a political-military alliance like the one between Tokyo and the Washington. Indeed, China is the biggest economy among all the participants. Yet all of them are bound by the same rules. And all of them benefit from cooperating with each other. Indeed, the global economy now needs to champion free trade more than ever as the pandemic rages and the world's largest economy wages blatant protectionist policies on other countries under the Trump administration. The RCEP is the fruit of more than a dozen countries' hard work over long years. It exemplifies billions of people's resolve to fend off economic isolationism. It should not be degraded or be thrown off course due to one single country's political agenda. To be clear, Japan is not above resorting to economic means to pursue political goals. The most recent example is the economic sanctions it imposed on its another neighbor, South Korea, as the result of disputes over historical issues. At one period during the RCEP talks, Japan once insisted that India should also be included in the deal. It even once claimed to withdraw if India was not going to join, mostly out of the hope to counter China's clout. However, Japan still ended up doing business with its Asian-Pacific neighbors, including China and South Korea. Maybe in the minds of some Japanese officials and politicians, cramming part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy or the QUAD into the RCEP is something worth trying. But to be honest: trade is trade, and it's in Japan's own interest to focus on trade. The author is a lecturer at the School of History, Wuhan University

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement initiated by ASEAN in 2012, was signed virtually on Sunday. The RCEP was originally between 10 ASEAN members and six other countries, namely China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

RCEP is huge in size and covers a wide range of issues from trade in goods, dispute settlement, and investment in intellectual property, digital trade, finance and telecommunications. Although India decided to withdraw from RCEP negotiations due to disputes over tariffs and trade deficits with other countries, the remaining 15 members have been working hard. They eventually signed the world's largest trade pact. RCEP will create the world's largest free trade zone. The signing of the agreement also has many special meanings. Usana Berananda, Thailand's director-general of the Department of ASEAN Affairs, said on November 5 that this will be the first-ever virtual signing of an agreement that ASEAN has undertaken. RCEP has become even more important with the COVID-19 pandemic still raging. All countries need to seek more extensive cooperation in the context of the public safety crisis. The signing of RCEP is a major victory of multilateralism over unilateralism, and an inevitable choice for participating countries to deal with challenges in a fast-changing world. Going forward, the Asia-Pacific region will be further integrated and reach in-depth cooperation like never before. RCEP will help China and ASEAN enhance strategic mutual trust and cooperation, promoting a community for a shared future for both sides. It also shows that China and ASEAN have the responsibility to jointly fight against anti-globalization and trade protectionism, and strive to bring bright prospects to the region and the world. Despite the severe economic impacts of COVID-19, the trade volume between China and ASEAN has risen against the downward trend. In fact, ASEAN overtook the EU to become China's largest trading partner during the January-June period. The signing of RCEP also echoes well with China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to promote regional integration and further strengthen policy communication with countries along the BRI. Based on the Joint Leaders' Statement on the RCEP issued in November 2019, they agreed to directly promote the connection of facilities with BRI construction. It is believed that the China-Laos railway and the China-built Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway will soon bring benefits to people in the region. Obviously, the BRI brings mutual benefits. In the critical period of fighting COVID-19, the BRI has shown its unique advantages between China and ASEAN. However, the signing of RCEP will be a blow to the Trump administration, which has hyped up trade frictions at all costs. This explains why Marc Knapper, US deputy assistant secretary for Korea and Japan, said Japan and South Korea "should be able to stand up and speak out when we see bad behavior from China." Faced with RCEP's signing, Washington has very few options left. One of the options is that once Joe Biden takes office, the US may return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which former president Barack Obama had promoted. But after the US' withdrawal, TPP has already been changed into the CPTPP - Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Being "comprehensive" and "progressive," CPTPP has become more feasible. Previously, the TPP was mainly focused on trade, but CPTPP also includes investment. The 11 members of CPTPP are all members of APEC, and they share a common will for further development. The US is only an outsider in the CPTPP. If it chooses to return to the partnership, will it be willing to accept the position as a newcomer? Or will it show its arrogance again? The US is very likely to use all means, including confrontation, hostility and smear campaigns to interfere with RCEP's operations. Doesn't Knapper's move to incite South Korea and Japan explain it all? If the US returns to CPTPP, Washington will try to turn it into a platform against RCEP. With growing populism and a paranoid Cold War mentality, the US is likely to continue its new economic and trade cold war with China. But the choice is not in the US' hands, but in the hands of CPTPP members. In a new era of globalization with win-win cooperation strategies, one must ask, will they abandon multilateralism and turn to unilateralism? The author is senior research fellow and professor at the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University

While we don't know the details of the allegations made by Pakistan and what exactly has happened, China has always expressed firm support to the development of the CPEC. So it is certain that China will keep a close eye on how the issue unfolds in the future. Back in 2017 when India openly refused to be a part of the BRI cooperation, it expressed concerns over the CPEC, suggesting that it might influence the disputed Kashmir region, disregarding the fact that China has repeatedly stated that its position on the Kashmir dispute would not change because of the CPEC. Yet, despite the complicated geopolitical background, the CPEC is committed to promoting regional connectivity and common prosperity, and is a purely economic program focusing on cooperation in areas like infrastructure, social welfare, industry and agriculture. Pakistan's allegations came just one day after a military conflict with India in disputed Kashmir. Whether in the Kashmir region or in other regions, it should be an international norm for both sides not to attack local economic projects and civilians. Under any circumstances, both countries have the responsibility to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and projects. The Kashmir region is a longstanding source of regional conflict between India and Pakistan. The geopolitical turmoil has been a major hindrance to local economic development. China is a third-party country that has certain economic projects, mostly infrastructure, in the disputed region. While China has always expressed willingness to help Kashmir develop its economy through triangular cooperation with India and Pakistan, there is no denying that Chinese projects have faced difficulties from geopolitical factors in the past. The Kashmir region needs economic development, and India and Pakistan need to guarantee the safety of third-party projects there, otherwise it will be hard for the local economy to reach outside help and investment. If Chinese projects are also targeted in the regional conflict, there will be even fewer opportunities for the region to attract investment and obtain aid. (N.B. The report on the same news published in the (Chinese language) Huan Qiu Shi Bao on November 16, 2020 is reproduced below.) THERE IS EVIDENCE! PAKISTAN ACCUSES INDIA OF SABOTAGING CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR "Today, we have irrefutable evidence and will show this to the international community". Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi and Pakistani military spokesman Major General Iftihar held a joint press conference in Islamabad on the 14th (pictured below), presenting a large amount of information on India’s support for terrorism in Pakistan, including letters and audio messages from Indian intelligence agencies to terrorists in Pakistan, and clearly accusing India of deliberately undermining the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Nikkei Asian Review stated on the 15th that Pakistan and India accused each other of supporting terrorism. The press conference on the 14th was the first case in which Pakistan shared a file publicly. The Pakistani side claimed that the Indian intelligence agency had formed a militia organization composed of more than 700 members and allocated 60 million US dollars to the organization to undermine CPEC. According to a report in Pakistan’s “Dawn”, at the press conference, Qureshi said that Pakistan had previously shared its concerns with major international partners but this was the first time it had publicly presented evidence to the world at large. He said that after "9/11", the world witnessed Pakistan becoming a front-line country in the fight against terrorism. From 2001 to 2020, Pakistan suffered 19,130 ​​terrorist attacks, more than 83,000 people were taken casualty in the war on terrorism and it suffered at least USD 126 billion worth economic losses. "While Pakistan has made huge sacrifices in terms of personnel and economy, India has been busy laying out terrorist networks". Qureshi said that Pakistan will submit the dossier to the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It should no longer remain silent about India’s support of terrorism. Pakistan’s Tribune stated that Qureshi mentioned two Indian intelligence agencies at the press conference -- the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Indian Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), calling them out for funding, training and harbouring by terrorists. He also explained in detail the nature of their contact with various terrorist organizations in Pakistan, including providing ammunition, and planning attacks. He said that there was a clear connection between the stepped up terrorist attacks in Balochistan, Pakistan and the proposal for construction of the CPEC. New Delhi has set up a unit in its intelligence agency with the sole purpose of disrupting the CPEC project. Qureshi said that Pakistan is ready to establish and deploy two security units to protect the safety of related projects and personnel. According to the Nikkei Asian Review, Major General Iftihar stated that India has recruited a 700-man militia to sabotage the CPEC, established a committee of 24 members, including 10 RAW agents, and earmarked funds to the tune of 60 million US dollars for this force. He also stated that there is evidence that RAW officer, Anurag Singh, was the mastermind behind the terrorist attack on the Pearl Intercontinental Hotel in Gwadar Harbor in 2019. Indian agents also directly participated in the plotting the attack on the Pakistan Stock Exchange in June this year, where Chinese companies own 40% of the shares. A spokesperson for the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied Pakistan’s accusation on the 15th, calling it an "anti-India propaganda activity".

Two pieces of China-related news from the US attracted attention on Thursday. The first is that Trump signed his first executive order since the presidential election banning US investors from investing in or buying shares in 31 Chinese firms that Washington says are linked to the Chinese military. The other is US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo saying Taiwan "has not been a part of China," and that has been recognized since the Reagan administration. A serious controversy over the election results has occurred in the US, but the situation is more favorable to Joe Biden. The two above-mentioned events show that the Trump administration will go into its "final madness" against China. Suppressing China is still a public stunt that this defeated ruling team wants to use to display its toughness until the last minute. They want to build a "political legacy" for themselves. The latest executive order will undermine US investors' interest in holding shares of Chinese companies and directly making investments through the capital market. Even if the order is abandoned after the Trump administration, it will make investors feel more risks. On the Taiwan question, Pompeo said something that other US senior officials never said before. His remarks once again renewed speculation as to how far the US will go to jeopardize the stability of the Taiwan Straits. The one-China principle is one of the cornerstones of China-US relations. Although the US has its interpretation on one China, the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China, and both sides across the Straits belong to one China, which is clearly written in the China-US joint documents. It was unimaginable in the past that a US secretary of state could say "Taiwan has not been a part of China." Barring last-minute events, there will be not much time left for the Trump administration. As they want to disrupt and create obstacles for a Democrat-led government, they could desperately do anything. During this period, it won't be surprising for them to utter radical remarks against China, or announce extreme anti-China measures to be implemented by the next government. The first thing that China needs to guard against is adventurous actions the Trump administration may take during the final weeks, especially military provocations and so-called diplomatic moves toward Taiwan. Once the US makes malicious provocations, China must resolutely strike back. The Chinese people don't want to be involved in trouble after the US election. But we must make the Trump administration know that we had not hesitated to fight back their provocations during the peak of their rule, nor will we be reluctant to strike back when necessary in the coming days. Now may be their craziest time, but we know it's also their most vulnerable time. They lack mobilization abilities to promote extreme confrontation with China. We also want to warn Taiwan authorities that they better not cooperate with Washington to take dangerous actions during the power transfer period of the US. The mainland has made preparations, including exerting stronger military pressure and carrying out punishments. Any upgrading of collusion between the US and Taiwan island will be severely punished by the mainland. The People's Liberation Army conducted intensive military exercises in the Taiwan Straits region recently. One of the purposes was to deal with challenges during the US government transition. Once the US and Taiwan island touch the bottom line, the mainland will fight a war that it is fully prepared for. The Trump administration has greatly sabotaged China-US relations, creating a countercurrent in which the US government plays a leading role in confronting China. This definitely runs counter to the spirit of the times, contradicting the practical interests of China-US relations. There are many negative assets in the China policy legacy of the Trump administration. It's believed Pompeo and his likes must be far more worried than the Chinese people to what extent their China policy will be inherited by the new government. What they calculate are party interests and individual ambitions besides national interests, while China's countermeasures are based on safeguarding core interests of the country and seeking common interests with the US. Therefore, China is able to deal with various challenges.

The conclusion of the RCEP indicates that the majority of Asian countries endorse an Asia-wide regional free trade framework that works to benefit all Asian economies and see it as a landmark step toward achieving closer economic integration in East and Southeast Asia. The RCEP sends out the message that Asian countries do not want to choose sides between the US and China. More significantly, they are not willing to blindly follow the US and exclude China, the biggest and most vibrant Asian economy, from the region's integration process.  A sound and healthy economic community in Asia cannot be achieved without China's participation. Of course, the concept of open regionalism embraced by China also welcomes America's participation in this cause. RCEP's rise was initially an ASEAN response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mega free trade agreement dominated by the US since it joined the negotiations in 2008. TPP membership included some Asian countries, but excluded many others. Most significantly, it excluded China, the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading partner of almost all Asian economies. The TPP was also an alarm to ASEAN because, before the TPP, Asian economic integration was driven and led by ASEAN, the largest regional organization in Asia. The TPP would divide Asia, slow down Asia's own economic integration process, and marginalize ASEAN. Against that backdrop, Asian economies launched RECP negotiations in 2012, under the leadership of ASEAN and with the enthusiastic support from China and other Asian economies. To some extent, RCEP reflects Asian countries' will to take the matter of regional economic integration in their own hands. Though they all welcome US input in the process, they are not inclined to see TPP-centric encirclement of China. The RCEP and TPP do not necessarily compete with each other. Instead, they represent different levels of economic openness and liberalisation. The TPP, now effectively the CPTPP, represents "deep integration" and high-degree of liberalization. However, the RCEP takes into consideration the diverse stages of economic development of various Asian countries and aims to cater to countries' individual needs and concerns while still significantly promoting economic integration and liberalization. The Trump administration's withdrawal from the TPP in 2016 resulted in America's detachment from the process of Asia's economic integration. The move, representing a Donald Trump-style economic nationalism and isolationism, was quickly followed by the Indo-Pacific strategy, a pro-active geopolitical initiative aimed at establishing a "united front" in the form of an alliance or quasi-alliance to contain China's rise. During the same period, Asian economic integration moved steadfastly and will soon see the fruit in the form of the RCEP. In this sense, the RCEP represents the failure of the Trump administration's attempted encirclement of China in western Pacific. The Trump administration's jettisoning of the TPP and promotion of "America First" unilateralism have raised doubts among Asian countries about US willingness to trade with the region on mutually beneficial basis. It is, however, highly likely that the Biden administration will change the Trump course and be more engaging in dealing with Asia on the economic front. In this sense, the successful conclusion of the RCEP might raise the alarm to a new and different US government. One should not take it as a surprise if the new Joe Biden presidency uses the RCEP to hype "China threat" in order to build consensus in the US to join the TPP again. Asia, in the spirit of open regionalism, welcomes more countries to join its regional integration project. If the US wishes to restart its TPP accession, the barriers it will face will not be in Asia, and may not even come from China. Even if Biden himself strongly hopes to resume the TPP membership, it might still take a long time for the US to reopen the process. The sentiment of economic nationalism in American society runs noticeably deep, and many Democrats, the political base of Biden, certainly are not the best friends of free trade. Candidate Hillary Clinton, when campaigning against Trump in 2016, vociferously objected to the TPP. It will be a painful process for Biden to develop a new narrative. In an ideal world, trade as an economic phenomenon should run its own course based on each trading nation's comparative advantage, without the interference of politics. In the real world, global trading is always tainted by domestic affairs and geopolitics. In this new round of China-US economic competition, the next key issue to watch is the global supply chain. Although former President Barack Obama and Trump are very different leaders, their trade policies share one common goal. That is, the US government, be it controlled by the Republicans or Democrats, is expected to alter the China-centred global supply chain and bring the gravity of the global production networks back to the US and its allies. At least, they probably both wish to move China out of the central position in the global supply chain networks. The difference is Obama implemented it through the alliance-building effort of TPP while Trump resorted to tariffs war. Further, Obama might have been willing to allow China to join, provided China could meet the high standards contained therein. Trump's aggressive unilateralism, in contrast, was perceived in China as overwhelmingly a geopolitical strategy to contain China and impair its "right of development". The US-China rivalry has however reached the stage where neither country can supress the other's development. At least from a trade perspective, a containment strategy undermines global welfare as well as damages both countries' economic interest. Unfortunately, this common sense has not been taken seriously by American policy elites. In this context, we should not have the delusion that pre-Trump globalization will be fully resumed. Insofar as the production networks are concerned, what is more likely to happen is the parallel existence of two global supply chains in Asia and North America, with China and the US as the respective leading players. Of course, most countries, including notably the European economies, will participate in both supply chains. The author is a professor of law at the City University in Hong Kong. 

Editor Note: China-US relations have faced unprecedented challenges now. The direction of the bilateral relationship has not only affected the development of the two countries, but also the future of the world. Where will China-US relations head after the new US administration takes office? How will Biden's China policies differ from Trump's? The Global Times collected opinions from several speakers at China Development Forum on Friday. William Cohen, former US defense secretary and Chairman of the Cohen Group I think it's very clear that there is going to be a very different tone that the Biden administration in dealing with China and with other countries. There will be a different tone, one of civility, one of a statesmanship, one of responsibility and personal relationship building. So I think there'll be a very different tone from what you've seen for the past four years. But that doesn't mean there's going to be much of a change in substance. The issues which we've been foundering on for the past four or even longer years really are centered around strategic distrust. We still have a strategic distrust between us. China doesn't trust the US and the US doesn't trust China in terms of how we've been dealing with issues like the military and human rights. Those are all issues on which we are will continue to disagree on. So I am looking forward to a Biden administration who will try to address these issues that currently separate us. There are so many issues that we can cooperate on, on the environment issues, pandemic issues, dealing with nuclear weapons and countering terrorism. Those are the issues where we certainly can come to an agreement. I'm sure that the Biden administration will continue to talk about human rights and put that on its agenda. So those are issues which will be contentious. They could start a friction but this is something that is really indigenous, I might say. Zhang Baijia, former deputy director of the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee The US now regards China as a strategic competitor. This is the fundamental reason why bilateral relations cannot return to what they were in the past. But I want to emphasize that the goals of China and the US are different. The US wants to maintain its global leadership, while China hopes to safeguard its right to development. China and the US will witness a comparatively plain relationship in the next two years to come. After the leadership change in the US, the two countries may mend fences in some areas so as to avoid bilateral relations spiraling out of control. Meanwhile, the two will carefully consider the gains and losses of their past policies and mull over how to engage with each other. Judging from the current situation, on top of the agenda of both countries are many domestic issues. For China, 2020 is critical in the decisive battle to comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society and is the year that the 14th Five-Year Plan was mapped. And next year China will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. For the US, there exists a demand to bridge the domestic divide, and to contain the pandemic. The Democrats also need to strive for an advantageous position in the 2022 middle-term elections. Therefore, these will lead to a buffer period in the China-US relations. It's expected that the Biden administration will act differently from the Trump administration. It will abandon Trump's "America First" unilateralism, and make changes in many aspects. But though there may be some adjustments, the basic policy that takes China as a strategic competitor will not change. For China, the policy change of the US will be both a challenge and an opportunity. Craig B. Allen, president of the US-China Business Council Since the US-China trade conflict began approximately three and half years ago, uncertainty in relations has really become a top challenge for US businesses operating in China, and for Chinese companies operating in the US. Volatility in the politic policy and regulatory environment, and the threat of countermeasures create unprecedented challenges to businesses planning and supply chain stability. We have said for many years that the business community takes a long term view of the relationship, so that means that we look beyond current challenges, our companies value our employees and customers in China. The business community hopes for a stable consistent policy in the 70 days before the new administration is sworn in. There are many challenges between now and the inauguration day, and not all are on the US side. For example, it looks unlikely that China will meet its ambitious targets set out for 2020 phase one [of their trade agreement], which may threaten the resilience of the agreement. In addition, just yesterday we saw another executive order that is intended to restrict American investment in Chinese companies that may have a relationship with the PLA. There may be increased tensions in strategic issues between the two countries. We encourage both sides to maintain calm and stability and avoid undermining business confidence in this transition period as we all prepare for a new administration to take office. There are many new key positions that President-elect Biden must fill. The policy approach regarding China is still under development. We need to be patient and give the new team a bit of time. However, the business community is already advocating a policy that quickly addresses our commercial concerns while building a more sustainable, long-term relation. One of those major issues is trade. Phase one (trade deal) remains an important commitment embraced by both countries. Both sides should meet their commitments to ensure that tariffs are progressively removed, trade and investment increases, and confidence is built from day one.

The US will continue to pressure China on issues including intellectual property rights, technology transfer, cyber security, and China's compliance with the terms of WTO, Roach predicted. Roach calls Trump-initiated trade war with China “a big mistake,” and suggests Biden to find a more workable approach to deal with the trade imbalances between the two countries. Biden has railed against Trump’s trade war – which studies estimate has trimmed 0.7 percent from US GDP – and would likely roll back many tariffs. Roach anticipated an eventual reduction in tariffs, saying that “if left unchecked, the tariffs could lead to damage to both nations on both sides of the conflict.” He instead touts an alternative approach of “bilateral investment treaty,” which requires mutual opening of markets between the two countries. “It could open up China's market to US companies, as well as open up US market to Chinese companies. And it would be based on enforceable and transparent rules governing mutual market access. We were close to reaching agreement on a bilateral investment treaty during the Obama administration but unfortunately those negotiations came to a halt as soon as President Trump took office in 2017,” said Roach. As COVID-19 cases in the US were recorded at more than 10 million, Roach pointed out that the adverse economic consequences of Trump administration’s approach to the coronavirus “could not contrast more sharply with the robust recovery in China.” “Just as China led the world in economic recovery in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, it is playing a similar role today,” Roach said in a recent commentary. He said China is playing a much stronger role in driving global economic growth than the US is. Moreover, he is concerned about the “faster and harder crash” of the US dollar, which he called “remains the most overvalued major currency in the world.” There will be a sharp deterioration of our domestic savings brought about by very large, government budget deficits that are going to be just as large under the Biden administration, if not larger, than they were likely to be under President Trump, according to Roach. The US has not done a good job in containing the virus, and it has used aggressive monetary and fiscal policy to try to compensate for its shortcomings in public health measures. “My fear is that will not work because we're now having a huge surge of infections in the United States,” he told the Global Times.” If America is successful in controlling the virus, it will be better positioned to resume its role as an engine of global growth, he said. Under the impact of anti-globalization trends like populism and trade protectionism, multilateral mechanism promoting regional economic integration has become a popular alternative for countries seeking more cooperation. Roach expects new leadership in the US may bring a chance for the US to get back in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) framework negotiated during the Obama-Biden administration. Calling for China to join the partnership is also becoming more popular. Roach called the mechanism “a constructive, rules based, high-standard multilateral framework.” “Ultimately, it will work best if it eventually does include China. That should be viewed as an important long-term goal of trade liberalization and economic integration,” he suggested.

India will not join the RCEP. The Indian government argues that as China has an advantageous position in the deal, and India has a ballooning trade deficit with China, such a context would leave India in an unfair position, were it to join. However, most international observers believe that it's the work of some interest groups in India, trying hard to obstruct India's participation for their own interests, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party made concessions in order to win their support. Furthermore, Modi is pushing ahead with the "Make in India" policy, which is characterized by strong economic nationalism, to encourage domestic production. However, considering India's foreign policies, especially the economic sanctions it has taken against China in the past year or so, not joining the RCEP may be a major strategic decision made after careful consideration. After the COVID-19 epidemic broke out in China at the beginning of 2020, many Indians thought India had an opportunity to develop their manufacturing industry and overtake China. The Indian government has introduced preferential measures in terms of land and taxation, lobbying multinational companies in China to transfer their production chains to India. In September, Japan, India and Australia agreed to launch an initiative to build resilient supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Galwan Valley physical clash in June has provided an excuse for India's "de-Sinicization" process. At the same time as the Trump administration is pushing for "de-coupling" from China, India, in fact, is promoting its economic "de-Sinicization" process more provocatively. Judging from remarks by some Indian senior officials and strategic elites, New Delhi hopes for a cold war, even a hot war, to break out between China and the US very much. It thinks India would gain a remarkable development opportunity from serious China-US confrontation. By moving closer to the US, India hopes Western countries, including the US, Europe, as well as Japan, could provide it capital and technology to help develop its manufacturing industry so that a value chain and industrial chain that can replace China will be established. Not only does India not want to join the RCEP, but it also has no desire to see Japan take part in it. India doesn't want the RCEP to be signed at all. Nonetheless, the deal is soon to be sealed. History will prove that the Modi administration has made a serious strategic blunder. Although the RCEP contains a clause leaving the door open for India to get back on board later, the threshold to join in the future will be higher and India may never have the opportunity to return. Missing the RCEP, India will lose its last chance to integrate into the globalization process. The Modi government had hoped a Trump reelection would lead the US to continue the trade war with China, as well as the consequent decoupling process. Therefore, India had actively promoted the development of its strategic partnership with the US prior to the US election. A de facto alliance between India and the US has formed since the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. After Joe Biden takes office, although the direction of the US' China policy will not undergo significant changes, a Biden administration will take completely different diplomatic approaches from the Trump administration. There will be more dialogue channels and cooperation opportunities between the US and China under Biden despite a continuing effort to contain China. This is by no means what the Modi government wants to see. The Biden administration is likely to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to revive the US economy. CPTPP is a regional economic integration agreement with higher thresholds. If India cannot even meet the criteria for joining RCEP, nor will it pass the CPTPP thresholds. India has dreamed to build its own economic sphere of influence and lead the regional economic integration of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation countries. It's fair to say, given its economic development level, India is unable to realize such ambition at all. For other RCEP members, India's opt-out might be a good thing. The Indian market looks vast, but it's quite closed and conservative with a low actual consumption level. Besides, organizations in which India participates and has a big say often have low efficiency and don't function well. It's fair to say India is unable to help achieve anything but is good at spoiling things. Opting out of the RCEP means India will be isolated in the next round of globalization and regional economic integration, but for other RCEP members, it means they will meet fewer obstacles in promoting regional economic integration. The author is Secretary-General of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, a visiting fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China and a distinguished fellow of the China (Kunming) South Asia & Southeast Asia Institute.

China has never restricted the departure of an Indian ship carrying Australian coal that has been stuck at Jingtang port since June. The shipper's unwillingness to adjust the ship's operating arrangements for commercial reasons is the real cause of the situation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Friday. Wang Wenbin, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Friday's media briefing that the Chinese authorities have maintained close communication with India, and have replied to India's appeals. In the case of emergency assistance, as long as an application is received, China will immediately assist in compliance with epidemic prevention regulations, including providing the necessary supplies, Wang said. Wang's remarks came after some Indian reports said that the crew members on the ship were seeking immediate relief, and the International Transport Workers' Federation has put out a statement saying it has grave concerns for the sailors on board.

Although the China policy of the incoming US president remains unclear, judging by what he said with Suga, it is anticipated that China-Japan relations may embark on a bumpy road due to interference from the Washington. As the US-Japan alliance is the pillar of Japan's postwar diplomacy, almost all Japanese administrations have made good US-Japan relations a top priority. Since the US mainstream media declared Biden's election victory, the Japanese administration led by Suga has been eager to set up contacts with the Biden team. On Sunday, Suga congratulated Biden via Twitter. His government is seeking to set up ties with Biden via former US ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy. The Suga administration wants to deepen alliance with the US and establish a good personal relationship with the US leader. Still, the "bromance" between former prime minister Shinzo Abe and Donald Trump contributed a lot to the stability of the Japan-US alliance. Against the backdrop of intensifying China-US competition, the Suga administration needs to know Biden's stance in issues such as the Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea and the South China Sea in order to maintain solidarity with Washington. In recent years, US officials have often agitated the Diaoyu Island issue. But it is surprising that Biden, who has not yet officially taken office as president, suddenly expressed such stance. However, this may not be so surprising considering Biden's previous political record. In a joint press conference with then Japanese foreign minister Seiji Maehara in October 2010, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton reassured Japan by saying that the Diaoyu Islands, "fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security." Former US president Barack Obama made similar statements as well during his state visit to Japan in 2014. Biden, as vice president during the Obama administration, is now continuing the Obama administration's diplomatic thinking. Senior US officials' pressure has also boosted Japanese anti-China forces' confidence to confront China. For example, the Japanese government outrageously announced the so-called nationalization of Diaoyu Islands in 2012, which led to a sharp decline in China-Japan relations. The US' intervention has driven a wedge in China-Japan relations, deliberately hindering the two countries' normal relations. In fact, when Suga served as chief cabinet secretary, he made many strong statements on the Diaoyu Islands issue. For example, in 2014, he declared that the Diaoyu Islands "are an inherent part of the territory of Japan." Now that Suga has become Japanese prime minister, he made sure to talk about the Diaoyu Islands issue during his first phone call with Biden. This shows that Suga is looking for the US' commitment and protection. He is also preparing for taking stronger measures on the issue and on Japan's strategic moves toward China. For the moment, it is difficult to predict Biden's China policy after he assumes office. But given his remarks when talking to Suga over the US-Japan alliance and the Diaoyu Islands, as well as his experience in the Obama administration, it is anticipated that Biden will continue the rebalance to Asia-Pacific strategy. Following this logic, he will probably proactively participate in Asia-Pacific affairs, encouraging or acquiescing in Japan to confront China or stirring up troubles in the South China Sea. As a matter of fact, Japan is also willing to become a pawn in US China strategy. Due to the continuous emergence of China, Japan has always been worrying that the US would pay too much attention to China while ignoring it. Japanese media outlets and scholars often use the term "Japan passing" to describe the scenario. In his State of the Union Address in 2011, Obama repeatedly emphasized the competitiveness of China, without mentioning Japan at all. This shocked the Japanese government and society. Therefore, Japan tends to hype up the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands to arouse the attention of the US toward it. Although Biden has not yet officially taken office, the China-Japan relationship, which is continuously improving and developing, will likely fall into a downturn spiral again thanks to the intervention of future Biden administration. It should be well aware that sluggish China-Japan ties from 2012 to 2017 were more than just the Abe administration's moves that have hurt the bilateral relationship. The relations were also damaged because the Abe administration proactively acted as a pawn with Washington's rebalance to Asia-Pacific strategy. The improvement in China-Japan ties does not come easily, and needs to be cherished more. It is hoped that the two countries can meet each other halfway and properly handle their divergences so as to open up new vistas of their bilateral relationship. The author is a media professional and a Beijing-based Japan watcher.

If everything falls into place, the RCEP will be the world's largest trade pact, even without the inclusion of India, which pulled out last year. It will also give a boost to the region's economic and trade vitality and integration. It will be a major achievement of economic integration of East Asia in the past two decades. For India, not joining the RCEP means it will miss big markets such as China, Japan and ASEAN. Especially against the backdrop of the global COVID-19 pandemic, all countries need foreign markets to help revitalize their own economies that are hit hard by the pandemic. Meanwhile, India lacks the capital and technology to develop its economy. Joining the RCEP can make up for this shortage. India's refusal to join the pact comes as a result of its worries that its domestic manufacturing and agricultural industries will take a hit by imports from China which may jeopardize Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "Make in India" agenda. Although manufacturing products from China and Japan may come to the Indian market, but these products are actually high-end, which can complement India's products which are usually at the low end, thus not posing as a major issue for India's manufacturing industry. The real reason behind India's refusal is geopolitical considerations. As China and Japan are regional economic major powers, they will have more say in the RCEP. Now India is obsessed with its pursuit to be a major power and hopes to play a dominant role in regional and global cooperation. Therefore, it does not want its role to be overshadowed by other countries. Nonetheless, India's ambition cannot be supported by its strength. India, on the one hand, wants to play a leading role in the region, but refuses to join regional blocs such as the RCEP, on the other. This reflects India's contradictory mindset. Cooperation under the framework of the RCEP is economy and trade-centered, which India has refused to engage in. But India is actively promoting cooperation under the framework of QUAD, a security grouping comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia, that is centered on politics and security. When it comes to future regional economic cooperation, other countries would wonder if India would play the political card. Japan used to jitter about joining the RCEP, but now it has become a strong advocate for signing the deal. Japanese government sources said India will be exempted from a stipulation that RCEP signatories will not accept new entrants to the framework for a certain period of time. For one, Japan has invested a lot in India. For another, political ties between India and Japan are getting closer these years. The warming-up of US-India relations also signals the closeness of India and Japan. There have been scholars exploring how Japan, India and Australia can construct a middle power coalition in the Indo-Pacific. In September, the three countries agreed to launch an initiative to achieve supply chain resilience in the Indo-Pacific region, in an apparent bid to reduce trade dependence on China. If India joins the RCEP, it may provide a chance for India and Japan to balance China's influence in the group. But India is not likely to join in the next few years. On the one hand, India is not confident of its economic strength. In the past two years, economic reforms promoted by the Modi government are not that successful. This year, it quietly pushed forward new reforms, indicating a failure of its previous endeavors. On the other hand, India will look for alternatives such as sub-regional economic cooperation, e.g. the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative. But indeed, India needs to think big. As a rising power, India should think about its role and the long-term development in Asia and beyond. This should be the attitude for India to develop its economy and diplomacy in a steadfast manner. The author is a scholar at the Sichuan Police College.

China and Pakistan have a long history of interaction and people-to-people exchanges, helping foster their relationship and mutual understanding in a variety of cultural sectors, said the Pakistani Ambassador to China. The two neighbors are getting closer than ever, from arts and culture, infrastructure and poverty alleviation to cooperation in regional security.

Friday sees the release of Parwaaz Hai Junoon, the first Pakistani film to hit Chinese mainland theaters in decades. Ambassador Moin ul Haque told the Global Times in an exclusive interview that he expects the movie to be warmly welcomed by Chinese audiences. Cultural exchanges Ahead of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan in 2021, Parwaaz Hai Junoon - a Pakistani romantic war movie made in 2018 - is scheduled to hit Chinese cinemas on Friday. "Parwaaz Hai Junoon is one of the most popular and highest-grossing movies to be made in Pakistan, which had done very well in box office in Pakistan and across the world," said Haque. "So we are very happy that it has become one of the first movies after a gap of almost 40 years to be screened in China, and would like to thank Fire International Media for its role in screening of the movie." "The movie is a tribute to Pakistan Air Force. It's a bit of action, drama, romance, comedy, and I hope that people in China like it as well," said the envoy. He mentioned the two countries are also planning joint production in the film industry. "So this movie will be a trailblazer and a starting point for such a cooperation." The ambassador said there is a long history of interactions between people living in China and Pakistan. "So after our two countries became independent, this history and cultural affinity brought them closer and closer to each other," he said, mentioning the two sides signed their first cultural cooperation agreement in 1965. "Since then, we had numerous events between Pakistan and China in the fields of art, festivals, sports, literature, and music. We have also established a number of sister cities and sister provinces between the two sides," said Haque. "We are also planning a number of cultural activities to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of our ties in 2021." "Cultural and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries help foster their relationship and mutual understanding," he said. "We have also set up Pakistan study centers in a number of Chinese universities, and similarly, there are also Confucius Institutes in Pakistan which are teaching Chinese language and history." According to the ambassador, China is the top overseas destination for Pakistani students, 28,000 of whom are studying in China. Multilateral frameworks The movie also highlights a JF-17, a fourth-generation fighter jointly developed by China and Pakistan. In the movie, a teacher at the air force academy asks students to compare the JF-17 with Mirage 2000, a French multirole, single-engine fourth-generation jet fighter, in class. A student answers that the JF-17 has three advantages, including flexibility and safety. According to a report by Jane's Information Group, China and Pakistan have launched production of a new variant of the JF-17B "Thunder" multi-role combat jet, to be inducted into the Pakistan Air Force by April 2021 to enhance its operational capabilities. "JF-17B 'Thunder' fighter jet is a joint production between Pakistan and China, and a symbol of great close friendship and partnership of the two countries," said the ambassador. "Now the two countries are working for the next generation fighter jet." He stressed that China and Pakistan are two important and responsible members of the international community, and adhere to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. "We have been contributing to the international community and maintaining global peace and security. We believe in the respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We believe in multilateralism and resolving disputes through peaceful means," said Haque. Corridor of opportunities Deeper and closer China-Pakistan relations have also helped them cooperate in other fields, including infrastructure, transportation, economic development and poverty alleviation, as well as regional peace and stability. Pakistan's first metro line, built by Guangzhou Metro Company, opened on October 25 in Lahore. It will be jointly operated by Chinese and Pakistani companies. Haque said the metro line is an extremely important project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will provide a modern, efficient, and affordable transport services to the people of Lahore, a metropolis of 12 million people with serious traffic congestion. The line will also help reduce carbon emissions and air pollution in the city as more people use it to commute. The envoy noted that China and Pakistan are discussing and working on many other transportation projects under the framework of CPEC in other major cities, including Karachi, capital of Sindh province, and Quetta, capital of Balochistan. He said the CPEC, in its first phase, focuses on infrastructure and energy development, referencing Gwadar Port projects in southwestern Pakistan under the BRI. The port "will enhance connectivity between our two countries and the rest of the world," said Haque. In the second phase, the CPEC will mainly concentrate on the areas of agriculture, science and technology, and vocational training, which are very important for Pakistan's poverty alleviation, and economic and social development, said the ambassador. "By learning China's experience, we are building a number of special economic zones across the country, which will provide opportunities for investors from China and other countries," he said.

President Xi Jinping attended the meeting and delivered an important speech. Russia holds the rotating presidency of the SCO this year. Although it was held online, the conference attracted massive attention with the COVID-19 raging worldwide, uncertainties increasing, tensions intensifying on the China-India border, and the breakout of conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The SCO is a banner in safeguarding multilateralism. It's also an important platform to promote regional security and cooperation. Strengthening the organization is in the interests of all its member states, and in promoting global governance.

Established in 2001, the SCO was initially aimed at fighting the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism through coordination. It has been upgraded gradually to foster regional cooperation. The member states also participate in other international organizations. Compared to those organizations, the SCO is a group whose members are geographically close to each other. It starts from regional security and expands to economic development, thus involving the major interests of all members. Its importance is self-evident and the development potential is almost unlimited.

In our view, it's very necessary for SCO member states to build this organization as an important platform to safeguard national interests and regional common interests. They should develop good relations with other members, figure out common concerns, and jointly promote the SCO to exert a greater influence in the world. This should be one of the bases for the members' diplomacy.

For those not willing to see the strengthening of the SCO cooperation, from the US to other Western countries, badmouthing the organization and hyping the conflicts among the SCO member states has always been the value orientation of their public opinion. They believe that multi-polarization should also be centered on the West, and SCO should not form a center of gravity alone. Therefore, SCO member states need to be vigilant about such opinions, and keep sober and have independent thinking on Western propaganda.

It's fair to say that the growth of the SCO since its establishment is not at an ideal speed, but it has promoted the interests of all members. Terrorism, separatism and extremism have been hit and suppressed in the region, and political stability in most member states has been strengthened. It has been increasingly aware that it's necessary to expand economic cooperation among member states. Some results have been achieved.

In particular, Australia, an island country albeit of continental proportions, has similar characteristics with Japan in terms of geosecurity disputes and the ongoing power competition. This allows the two countries to have a lot of room for military cooperation. For Japan, Australia has become the country with the closest security cooperation besides the US. Certain observers now recognize that Japan-Australia relations are considered as quasi-military alliance. In September, Yoshihide Suga formally assumed the post of Japan's Prime Minister. He carried out the first telephone summit meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison on September 20. The two sides expressed their desire to continue to strengthen Japan-Australia relations and confirmed that they will deepen security cooperation for the establishment of a free and open Indo-Pacific region under the Indo-Pacific concept. Within two months of Suga coming to power, significant progress has been made in Japan-Australia security cooperation. On October 19, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and Australian Defense Minister Linda Reynolds held talks in Tokyo. The two sides reached an agreement to create a framework within which the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) will provide protection for Australian warships and other military assets. Australia will become the second country, after the US, to have its military assets come under Japan's protection through a provision in the SDF Law. Moreover, the two sides discussed issues such as military cooperation in new security fields including space and networks. Exchanges and visits between military officials and troops were on the agenda as well. While the two defense chiefs were actively preparing to boost security cooperation, the SDFs and the Australian Army also sent warships to conduct military training exercises with the US military in the South China Sea. According to Japanese media reports, Tokyo and Canberra have basically reached an agreement regarding the simplification of specific procedures for sending troops to each other's country for military operations, such as training exercises and disaster relief assistance. The negotiations began in 2014, and the agreement was originally named the "Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)," which has been changed to the "Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)." It is expected that the above-mentioned agreement between Japan and Australia will be finally confirmed during Morrison's visit to Japan later this month. Australia will then become the first target country of Japan's RAA. Australia is an important partner for both Japan and the US in their implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. On the basis of the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo and Canberra have continued to carry out deep security cooperation. On October 6, the foreign ministers of the four countries - the US, Japan, Australia and India - gathered in Tokyo to discuss cooperation on the so-called Indo-Pacific Strategy, with obvious intentions of containing China. In early November, the four countries kick-started the Malabar Exercise. However, some analysts believe that although they are constantly strengthening military cooperation, the four countries also have their own calculations, which makes them difficult to be integrated into one. After Suga took office, Japan-Australia security cooperation has continued to move forward. Many analysts think the upcoming summit between Suga and Morrison will likely see a stronger consensus between the two for further security cooperation. However, such cooperation is more of political significance. The two sides will not make any concessions for each other's core substantive interests. For example, in 2016, Australia officially announced that it would hand over a large order for its 12 submarines to France, thus closing the door to the Japanese Soryu-class submarines, which had been considered internationally the most likely to win the contract . The author is PhD candidate at the Japan Institute of Nankai University

Besides, the US will maintain the established nuclear deterrent status while keeping up with its vigorous development of strategic nuclear weapons and technology. At the same time, the US is anticipated to continue to develop nuclear submarines so as to seize the initiative and dominant position in the strategic arms talks with Russia.It is highly possible that the US will make military contractions in the Middle East and Central Asia, but increase its military presence in the Western Pacific region to promote its military deployment - the old Obama pivot plan to the Asia-Pacific region. It will intensify military activities to show its deterrence abilities, and to support its hegemony in the Western Pacific region. The US will restore and strengthen its military alliance with its traditional allies and consolidate the status of NATO in the world. Meanwhile, in Northeast Asia, the US will strengthen its relations with Japan and South Korea and give full play to the two countries' roles in the region. Former US president Jimmy Carter once observed that the US has only enjoyed 16 years of peace in its 242-year history. This indicates that major arms dealers in the US have played an important role no matter which party is in power. A Trump administration or a Biden administration is, in effect, an alternation between the two parties backed by the largest financial oligarchs or conglomerates who need the government to help promote their arms sales. The South China Sea is an area where China and the US have a relatively high concentration of military. The US has been wantonly provoking China's territorial waters, especially around the islands and reefs of the South China Sea. After taking office, Biden will probably adjust US military relations with China. On the South China Sea issue, Biden is expected to make adjustments according to the changing course of China-US relations. The South China Sea disputes, especially those around the Nansha Islands, involve many countries. Therefore, the US is highly likely to continue intervening and tampering with the islands so it can disrupt regional order. It will also use this as a pretext to export American weapons and equipment to the region once it has created chaos - the ultimate aim is to build a weapon-centered and US-led order in the region. Yet there is little possibility that the Biden administration will accidentally ignite a conflict in the South China Sea. However, the chances that Trump will do so in the final days of presidency are rising sharply as he needs to leave a wealthy legacy for the military industries before he officially leaves office. But for Biden, dealing with the messy relations with other countries will be his priority after dealing with the COVID-19 virus and troubled US economy. As the US media are also looking for clues of Biden's military policy toward China, Michele Flournoy, a hawkish candidate for Biden's defense secretary, has come to the spotlight. She used to write in US media that if the US military had the capability to sink Chinese military assets in the South China Sea within 72 hours, the Chinese mainland would think twice about Taiwan. This would create a direct military conflict between China and the US should it ever happen. China would also strike at the US, and hard, leading to a dangerous, intense conflict between the two countries. It is doubtful that this will become US foreign policy after Biden takes office. The author is a Beijing-based military expert

New listings by Chinese companies reached a record high at the US stock market this year despite some turbulence. Observers said that more listings might follow in the coming year as the market becomes increasingly optimistic that the incoming Joe Biden administration might work to improve economic relations with China. So far this year, 26 Chinese IPOs have been held in the US, with a total worth of $29 billion, the highest since 2014, according to statistics from Refinitiv, a market data provider. "Most investors in China see Biden as a fresh impetus, one that will be more predictable and less arbitrary," Dong Dengxin, director of the Finance and Securities Institute at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology, told the Global Times on Wednesday. "It means it is likely that more companies will go public in the US under his administration," Dong said. Stock markets on the Chinese mainland responded warmly to Biden's election victory, with all three stock market indexes rising on Monday. While it is unlikely that a Biden administration, expected to take office on January 20, will reverse Trump's hard stance against China in terms of trade and finance, the new administration is expected to be more "consistent" and "more respectful of market principles", Dong said. Chinese companies have been under the threat of delisting from the Trump administration, which is trying to impose stronger US accounting standards on them. According to the US Treasury in August, Chinese companies that do not manage to comply with those standards will be delisted from US exchanges by the end of 2021, Reuters reported earlier. Several big Chinese companies listed in the US, including technology giants JD.com, Alibaba and NetEase, launched secondary listings at Shanghai or Hong Kong exchanges against this backdrop. Since February last year, 16 Chinese companies have delisted from the US market, including Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp, which became the biggest listing on the Chinese mainland in a decade when it was relisted in Shanghai in July. However, uncertainties could persist over the relationship between China and the US, and for smaller Chinese companies, especially those valued at less than $100 million, the appeal of Chinese markets, especially the Hong Kong stock exchange, might dwarf those of US exchanges, Dong said. "The Hong Kong market has grown more diverse and inclusive after reforms starting from 2018, and usually a Hong Kong listing is less costly," Dong added.

In recent years, along with the development of the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo has simultaneously promoted the integration of US-Japan militaries and strengthened security operations with countries such as Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam. In particular, Australia, an island country albeit of continental proportions, has similar characteristics with Japan in terms of geosecurity disputes and the ongoing power competition. This allows the two countries to have a lot of room for military cooperation. For Japan, Australia has become the country with the closest security cooperation besides the US. Certain observers now recognize that Japan-Australia relations are considered as quasi-military alliance. In September, Yoshihide Suga formally assumed the post of Japan's Prime Minister. He carried out the first telephone summit meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison on September 20. The two sides expressed their desire to continue to strengthen Japan-Australia relations and confirmed that they will deepen security cooperation for the establishment of a free and open Indo-Pacific region under the Indo-Pacific concept. Within two months of Suga coming to power, significant progress has been made in Japan-Australia security cooperation. On October 19, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and Australian Defense Minister Linda Reynolds held talks in Tokyo. The two sides reached an agreement to create a framework within which the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) will provide protection for Australian warships and other military assets. Australia will become the second country, after the US, to have its military assets come under Japan's protection through a provision in the SDF Law. Moreover, the two sides discussed issues such as military cooperation in new security fields including space and networks. Exchanges and visits between military officials and troops were on the agenda as well. While the two defense chiefs were actively preparing to boost security cooperation, the SDFs and the Australian Army also sent warships to conduct military training exercises with the US military in the South China Sea. According to Japanese media reports, Tokyo and Canberra have basically reached an agreement regarding the simplification of specific procedures for sending troops to each other's country for military operations, such as training exercises and disaster relief assistance. The negotiations began in 2014, and the agreement was originally named the "Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)," which has been changed to the "Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)." It is expected that the above-mentioned agreement between Japan and Australia will be finally confirmed during Morrison's visit to Japan later this month. Australia will then become the first target country of Japan's RAA. Australia is an important partner for both Japan and the US in their implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. On the basis of the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo and Canberra have continued to carry out deep security cooperation. On October 6, the foreign ministers of the four countries - the US, Japan, Australia and India - gathered in Tokyo to discuss cooperation on the so-called Indo-Pacific Strategy, with obvious intentions of containing China. In early November, the four countries kick-started the Malabar Exercise. However, some analysts believe that although they are constantly strengthening military cooperation, the four countries also have their own calculations, which makes them difficult to be integrated into one. After Suga took office, Japan-Australia security cooperation has continued to move forward. Many analysts think the upcoming summit between Suga and Morrison will likely see a stronger consensus between the two for further security cooperation. However, such cooperation is more of political significance. The two sides will not make any concessions for each other's core substantive interests. For example, in 2016, Australia officially announced that it would hand over a large order for its 12 submarines to France, thus closing the door to the Japanese Soryu-class submarines, which had been considered internationally the most likely to win the contract . The author is PhD candidate at the Japan Institute of Nankai University

In a speech Tuesday at the Ronald Reagan Institute's Center for Freedom and Democracy, Pompeo acknowledged that his attitude toward China had been determined in part by his time as the head of the CIA starting in 2017. As I said before, Pompeo behaves still like the chief of the CIA. In most countries, intelligence organs converge upon bottom-line thinking. By contrast, diplomatic departments represent more of a country's openness and inclusiveness. Pompeo has upended that balance by turning the State Department into a more combative and confrontational front foe - even more so than the CIA. He is tampering with the DNA of human diplomacy and has insulted and offended the world's diplomats by showing a bad example of his own. As for Pompeo's stubborn belief that China's political system is bound to end, I'd like to say that socialist China will live as long as people's wish for a better life. Today's US is bound to end its political doctrine with the white supremacy at the center. If Pompeo can live a long life, he will see that the US will not be a white-majority country and the ideology he touts today will crumble. History will not leave space for him. Finally, I would like to say to him: Get ready to go. The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times. 

After a tension-filled and tumultuous 2020 US presidential election, Americans have chosen Joe Biden to become the 46th president of the US. Where is the China-US relationship headed in the years to come? What will be the possibility of an outbreak of a new cold war between Beijing and Washington during Biden's presidency? Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China (RDCY) jointly held a Webinar with the No Cold War campaign and Tricontinental Institute for Social Research themed "the Future of China-US relations" and discussed these issues on Saturday. Wang Wen Professor and executive dean of RDCY The 2020 US presidential election is settled. We can see that the China card, played by the two presidential candidates during their campaigns, did not work well for their elections. This was especially the case for Trump, who tried hard to divert voters' attention from his failures to fight COVID-19 by smearing China. However, China did not fall for it. Instead of engaging in a fierce battle with the US, China exercised restraint and was unwilling to draw the spotlight of US public opinion. The US has too many domestic problems and playing the China card can hardly cover up these problems. This fully demonstrates that this election tactic failed. Frictions between China and the US will become the new normal in the next decade or more, a normal that I would call "co-opetition," cooperative competition. For that, China is well prepared psychologically. China can understand US anxieties that come with a speculation that China will replace its leadership in the world. But in fact, China has been a strong supporter of the post-World War II international order led by the US. During the global financial crisis in 2008 and the pandemic in 2020, the US situation would be even worse without China's support. In the past eight months, for example, China has exported nearly 40 billion masks to the US. China is not afraid of the US, but wants to ease the US anxiety with its pragmatic actions. John Ross, Senior fellow at RDCY and a member of the No Cold War organising committee I would like to be able to say that with the defeat of Trump in the US presidential election the organization No Cold War can now disband - as the cold war will come to an end. But, unfortunately, that would be inaccurate. Regrettably forces in the US committed to a cold war strongly exist in the Democratic Party as well as in the Republican Party. A Biden administration differs from Trump primarily in the tactics for pursuing aggression against China - a difference on how to pursue an aggressive policy against China, not on whether to attack China. Biden will almost certainly switch back to the "broad anti-China alliance" strategy of former US president Barack Obama - as Biden, as vice president, was a key part of the administration which launched this policy. Therefore, an aggressive US policy toward China will continue - but with different tactics. It is clear how China will deal with this situation. It will not pursue any aggressive policy toward the US under Biden, just as it did not under Trump. China will concentrate on its own development - while welcoming any steps by the US to reduce tensions. This is very clear in the new five-year plan - which does not focus on the US at all but on the development of a high income China economy. But, for the reasons outlined, this will not stop the US pursuing an aggressive policy towards China. Margaret Kimberley Editor and senior columnist at US-based website Black Agenda Report The change in presidential administrations brings with it inevitable questions about policy changes that will impact the rest of the world. Change is desperately needed in the wake of the many disasters that President Trump and his foreign policy team have wrought. But there is more consensus than there is difference among the duopoly in the US. There is a bipartisan, pro-war orientation that continues uninterrupted and I believe we will see this dynamic play out again. Imperialism is bipartisan and it also has a revolving door of people who were Obama administration officials who are now advising Biden and will no doubt accompany him back to the White House, State Department and Pentagon. They pen essays in Foreign Affairs magazine calling for China to change in some way that America would like. Biden will surely bring Obama holdovers from their holding places at think tanks and universities. They will probably be more polished than secretary of state Mike Pompeo who thinks that "maximum pressure" and boorish insults will win the day. But style is not what counts. The hedge fund chieftains who invest in the military and in the presidency are calling the shots. They don't give money without anticipating that they will also have influence. They don't build planes, helicopters and battle ships for show. Ultimately, they build them to be used and that is never good news. It is rare for the acts of one administration to be undone by the next. Dangerous policies continue because they are all on the same page. We can only hope that China's leaders and leaders of other countries targeted and smeared have better judgment than their American counterparts. Radhika Desai Professor at the Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, Canada The protracted agony into which the 2020 Presidential Elections have thrown US society, politics and its economy is merely another milestone in the decades-long unravelling of the US' neoliberal, financialized capitalism and in the consequent decline of its world influence. Elections 2020 are only further deepening the crisis of governability that led to Trump's election in the first place. Civil War remains a lurid fear rather than a realistic possibility. This sort of US will alternate between being preoccupied with its internal problems and being internationally provocative to distract attention from them. Like the old Cold War, it is already generating pressures on other countries to line up along one or the other side. As this happens, it is clear that only the most roguish regimes, India or Brazil come most readily to mind, will line up alongside the US. The only thing China can do is to remain open to reasonable dialogue, befriend the wiser elements of US and allied societies and focus its attention on countries and forces with which it can cooperate in mutually beneficial development. Given the glaring contrasts between a chaotic US and a stably rising China, there will be many of them. John Foster Emeritus professor of Social Sciences at Paisley University, UK A Biden victory will change the new cold war. But it won't stop it. The US approach is likely to become more sophisticated, comprehensive and dangerous. Biden is rooted in the US State Department establishment - under Bill Clinton in the 1990s and Barack Obama in the last decade. He was a hawk under Clinton pushing for NATO intervention in the Balkans. He was a hawk under Obama - closely involved with Victoria Nuland in planning the coup in Ukraine and then pushing unsuccessfully for NATO retaliation on Crimea. He is today a hawk on China: seeing China in highly ideological terms as a "totalitarian" challenge. But his approach will be more sophisticated, ideological and long-term than Trump's - and in particular seek to base it within wider alliances. The threat from a new cold war on Biden's terms cannot be minimized. Its expectations and character make in some ways more dangerous than Trump's. Economic parity between the US and China will be reached sooner. The consequential effects on dollar primacy will now be seen within the current decade. Qiao Collective A collective of diaspora Chinese challenging US aggression on China As Chinese Americans, we live in a country that promises "liberty and justice for all." But it is becoming more and more clearer that that trust is misplaced, and has been grossly betrayed throughout the years. One needs only to look at the history of our time here, from the very early days, to see that this is the case. For instance, real wages have stagnated in this country for the average American for 40, 50 years, and we Chinese Americans are largely such average Americans. In fact, Asian Americans are one of the groups hardest hit by unemployment due to the COVID-19 crisis. Make no mistake, this is a new McCarthyism, a new age of injustice. It was coming regardless of who wins this election. We don't see the character of the US changing anytime soon, since history teaches us that we have always been its enemies, either to be crushed and killed or to be used and exploited. The only time Chinese people are "accepted" by the US is when they act as its mouthpieces, praising its supposed freedom and superior political system, validating criticisms and attacks against China. The audience is surely familiar with these types of Chinese diasporas. But please know that these people, loud as they might be perched on the platform given to them, do not represent the working Chinese American: those who labor long and hard hours at low-paying jobs, live in poor housing and downtrodden environments, and constantly face state violence. Vijay Prashad Executive Director, Tricontinental Institute for Social Research (India), Senior Fellow of RDCY Liberal commentators say that Biden will be more "internationalist" or more "multilateral." Evidence for this that is offered is Biden's pledge to return the US to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (or the Iran deal) and the 2016 Paris Agreement. The US will not come back here to develop a multilateral process. This is entirely premised on Biden's priority to rebuild and consolidate the North Atlantic or Western alliance system, which has been eroded by Trump's attack on European underfunding of NATO, by his withdrawal from the Iran deal and for the climate deal. Biden returns here as a show of faith; let's be clear that the US - under Obama - did not enter these deals to advance a multilateral process. The US entered the Iranian deal because the Europeans were desperate for a source of energy after the US destroyed access to Libyan oil after NATO's 2011 war and to Russian natural gas with the Ukraine conflict in 2014. Obama agreed to the Iran deal because the Europeans were desperate, not to line up with the demands of international law; Biden will give the Europeans this gift. On climate, the US watered down Paris, but will return to the table only to give the appearance of multilateralism. The fact is that Biden will want to strengthen and subordinate Europe so as to better confront China. A Biden presidency will not calm the cold war. Claudia De la Cruz The People's Forum in NYC Neither party will advance the class struggle. Neither of the two political wings of the US bourgeoisie offers a change to its policy against Venezuela, Cuba, China, Iran - to name a few. And it does not offer a material change to the reality of the majority of people in the US. Some of the key questions in this context are, how will we coordinate our efforts, and organize ourselves so that we are not the end tail of the democrat's anti-Trump coalition? And how will we accumulate the people power to respond to this moment as social movements and advance the class struggle in this critical stage? As social movements, we must maintain, that the only route to any structural change in the US will come through the unity of social movements and its leaders, the creation of a strong mass organization and political organization independent of the bourgeoisie political machine. This is our big challenge!

It would be naive to believe a US administration under Biden will change the course of the one led by President Donald Trump in containing China from all spectrums - including military. As the trend continues, the direction from which China feels the pressure may be different though. Biden has said that Russia is the biggest threat to US security, and characterized China as a competitor rather than an adversary. It is safe to say that the US has no will to have a war with China. This was even so over the course of the Trump administration. Then US Defense Secretary Mark Esper made clarifications in late October through military and diplomatic channels that the US side has no intention of creating a military crisis against China - the so-called October Surprise. Biden is less likely to launch a military adventure than Trump. He may take into consideration the costs and consequences of a military showdown with China and exercise restraint. But still, the US will not agree to the just development of China - nor cooperate with China militarily. The Biden administration may slightly adjust its policies, but probably not steer too far away. The South China Sea is seen as a flash point between Chinese and US militaries. The US has been sending warships to the region as part of its so-called freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). The Obama administration authorized six FONOPs and the Trump administration as high as 23. Biden will face a test in terms of FONOPs, which have become a habitual practice of the US. If Biden stops it, he would give the Republicans an excuse to accuse him of being soft on China. Therefore, the future Biden administration is likely to continue with it, but will control the frequency and intensity and be careful about selecting the waters around the islands in order to avoid a military clash with China. The US has been observing China's reactions. The US cares when China reacts in a hardline manner. It is making a test. The Americans adopt such a logic that its patrols will become a status quo regardless of China's objections. But China will not agree to the status quo - hence strengthens its countermeasures. The US media have singled out Michele Flournoy as Biden's favorite pick for the top position in the Pentagon. A June article Flournoy wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine has also been raised as proof of her tough stance toward China. "If the US military had the capability to credibly threaten to sink all of China's military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours, Chinese leaders might think twice before, say, launching a blockade or invasion of Taiwan; they would have to wonder whether it was worth putting their entire fleet at risk," she wrote. This does not mean Flournoy is pro-war. Rather, she hinted no war with the mainland. This is the general posture of the US in dealing with the Taiwan question now. Washington's logic is that if the US sits still, the mainland will make the next move. But if the US is powerful enough, the mainland dares not to move. On the one hand, what Flournoy possibly means is an excuse for the US military deployments. But on the other hand, it shows that the US does not want a war. Regardless of who is selected as the new defense secretary, he or she will emphasize China's challenge and US' absolute supremacy in regions such as the Asia-Pacific. Hegemony lies behind US' habitual military actions. No matter who takes the rein in the US, China will stick to its path of peaceful development and develop its military. In recent years, the development of China's weapons has aimed at certain targets and has been practical. And such a trend will continue. The author is deputy director of the Department for International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies.

Browsing Western media, one could easily get the impression that one of their concerns is how the Chinese people view Joe Biden - do they welcome his election or not?

From China's official stance, to a small Chinese restaurant in Beijing Biden visited in 2011 as then vice president, they did not let even one detail slip away, and tried to find a clue on how China would cope with the new US president, and whether China-US relations would ease or face deeper confrontations. But I also wonder if these Western media outlets get the message from Chinese people's reaction to the US election - in terms of relations with the US, the Chinese have become mature. Such maturity comes from their recognition of the US system and understanding of their own country. The chaos during the US election made them see the pitfalls of US democracy as well as signs that the US is degrading in terms of the ability to solve social issues. The ineptitude of the US leadership in dealing with the raging COVID-19 pandemic exposes politicians' zero responsibility and putting personal interests above the people's. All these have reversed the Chinese people's illusions of the US. By contrast, China has withstood the US-launched trade war. Trade remained the same. In fact, the country's foreign trade expanded 4.6 percent in October, and rose 1.1 percent in the first 10 months. The lives of most Chinese people were not affected by the trade war. But in the US, farmers up to Wall Street elites have become fed up with the trade war, and the US government is paying higher political costs for a feud with China. Trump's rule in the past four years has awakened Chinese people. It made the Chinese people understand that China must start to make up for its technological weaknesses. It also made the Chinese realize the ice-cold reality that the US will never accept China's rise and will resort to every possible means to suppress it - this is the US, no matter who is the president and no matter the personal style of the president. Biden is also a hawk when it comes to deal with China, though his approach may be more tactical. The Trump administration has overly consumed the US hardline policy toward China. Biden's election may bring a new chance for the two countries to manage strategic distrust and engage in new competition, but the Chinese people have no fantasy of a China-US detente. Biden is expected to emphasize the differences in values and systems between China and the US. And as China develops further, the US will guard against China more - this has become the mature consensus reached by mainstream Chinese society. The Chinese people pay attention to the US presidential election because China-US relations are important to both countries, and have a profound impact on the world. But the Chinese people also view the election as an entertainment show, and certainly they won't be into the drama too much.

Headlines in German newspapers in Berlin show a tale of winners and losers as they report Joe Biden's victory in the US presidential race over outgoing US President Donald Trump on Sunday. German government leaders have reacted with relief and congratulations following the projected win of Biden. Photo: VCG

While Democrat Joe Biden, declared victory for the US presidential election over the weekend, may unite the country's allies in setting rules for global trade and continue to confront China after he assumes the presidency, he can't neglect cooperation with the world's second-largest economy, experts say. Whether Biden's foreign economic policies are more or less disruptive than Donald Trump's, China will not be anxious to negotiate with the US government to remove the high tariffs imposed by Trump on more than $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, as China is shifting to a new development pattern centered on "dual circulation" that will primarily rely on domestic market supply and demand, they noted. In the past four years, the reckless Trump administration upended a rules-based global trading order, as the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), threatened to dismantle the WTO, imposed higher tariffs on steel, aluminum and other products, and launched a massive trade war with China. "Unlike businessman Trump, Biden as a veteran politician is more reasonable and predictable," He Weiwen, a former senior trade official and an executive council member of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, told the Global Times on Tuesday. Judging from the Democratic Party's attitude to globalization, Chinese experts said that Biden will support multilateralism and play a more active role in rules-making in global organizations. In the meantime, Biden may push forward the functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO and pursue renegotiating the TPP. In article "Why America Must Lead Again" published in Foreign Affairs in April, Biden hinted at his foreign economic policy after winning the presidency. In order to win the competition for the future, the US must sharpen its innovative edge and unite the economic might of democratic countries around the world to counter "abusive economic practices" and "reduce inequality," he wrote. Gao Lingyun, an expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, predicted that the US will make some concessions to repair ties with its traditional allies such as Japan and Europe. Based on a stable relationship with Japan, it is highly likely that the US will seek to expand its influence in Asia later. "But relations won't return to those of the era of Barack Obama in a short time," Gao predicted. Meanwhile, room for China-US cooperation will be much broader after Biden takes office, as he respects international rules and could reduce the risks and uncertainties hanging over bilateral relations to a certain extent, experts noted. As a rival to Trump, Biden frequently criticized Trump's enthusiasm for wielding the tariff club. In an interview with US media outlet NPR in August, he said that Trump's tariffs have made US manufacturing go into a recession and its agriculture has lost billions of dollars. He said that Biden will surely lift the tariffs Trump imposed on Chinese goods but he would maintain the phase-1 trade deal intact because Biden would expect China to expand imports of US goods following the swift recovery of the Chinese economy from the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. During the just-ended annual China International Import Expo held in Shanghai, Guangdong Province-based Foran Energy Group signed an agreement with US producer Cheniere Energy Inc to purchase 26 cargoes of liquefied natural gas over the next few years, reflecting American companies' reliance on the huge Chinese market. China-US relations will be cooperative yet competitive, Gao said, noting that there will likely be a change in tone in China-US bilateral relations during Biden's presidency. He said that the US may strengthen cooperation with China in climate change, specifically in new energy development. "In this sense, there will be a window for cooperation between China and US technology companies, rather than a complete ban on advanced Chinese companies," He said. However, Washington is most likely to continue its containment of China's technological development. "The US does need to get tough with China… There is no reason we should be falling behind China or anyone else, when it comes to clean energy, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, 5G, high-speed rail, or the race to end cancer as we know it," Biden wrote in the article. Experts said that however the external environment changes, China will stick to its "dual circulation" strategy, under which local technological innovation will drive China's manufacturing industry and push it up the global value chain while strategically ensuring domestic market supplies.

The result of the 2020 US presidential election seems to have been settled: Joe Biden is the president-elect. According to previous China-related remarks made by Biden and his campaign team members, the US may make considerable adjustments to its China policy. This does not mean optimism for the two's tensions to subside could prevail. China needs to summarize the results of the diplomatic struggles it had with US President Donald Trump's administration over the past few years. It needs to change its thinking and adjust its diplomacy in due course, so as to rebuild a stable and good surrounding environment. The basic purpose of the Trump administration's China policy is to "kick China out" of the US-led international political and economic system. The US under Trump believes that China has grown and expanded through so-called liberal system. The US believes that China has been the biggest beneficiary of the free-market economy. Therefore, the US is trying to rope in more countries to contain China. Politically, it has been seeking to isolate China, hyping that China's so-called "state capitalism" and domestic and foreign affairs constitute a global threat. Economically, it has sought to decouple with China by reshaping the international industrial chain, and creating a new economic network. On the technology front, it has suppressed Chinese high-tech enterprises, and vigorously promoted the decoupling of high-tech technology from China. In terms of cultural exchanges, it has deliberately "built walls" and set restrictions with the excuse of national security. Undoubtedly, US' extreme practices have been resolutely countered by China. At the same time, China has kept countermeasures within a proper and appropriate range. It has carefully avoided a complete breakdown of bilateral relations, and left room for China-US ties to get back on the right track. However, an obvious fact is: The "anti-China" trend led and pushed by the US has been polarized (and even extremely radicalized) by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has triggered a lot of political turbulence around China. The strategy of China's peripheral diplomacy has always been to, "capture the ringleader first in order to capture all the followers." By stabilizing China-US relations, it can achieve stable relations with neighboring countries. Such a foreign policy has enabled China to enjoy a stable surrounding environment for a long time. However, when the Trump administration deliberately started to "pick on" and "nitpick" China, the effectiveness of the strategy of "seeking cooperation through competition" declined quickly. Tit-for-tat measures will not be able to stop US suppression in a short period of time. On the contrary, the US has added fuel to fire on a series of China-related issues, such as Taiwan question, affairs regarding Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. Similarly, because the goal of "capturing the ringleader first in order to capture all the followers" has not been fully achieved, under the US' leadership and demonstration, regional countries such as Australia, India and Japan have followed suit on issues regarding US strategy of containing China. Now, China may consider changing its mind-set: consider taking harsher countermeasures in response to the radical "anti-China" forces that follow the US. The US is strong enough to be "willfully" taking measures against China. But if countries such as India or Australia dare to play the "anti-China" game like the US, China should hit back with stronger countermeasures without hesitation. We once mistakenly believed that anti-China attitudes and actions of certain surrounding countries were forced by the US. In fact, countries like India, Japan and Australia took actions against the so-called China threat even earlier and stronger than the US. Whereas taking the lead with anti-China stances is against their strategic interests due to the power gap with China, their best choice now might be to hide behind the US and follow Washington's steps to gang up against China. Therefore, it can be seen that in the past few years, China's neighboring powers have explicitly or implicitly promoted the escalation of the China-US confrontation. After Japan's former prime minister Shinzo Abe resigned, he publicly admitted that he tried his best to persuade Trump to focus on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, some inside India's strategic circle suggested India should take advantage of China-US conflicts. India first proposed the Quad (an informal security grouping of the US, Japan, India and Australia) ministerial meeting, and took the initiative in launching the India-Japan-Australia resilient supply chain concept in the Indo-Pacific region. The Trump administration's diplomacy toward China, coupled with the coronavirus pandemic, has severely deteriorated China's strategic environment. If the "anti-China" trend in the past was just a single spark, the new one could become a bonfire if surrounding countries gang up against Beijing. This requires China to invest more efforts and energy right away. Biden coming into power no doubt offers China an opportunity to consider adjusting its diplomatic strategy. The author is research fellow with the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.

This year's annual Malabar naval exercises kicked off on Tuesday at a sensitive time of a nearly six-month China-India border standoff and the US presidential election. Despite the drill jointly participated by India, the US, Australia and Japan, experts noted that such an ill-intentioned attempt to corner China is a hollow bluff, and China will not be disrupted by India's irrationality or US interference. Hosted by the Indian Navy, the Malabar exercises date back to 1992. With the participation of QUAD countries - Japan, India, Australia and the US - this year's drill focuses on "curbing China's presence in the Indo-Pacific," Indian media said. Indian media reported that the US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS John S McCain, Australian Navylong-range frigate HMAS Ballarat, and Japan Maritime Self Defense Ship (JMSDF) destroyer JS Onami are participating along with Indian warships. Some Indian experts believe that the Malabar drill 2020 "looks mundane," judging by the assets to be displayed by the four nations, as the previous one was more sophisticated and focused on anti-submarine warfare. Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that Australia's participation makes this year's Malabar exercises bigger than last year's, but China will not be intimidated by an ordinary annual military exercise. The military capacity gap between China and India is huge, and it's not difficult for a Japanese leader to tell China is a better trade partner and bigger market, Hu said. Yoshihide Suga, Japan's new prime minister, said in September that he hopes to establish stable relations with neighboring countries like China. The fact that India invited Australia means India chose to fall out with China, as Australia had a bad record in cooperating with the US to smear and attack China repeatedly on issues such as Huawei, Hong Kong and the COVID-19 epidemic. Some Australian scholars said China-Australia relations are at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972. Facing a catastrophic epidemic and economy, the Modi government's muscle-flexing drill targeting China suggested India is seeking to show a proactive position and a tough stance ahead of the 8th round of commander-level talks. But it is very unwise and irrational for the Modi government to hold the naval drill that includes all QUAD countries, said Hu, adding that Mike Pompeo's recent anti-China tour to Asian countries also showed that the US' Indo-Pacific strategy is unpopular. Some Indians ignore China's development prospects (and India's interests in it) and also the future of China-India relations, Hu said. "That's India's loss." Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Tuesday's press briefing that China hopes the military drills will be conducive to regional peace and stability, rather than the opposite.

Cooperation will remain the main theme of US-India relations in the next stage after Biden becomes the president as the overall direction of ties between the two countries will not change simply due to who sits in the Oval Office. The sustained warming of US-India relations over the past two decades began with former US President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000. The first US-India military cooperation agreement was completed under the former US president Barack Obama's administration. Obama also supported India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In a policy paper released by the Biden Campaign in August, Biden has expressed the importance he attaches to a cooperative relationship with India, strategically, economically and on security. Likewise, the new US government won't have much change on the general policy of the Indo-Pacific region, except for a possible adjustment over the name of Trump's Indo-Pacific Strategy. It will be very likely to become a 2.0 version of Obama administration's Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific strategy to some extent, where New Delhi will continue to be expected to play an important role. Surely, differences will still exist while the cooperation between the two countries keeps getting stronger. During Trump's presidency, differences between the two sides have been mainly about trade. Yet probable future disputes between the US and India may center more on issues of human rights and religious freedom. Biden has also been speaking out against Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi government's human rights violation problems. Therefore, the trade dispute between the US and India may be eased during Biden's term, but contradictions and differences on religious freedoms and human rights will enlarge. It is within the realm of possibility to forecast that US-India relations may suffer severe strains in the future based on past tensions between the two over the past 20 years. Even with recent military cooperation, there are no guarantees of long term resolve. To better deal with India's controversial human rights issues, the future Biden administration may ask vice president-elect Kamala Harris, an Indian American, to manage negotiations with the Modi government. She may be asked to exert pressure on New Delhi to make compromises on relevant issues as Washington wishes. Harris, as US' first female and vice president of South Asian descent, is expected to play an important role as a bridge between the communication between the US and India on bilateral diplomatic issues - and even with South Asian regional issues. When it comes to the border standoff between China and India, the incoming Biden administration will also probably not take a markedly different stance from the Trump administration. Both Democrats and Republicans are clear that a long-term confrontation and deteriorated relationship between China and India will be of great benefit for the development of the US-India relations - all the while knowing that the tensions between China and India will unlikely lead to a war - at least in the short term, nor will it bring a deadly hit to peace and stability in the region. Biden's campaign in particular mentioned China in his administration's Indo-Pacific plan, in which the US would work with India to support a rules-based and stable Indo-Pacific region where no country, including China, is able to threaten its neighbors with impunity. It is almost certain that Biden will keep up a tough stance with China with some differences on the specific measures that the Trump administration introduced. This will also further boost its cooperation with India on China related issues. The author is director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University.

Indian Home secretary Ajay Kumar Bhalla said that New Delhi was yet to make a decision on whether to allow Chinese telecom companies to participate in the upcoming 5G network construction in India, the Times of India has reported. However, the Indian official acknowledged that China's "penetration in the existing telecom hardware and software [market] was too extensive," and that, unless India could find a substitute, the existing facilities could not be quickly closed down. So why is India moving so slowly in its 5G network construction? The South Asian country is stuck in dilemma of its own making: Indians driven by irrational and extreme anti-China sentiments call for Chinese 5G players to be excluded at all costs, but reality shows that such a strategy simply can't work. Chief among the reasons are costs. According to media reports, the current financial stress telco providers are under may put the brakes on India's 5G ambitions. In fact, India's current 4G communications network largely relies on China's cost-effective technologies and products, and, as Bhalla noted, the existing facilities cannot be closed down abruptly. In addition, it's unfair to let Indian telco providers pay the price of the extreme anti-China sentiment being touted by politicians to protect their own political interests. Top Indian telecommunications carrier Bharti Airtel reportedly said that if it uses European products to replace China's 5G equipment, it may lead to "unaffordable costs." Blocking Huawei from rolling out 5G technology may cause the loss of at least $4.7 billion in India's case by 2035, a report by Oxford Economics has shown, according to media reports. Obviously, if India aims to begin 5G network construction as soon as possible, promoting economic development in the interests of the Indian people and its telecom companies, India should be cooperating with Chinese companies sooner rather than later. For India, this is the most reasonable and feasible approach. As for any such decision being made in the name of "national security" - a concern fabricated by the US - it shouldn't take much for Indians to realize such a fear is totally illogical and groundless. Unless they deliberately choose to hold on to these doubts against China, there is no reason for India to follow the US on the 5G issue. Faced with the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic contraction and other challenges, India has too many problems that need to be resolved more urgently than 5G. Perhaps India has not yet come to the point at which it must make a decision about 5G. However, India urgently needs to separate economic issues from geopolitics and avoid going further in the wrong direction as a result of irrational and extreme emotions. To begin with, India should revise its decoupling approach in a timely manner, and remove the restrictions it imposed on Chinese companies and products - such as the previous app ban - before such measures cause larger damage to India's own economy. The author is an associate research fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 

When US former president Barack Obama was still in office, the US began to intensify its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. US President Donald Trump has upgraded that layout into so-called Indo-Pacific Strategy. Most recently, due to the presidential elections, the Trump administration has emphasized the so-called QUAD mechanism of the US, Japan, India, and Australia. As this trend of seeking increased influence in the Asia Pacific will not change, President-elect Joe Biden is likely to continue it by selling old wine in new bottles - carrying on some of the current administration's policies to neutralize China.

Whereas China is the main competitor of the US, as Biden said, the Biden administration will need a variety of measures to contain the Asian country. These will likely include enhancing military alliances, as well as ties between the US and its allies to maintain the US' hegemony in military and other spheres in the Asia-Pacific region. This is why the US is striving to establish the QUAD mechanism right now. It is not important whether or not the QUAD will be a formal alliance, but the vision of forging such an alliance is. Because it shows the US' devotion to building a multilateral military mechanism. If the QUAD is officially established in the Asia Pacific, its targets may include countries like North Korea, Iran, and Russia, in addition to China. It would be an all-round alliance focusing on the vital role of Indo-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the four QUAD countries are sleeping in the same bed, but with different dreams. They are taking advantage of the QUAD for their own ends. Therefore, it is quite hard for the four to make a NATO-styled group with a complete alliance mechanism. In term of US overseas troops, Biden has a different stance from Trump. Trump hopes to change the nature of the US global military presence to make American troops stationed overseas earn America direct dividends. Trump does not want to deploy US soldiers in other countries for free. By contrast, Biden will consolidate ties with allies, and not shake them down for money. His policies will be similar to those as were carried out during Obama's tenure. Even if some countries might have to share more  costs for hosting US troops, the financial increase will not be sharply higher. Since the Biden administration seeks to keep US hegemony across the globe, it will have to figure out a feasible way to maintain its alliances. The US has been working on that with two hands. On one hand, it attempts to build an Indo-Pacific military alliance. While on the other, it seeks to expand NATO to the east until it is right on China's doorstep. The QUAD is actually a move to turn bilateral military alliances between the US and other countries into a quadrilateral one. Except for US-India ties, America already has military alliances with both Australia and Japan. The US is now making the QUAD into an Asia-Pacific multilateral alliance. Both Trump and Biden are representing the interests of American elite groups. Containing China, as well as Russia, is in line with those groups' doctrines. So the US will not budge regarding its strategy to suppress any potential threat in the Asia Pacific. Biden is no exception. Against this backdrop, what should China do? It ought to maintain strategic determination and continue to work hard in accordance with its own development projection. We should also be more prepared for military struggles. In terms of core issues such as sovereignty, security and development interests, China must not make even the slightest compromise. When necessary, Beijing should use military abilities to defend its essential national interests, including the Taiwan question, South China Sea issue, and other rights to develop overseas. On the other hand, China needs to further improve friendship with neighboring countries in the Asia Pacific, realizing win-win norms and also blocking the US' aims for nefarious collusions. Take Japan and India, for instance. Tokyo is actually sitting on the fence: It worries that being a spearhead of Washington to contain Beijing will backfire. India needs to properly manage disputes and crises with China. Indeed, New Delhi doesn't want Washington to be involved in its affairs with Beijing. Besides, China should also attach more importance to countries such as South Korea, New Zealand, and ASEAN members, so as to prevent the US' attempt  from forging new military alliances. We need to make more efforts in terms of comprehensive national strength, technology, and many other spheres in order to make the US know it is impossible to contain China and thus shrink back from creating more difficulties. We should make Washington remember this deeply. Furthermore, it is also very important that we take comprehensive diplomatic measures to dissolve US attempts to forge new military alliances aiming at us. The author is a Chinese military expert and commentator

Fabricated Western media reports accusing China of encroaching on Nepalese bordering lands reflect the political intentions of some anti-China forces and pro-Indian activists, said some Nepalese observers who shared their first-hand observations and analysis with the Global Times. Media reports claiming that China has annexed more than 150 hectares of Nepalese land have been proven fake by repeated investigation teams from China and Nepal. Despite foreign Ministries of both sides have denied the groundless reports, media kept hyping them amid rising regional instability where both China and Nepal are caught in border disputes with India. Groundless reports citing anonymous Nepalese politicians said that Chinese military had crossed the China-Nepal border into the border district of Humla and moved the stone pillars used to demarcate the boundary into Nepalese territory for China to construct military bases. Nepalese observers told the Global Times that repeated front-lined investigations have proven that the pillars were not moved and were covered with ice and mud. Karchen Lama, Chairman of Himali Bhote Lama National Liberation Front, a sisterhood organization of Nepal Communist Party (NCP), told the Global Times that he led the 16-member team to visit the border area and found the pillars were not replaced and China has not encroached on Nepalese land in the area. Another Humla District official, who preferred not to be named, and was part of Nepalese joint investigation team, composed of Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, Army and other departments, also confirmed the pillars were found in their original positions and the news reports completely misrepresented and distorted the situation. The buildings that some in Nepal say encroach on its land are in Humla district which falls within Chinese territory and is actually a newly-built village in Burang county in Ali, Southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region, a Burang county official told the Global Times in a previous interview. Nepali Congress, a social-democratic political party in Nepal that was widely tagged as a pro-India force, was considered the main actor behind the media hyping. Nepal's former minister Jeevan Bahadur Shahi, also a member of Nepali Congress, who had previously been trained as a pilot at a US-based aviation school, initiated the accusation against China. "His reports were found malicious and wrong when later a team comprising of security agencies found both NO. 11 and 12 pillars in their proper sites," Yogeshwar Ktm Man, former Police officer of Nepal Police Service, told the Global Times. Yogeshwar noticed that Western and India media actively spread the misrepresented news which have been proven "baseless and malicious," amid the background that more Western and Indian political forces are attempting to turn Nepal as a "center of geopolitical interest which targets China." Nepalese intellectuals are suspicious about the increasing Western activities in Nepal, considering many NGOs are still operating throughout the country and behind some armed rebellion political movements, said Yogeshwar Ktm Man. He alleged some Indian channels "were running news against Nepal's sovereignty and spreading concocted news about Nepal and China." He is worried some news reporters and politicians have been working as paid agents of India. Karchen Lama also suggested that he learned Jeevan Bahadur Shahi is spreading the flag of Tibetan separatists at the border village at night. "Some local media is under pro-Indian forces' control and they are able to spread such reports easily with highlighted cover news. They provoke Nepalese saying China will capture Mt. Everest (Mount Qomolangma) someday. They are working to raise enmity between Nepalese and Chinese and they are moving ahead continuously on their mission," said Karchen Lama. "Some India political forces are afraid of gradually losing control in Nepal, since Nepal is the part of Chinese-initiated Belt and Road Initiative project and will be connected with China through better roads and rail links. In the future Nepal will not be an India locked country. So, self-reliant Nepal is a problem for India," Yogeshwar Ktm Man argued. The increasing presence of Indians and Westerners is aimed at disturbing China, Pushpa Raj Pradhan, Editor-in-Chief of the Nepalese media People's Review Weekly, commented to the Global Times, saying such misrepresentations with political intentions against China were raised five years ago and heard in recent years. "Nepal is a tiny country with huge unseen foreign investments. Westerners as well as Indians are active in Nepal to make their stronghold here. Indians want Nepal to be their protected state, whereas, Westerners want to make their stronghold here to watch and conduct anti-China activities," Pushpa Raj Pradhan said.

After Democratic nominee Joe Biden was elected 46th president of the US on Saturday, some observers wondered whether there will be less likelihood of military conflict with China, than under the Trump administration. Some Chinese experts believed that US strategy of containing China won't change after Biden enters the White House, but he may adjust containment measures even while offering to better communicate with China. Biden's policies will be based on the reality of the Trump administration and resemble those under the Obama administration to some extent, which, however, depends on congress and party politics, a military expert who asked to remain anonymous told the Global Times. Compared to Trump's direct style, Biden will be more moderate. In the military sector, Trump ad always been aggressive and trying to "show some muscles," the expert said. It's expected that such an aggressive stance under the Biden administration will be toned down, but he will join more allies to further isolate China, the expert noted. By advocating his values, Biden may also highlight China's "incompatibility," putting pressure on its system and emphasizing its weakness, the expert said. The expert cited the South China Sea issue as an example. The outside world has been concerned that the possibility of a small-scale conflict between China and the US in the South China Sea has increased, and if it were not controlled, it would lead to disastrous consequences. This judgment was furthered solidified when two US aircraft carriers entered the South China Sea and continuously conducted large-scale military exercises. At the same time, close-in reconnaissance of China by US ships and aircraft became more intense than ever. The experts said that the US' so-called "freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea and its close-up reconnaissance trend will continue but be less frequent. "After Biden takes office, it remains unclear whether the US actions will maintain a high intensity in the region, but there will be some new characteristics, such as pulling more countries together to support so-called "freedom of navigation" and collectively put pressure on China," the expert noted. The expert also believes that while the Trump administration relied on military exercises to pressure China over the South China Sea, the Biden presidency may reduce their frequency. The US may use "legal battles" to weaken legal support for China's South China Sea claims. Such change will decrease the instant pressure on China, but in the long run will make the South China Sea issue more complicated. Just a week before the US election, US Department of Defense communicated with China and is likely to have more communication and cooperation to ease tensions and avoid conflict. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said at a monthly press conference on October 29 that the militaries of China and the US were currently holding a virtual meeting on crisis communication, and more exchanges and consultations on issues including maritime military security will be held by year's end. The first meeting on crisis communication provided an opportunity for mutual understanding between the US and China on the prevention and management of crises and reduction of military risks. Both sides agreed that it is very important to establish timely communication mechanisms, and it is necessary to maintain regular communication channels in preventing crisis and carry out post-crisis assessments. The two militaries held a virtual meeting on crisis communication from October 28 to 29 and both sides agreed to conduct a military personnel humanitarian relief and disaster reduction seminar and exchange, via video conference in mid-November. It's very unlikely Biden will make any changes to crisis communication, as China-US military relationship is an important part of the bilateral relationship, the expert said. Maintaining a stable military relationship is in line with interests of the two countries, especially when military-to-military communication is not affected by the change in presidency, according to the expert. "The overall characteristic of the Trump era is simple and straightforward. But Biden won't do that. No matter how it will play out, the mechanism will continue, so China and US militaries will have more communication channels," the expert said. US media reported that Biden could nominate a woman to head the Defense department and Michele Flournoy, a former undersecretary of Defense for policy, is already the front runner to lead the Pentagon, according to Politico. As a China hawk, she has called for a strengthening of American military capabilities and the deepening of ties with US allies in Asia, according to the Guardian. If she leads the Defense department, she would be more faithful to Biden's concept of aiming at China's "weakness," the expert noted. The possibility can't be ruled out that the US will attack the edges of China. For example, if the US identifies China's submarine strength as a "weakness," it will increase its submarine activities accordingly. It will take time to see how the military relationship between the two countries evolves, the expert noted. However, amid geopolitical rivalry, it is important to maintain a stable relationship in spite of divergences and maintain communication and cooperation.

As customary, these advisors are likely to become members of Biden's cabinet. Therefore, their points of view will significantly affect the Biden administration's future foreign policy. Donilon in 2019 published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine, arguing that US incumbent President Donald Trump's trade war is "the wrong way to compete with China," and the US should focus on renewal, rather than protectionism. Blinken said in September that, "China's strategic position is stronger and ours is weaker as a result of President Trump's leadership." He also said that Trump left "a vacuum in the world for China to fill." Campbell and Sullivan wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2019 that, "the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with Beijing in four key competitive domains - military, economic, political and global governance." Judging from the narratives from these advisors, the goal of Biden administration's China policy is almost identical to that of the Trump administration, albeit more tactfully stated. The Biden administration will continue to regard China as its main rival, seeing China as the biggest threat to maintain its position as a global hegemony. However, Biden will differ from Trump on dealing with this challenge. Even though Donilon said that trade war is the wrong way to compete with Beijing, some Democrats are aware that Trump's manner to pressure China on trade has worked to some extent. The Biden administration may not withdraw all tariffs imposed on China as soon as he takes office, but will see them as bargaining chips to further negotiate with China. But as Donilon said, Biden would attach greater importance on "renewal," rather than trade deficits. Many of Biden's advisors, such as Blinken and Sullivan, believe the US should improve its ties with Europe. It is expected that transatlantic frictions will be eased after Biden takes office. The US will hope European allies could play a big role in competing with China. Blinken said Trump has weakened American alliances, abandoned US values and gave China a green light to trample on so-called human rights and democracy. This reflects the reality that the Biden administration will underline human rights and democracy, and will create an ideological alliance by uniting its allies such as Europe, Japan and South Korea in a bid to pile pressure on China. Biden will be restrained in implementing these policies, however. Trump received nearly half of the popular votes. This embodies the fact that Trumpism enjoys a large following in the US. These forces will restrain Biden to return to liberalism and multilateralism. Despite such rhetoric by these advisors, the Biden administration's foreign policy may not follow the path they described. This is because a country's foreign policy will be influenced by many factors. The House and the Senate are currently controlled by different parties. They are the ones who will make some policies difficult to implement. The Biden administration may make compromises with the Republicans on some foreign policy agendas, especially on China. The possibility that the new government will still remain tough on China cannot be ruled out. The policies that the US will implement after the Democrats assume office and meet challenges and difficulties will be different from what they now expect. It also remains to be seen whether the foreign policies Biden will adopt will be consistent with what his advisors suggest. Biden served as the vice president under the Obama administration for eight years. His diplomatic philosophy may inherit some of Obama's ideas. Most members of his team had positions under Obama's tenure. On issues including global governance, climate change and the Iran nuclear deal, Biden is very likely to continue Obama's philosophy. But when it comes to relations with China, he may incorporate some of Trump's ideas. The new generation of Democrats is also making reflections on how to better deal with China. From the US perspective, Republicans' China policy is not completely ineffective. Some Democrats even believe they should borrow some of the things that the Trump administration worked well with. International situations and the balance of power between major countries have changed a lot over the past four years. It's unlikely that the Biden administration will fully implement all of Obama's diplomatic ideas. (The author is a research fellow with the Institute of America Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.)

The 20th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is set to be held virtually on Tuesday, and it is widely expected to focus on discussions about the fight against the COVID-19 epidemic and economic cooperation in the post-COVID-19 era. While a lot of attention has been concentrated on whether the top leaders of China and India would resolve their differences under this multilateral mechanism, the meeting may also serve as sign of whether India can further be integrated into the SCO three years after joining the organization. If India can put aside its political differences with some member states and promote economic exchanges within the multilateral framework, there will still be considerable room for economic cooperation between India and other SCO member states, which may also ease concerns over challenges faced by the organization after its membership expansion. The SCO was founded in 2001 as a security mechanism aimed at dealing with regional governance and geopolitical problems, but in recent years, the SCO has put a lot of emphasis on the promotion of economic and trade cooperation among member states. Especially after it expanded its membership to include India and Pakistan in June 2017, there has been great interest and attention as to the role that the new member states play in the SCO and the opportunities they may enjoy. In the post-epidemic era, whether anti-epidemic and economic cooperation could be the starting point of enhanced connections between India and other SCO member states is of great significance not only to the SCO, but also to India. While the SCO needs to gain the consensus of its member states to push forward initiatives, India also needs to leverage the multilateral organization to further expand the potential for its economic and trade cooperation with other countries. The Indian economy is under great pressure because of the epidemic. Getting out of its predicament requires not only its own efforts but also a helping hand from the outside world. The SCO is one of the few regional multilateral mechanisms India has joined, with the combined GDP of its member states exceeding $16 trillion after the 2017 expansion, representing a huge regional market. That's a starting point for India to integrate into the regional trade network. It is the common wish of SCO states to deepen cooperation in the post-epidemic era to speed up the recovery from the economic impact. Any initiative to promote industry chain collaboration or trade connectivity may need the consensus of all member states. While India has always been cautious in backing such initiatives, it is hoped that this time the country could put aside many geopolitical concerns to jointly participate in the economic and trade cooperation efforts.

Scholars from China and India attended an online seminar on Friday to discuss how to explore and deepen cooperation to advance China-India ties and avoid bilateral relations from being kidnapped by border disputes. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. But since May 5, the two countries have been locked in a border stand-off with bilateral relations souring significantly. Scholars participating in the seminar agreed that China and India, two Asian giants, should maintain dialogue and communication to properly handle border disputes and strengthen crisis management. They proposed that the two countries should seek long-term solutions to fix the border predicament. Jiang Yili, a research fellow for the China Institute of International Studies, said that the clash in the Galwan Valley in June seriously damaged China-India relations and brought the mutual trust to its lowest level. With strengthened US-India strategic interactions and intensifying China-India strategic competitions, China-India relations are very likely to be at low ebb for a long period to come. "China should enhance strategic communication with India to dissolve India's strategic suspicions over China," Jiang said. Rong Ying, a deputy head of the China Institute of International Studies, said that development is a top priority for both China and India. In this regard, China and India have common strategic interests. The two countries should consider overall interests of bilateral relations, handle the divergences in a proper way, and not allow differences to disrupt bilateral relations, Rong said. India and China have developed multiple mechanisms to resolve their border standoffs, and other issues related to mutual trust or security concerns. Nevertheless, a lot more work still needs to be done to strength their mutual trust - especially if the two sides have to build stronger security cooperation, said Swaran Singh, professor and Chairman of Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University. "It is their own national interest that both India and China must avoid undercutting each other and compliment their leverages to together build a better world," Singh stressed. Experts also emphasized the importance of economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges between China and India at the conference, which was held by the Institute of South Asian Studies at Sichuan University.

China and India have cemented agreements achieved in previous rounds of talks in the latest commander level meeting on Friday, with both sides vowing to ensure their frontline troops "exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation." Future talks will be arranged soon, indicating the two sides are prepared to prolong the row through the coming winter and even longer, according to an official media release by China's Ministry of National Defense on Sunday. Both sides agreed to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, maintain dialogues and communications through military and diplomatic channels, and push for the settlement of other outstanding issues, so as to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, said the release. The wording in the eighth round of talks - "China and India also agreed to have another round of meetings soon" - seems to be keeping the door to a peaceful solution open. "The agreement of maintaining dialogues and communications itself shows that neither India nor China desires an escalation of the issue, and that both are trying to prevent disagreements from developing into conflicts," Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times. The recent enhancement of India-US ties have definitely weighed on the China-India talks, said Qian, adding that the signing of Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation during the recent 2+2 India-US ministerial dialogue, which promoted the quasi military alliance between India and the US and the building of QUAD, an informal security grouping of the US, Japan, Australia and India, would surely encourage the Indian side to act tougher during talks. However, similar to the seventh round of such talks between senior commanders in mid-October, the latest round conducted in early November failed to bring about concrete progress in forming a disengagement plan, which Chinese observers called the "main point" of this series of military channel communications. Since their sixth round of talks in late September, China and India had announced a slew of decisions including not sending more troops to the frontline, refraining from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground and avoiding any actions that may further complicate matters, Times of India reported. Chinese analysts pointed out that the outcomes of the seventh and eighth rounds of talks indicated the two sides have entered a stalemate over the disengagement solution, despite other agreements being reached in a generally positive atmosphere, adding that it was the Indian side to blame for this situation. Indian's reluctance to retreat from the Chinese side of the LAC and to end their aggression near the south bank of the Pangong Tso Lake, which they dared to regard as a "trophy of war" in the border friction, led to the failure in addressing the row, Song Zhongping, a military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Sunday. Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, also expressed disappointment over the latest round of talks, saying that an insincere India had misused the military talks as a setting for shameless bargaining. According to the Times of India, India maintained that the disengagement process has to start simultaneously at all the flash points, while nearly 50,000 Indian Army troops are currently deployed in a high state of combat readiness in various mountainous locations. China deployed an equal number of troops, the report claims, citing official sources. With winter already setting in, the region has now been hit by extreme cold. The China and India border stand-off will become a war of patience and a test of both sides' logistical support capabilities. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has an overwhelming superiority over the Indian army if there is ever a winter war, observers said. Chinese soldiers on border patrol have been given new equipment and suits, including glare-reducing lenses, multifunctional kettles and cold protective suits, to protect them from the extreme weather, the PLA Daily reported. According to the report, a total of 15 kinds of equipment and suits were supplied to meet the requirements of patrolling in temperatures ranging from - 40 C to -30 C. And compared with China's indigenous and sufficient supply of winter gear, India has to rely on foreign suppliers, acquiring extreme cold gear sets from the US. Whether such imported gear would meet the challenge of the harsh cold of the region remains a question, Song noted, suggesting that the PLA is better prepared and more capable when it comes to winter supplies. The PLA's weapons also beat the Indian army's in terms of extreme cold resistance capability, Song added. Considering this gap in capabilities, it would be not surprising if the Indian army choose to disengage in the winter time and return when the cold abates, as it is increasingly clear that the border issue with China has become a routine card to play whenever domestic tensions emerge in India, observers said.

As a crucial victory in major swing state Pennsylvania put Joe Biden over the 270 Electoral College vote threshold to win the presidency, the president-elect made his first speech on Saturday night emphasizing "unity and healing." While the world displays a growing sense of expectation for the 46th president of the US, some Chinese experts considered the outcome offers some "breathing room" for the tense China-US relations. Biden entering the White House is expected to provide an opportunity for breakthroughs in resuming high-level communication and rebuilding mutual strategic trust between the two major countries, some experts forecast. Biden won the presidency and delivered a speech on Saturday, promising to "restore political normalcy and a spirit of national unity to confront raging health and economic crises," according to The New York Times. The victory also signals a repudiation of incumbent US President Donald Trump's "divisive conduct and chaotic administration," the newspaper said. While the US is about to welcome its new president, some Chinese academics and observers on China-US relations have been keeping a close eye on the outcome of the race, which may also bring changes to deteriorating bilateral relations that have been trapped in a vicious circle under the Trump administration. Jin Canrong, associate dean of the School of International Studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, told the Global Times that Biden will usher in a "buffer period" for China-US relations - relations may still worsen, but not as quickly. "Biden will be more moderate and mature in handling foreign affairs," Jin said. Biden is expected to appoint more professional officials to his diplomatic team and so it will be possible for US-China tensions to take a brief timeout. The vicious circle has led to damaged strategic mutual trust, a suspension of high-level communication and little concrete cooperation, Xin Qiang, deputy director of the Center for US Studies at Fudan University, told the Global Times. It might now be expected that China and the US will resume pragmatic cooperation on vaccines, the anti-epidemic fight and climate change, Xin noted. Some liaison mechanisms and stalled dialogues can be expected to resume, "but it will take time to rebuild mutual strategic trust," he said. However, the pending change in US leadership will not change the overall direction of Washington's China policy, observers said. Regardless of who resides in the White House, the US will to some extent maintain its current approach toward China. Biden's China policy will not simply return to the Obama-era approach, since during the past four years China-US relations and the global landscape have changed significantly, observers said. "We should not put too much expectation on Biden," Jin said, "because to contain and confront China is a strategic consensus between the two parties of the US." Biden might take different measures but not a different overall direction, Jin asserted. The elites and the public in both countries have reshaped their perspective on each other's country, Da Wei, director of the Center for Strategic and International Security Studies of the University of International Relations in Beijing, told the Global Times. "Biden's China policy will be built upon the Trump era. In fact, a fundamental change in China policy is probably the major political legacy left over from the Trump administration," Da said. There is some bipartisan consensus in the US that its policy of engagement with China needs an overhaul and that will not change as Biden takes office, Da warned. The question of what alternatives he will pursue remains unclear, Da noted. "However, competition does not mean decoupling," Da said. "I don't think the incoming Biden administration will agree on a full-scale decoupling with China." Will the trade war continue? Will punitive tariffs be scrapped? An October report by Swiss bank Lombard Odier noted that a Biden win "reduces some trading uncertainty," according to CNBC. A Biden presidency could lead to a more rational approach to bilateral trade even if his team could prove as hawkish on China as Trump's, the bank's analyst was quoted as saying in the US media report. But a Biden presidency should automatically spell a rapid reduction in tariffs on Chinese goods, the report speculated. Xin of Fudan University predicted that the two governments may first reassess the phase one of the US-China trade agreement. It cannot be ruled out that some adjustments will be made due to the changing situation and then the two sides can continue negotiations on the basis of the phase one agreement. "From the perspective of the US, the tariffs imposed by Trump are actually a good bargaining chip for Biden to continue negotiations, and he is unlikely to take the initiative to cancel them," Xin said. Democratic-supporting labor groups have always leaned toward protectionism compared to the Republican Party, the expert said. Trump's position on trade issues is not necessarily a mainstream GOP view. Thus in those areas where the American people are been hurt from trade frictions, such as daily necessities, the tariffs against China may be relaxed, but in other areas, long-term difficult negotiations may be required. Biden will immediately consult with the US' main allies before deciding on the future of US tariffs on China, seeking "collective leverage" to strengthen his hand against Beijing if elected president, Reuters reported in October, citing Biden top advisers. The two Biden aides said the starting point would be to not repeat the mistakes of Trump when he slapped tariffs on European and Canadian goods as part of his "America First" agenda, antagonizing key US partners, according to the report. Biden's victory has revived the proposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP) introduced during the Obama administration. The agreement was never approved by a Republican-dominated US Congress, but was generally believed to be aimed at pressuring China. After officially taking office in 2017, the first thing Trump did was to announce the US' withdrawal from the TPP, but the remaining 11 countries of the pact went on to sign the Comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) in March 2018. Da believed it was possible, but difficult, for the US to rejoin the agreement. Joining the CPTPP may face opposition from both parties in Congress, as signing up a free trade arrangement is increasingly politically incorrect in American society, Da said. "Returning to the CPTPP also requires negotiations with existing member states, which technically takes time," he said. Is risk rising or falling of a China-US clash in the Taiwan Straits? Sun Taiyi, an assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University in Virginia, the US, told the Global Times that both Democrats and Republicans want to improve ties with Taiwan, a position shared by the White House and both houses of the US Congress. Biden foreign policy adviser Anthony Blinken, a strong contender for secretary of state in the future administration, told media in May that he would adopt a "balanced strategy" to handle cross-Straits relations. Such a strategy would not be as "pro-Taiwan" as Trump, but would help create a more secure and stable environment across the Straits, he said. The US would not try to provoke China by crossing a "red line," which in turn would reduce the possibility of a Beijing military strike on Taiwan, Blinken noted. "The good thing about Trump's Taiwan policy is that he won't risk a war with the Chinese mainland for Taiwan, but his recklessness and lack of understanding of the sensitivity of the Taiwan question may lead to unexpected risks," Xin said. Biden should be more cautious and restrained on Taiwan question, Xin believes. While US efforts to sell arms to Taiwan and support the island will continue, Biden has a clear understanding of the dangers and red lines of the question, which would reduce the chances of a clash across the Taiwan Straits, he said. Chinese experts predicted that the Biden administration would not go far beyond the traditional US policy on Taiwan and that it is highly unlikely there will be a push for a clear strategy on the island during his tenure. Will Biden back more sanctions against China over Hong Kong? The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post quoted observers as saying that Trump's previous moves to sanction Hong Kong officials and end the region's special trade status are unlikely to be reversed by a Biden administration. The report said that Biden would likely maintain a tough line on China on technology, economics and other fields, but was unlikely to use Hong Kong issue as a bargaining chip. The Biden administration would prefer to return to traditional US-China competition and diplomacy. Lau Siu-kai, vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies, told the Global Times he did not expect Biden to add to existing Hong Kong sanctions. "In the US, and China's Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are some anti-China forces, such as Hong Kong separatists and Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party authority, that bet on Trump and even spread disinformation to attack Biden during the election," Jin told the Global Times. "This will prompt the Biden administration to reduce support to them, but the new administration won't abandon these forces as they are still useful to the US." Will sanctions on Chinese tech companies such as Huawei and TikTok be eased or intensified? An opinion piece published by the India Observer Research Foundation (ORF) on Friday said that if Biden's pre-election political rhetoric translates into post-election action on Chinese technology, the technological decoupling will intensify between the US and China. Da suggested that after Biden takes office, the US crackdown on China's core technology may not relax, but its scope might narrow. Trump previously proposed a catch-all scope defined by "national security" and "technological competition" that was unrealistic, Da said. "For example, for companies like TikTok and WeChat, the ban could be lifted as they do not have irreconcilable conflicts with the US," Da said. But in areas where Huawei is at the heart of an irreconcilable rivalry between China and the US, the situation is "more complicated," Da said. "I expect there will be some loosening of chip sales to Huawei by the US, but it will be very difficult to change the policy on 5G construction," he said. Xin believed Biden would not follow Trump into US-China entanglements over non-critical technology. The essential difference between Biden and Trump would be in core areas such as aerospace, quantum communication and artificial intelligence, Xin noted. "It is inevitable that China and the US will partly decouple from each other in the high-tech sector," Xin said. The victory of Biden, who "represents the pro-establishment camp of the US," would make some forces within China have the illusion of a US policy reversal, Jin said, but China should "keep vigilant and stick to the right path of strengthening self-reliance." Such forces would "try to argue that China doesn't need to improve its self-reliance capability anymore because Biden will fix US-China relations so China can still import high-tech products from the US," he said. That is plain wrong, Jin asserted. "China should not put its destiny in the hands of a change within the US," he said.

Infographic: GT

Will the US exhibit a 'final madness' in its China policy over the next 70 days? There are 70 days to go until the inauguration of the new president on January 20. What risks will the China-US relationship face during this period? Chinese analysts posited a possible "final madness" from Trump in his relations with China. Da said Trump would logically use his last two months in office to solidify the policies of his presidency so that they could not be reversed by the Biden administration, including China policy. Trump administration officials like US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would likely use this last chance to undermine US-China relations, he said. The South China Morning Post reported Saturday that tensions would likely increase between China and the US over Taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues ahead of the inauguration ceremony in January. The Trump administration might step up efforts to confront China politically, economically and diplomatically. But Trump will reduce the risk of a major crisis if he instead focuses more closely on his domestic electoral battles and legal proceedings. Shen Yi, an expert on US politics and international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, told the Global Times that the election shows us that "the pro-establishment forces among both the Democrats and Republicans have united and cooperated to kick Trump out of the office." So in his last 70 days in the White House, Trump will have no supporters and no resources to be able to take any major action or make a big trouble in international relations and it would be meaningless for him to try to do so, as "no one will listen to his instruction anymore," Shen said. "Technically, Trump has entered a period of 'being the lame duck'," Shen noted. Some institutions including military departments that have complex structure to execute the orders from Trump need to consider the costs after January 20 from a realistic perspective, so it is highly unlikely that all his orders will be implemented, he added. With regard to the possibility of surprises in China-US relations during the power transition period, some Chinese analysts shed the light on issues of concern such as the detention of Huawei's senior executive Meng Wanzhou, executive orders to ban TikTok and WeChat and further restrictions on Chinese students in the US. "The handling of the arrest of Meng, for example, will be a major indicator to assess the future adjustment in China-US relations," Shen said, adding that it is also likely that Trump will issue executive orders to ban Chinese apps in his final days as the top US leader.

Though major Chinese tech giants, such as Tencent and Huawei, have not issued any official statements on Biden's victory, sources close to those companies told the Global Times over the weekend that they have been keeping a close eye on the US election. Some analysts warned that although the China-US relationship will enter a "new period" as US President-elect Joe Biden is expected to come up with a far more moderate foreign policy, the long-term technology rivalry between the two economic superpowers won't change. Some also urged industry representatives to drop the illusion that changing leadership in America will automatically solve existing issues between the two nations. For China's high-tech sector, it is more important to focus on advancing technology development and self-reliance in core technologies, rather than pinning too high hopes on the politicians on the other side of the Pacific. "We're happy to hear that Biden has won the election, as China-US relations have worsened on the watch of Trump administration. We look forward to some improvement after Biden takes office," Jason Ji, a manager of an electronic company based in Shenzhen, South China's Guangdong Province, told the Global Times on Sunday. Ji said that under the US supply restrictions, it has taken longer for some Shenzhen companies - which source certain parts and chips from US suppliers - to deliver finished products to clients. "Trump's hostile policy against China's tech rise has affected my company's business to some extent, and we are now closely watching to see if Biden will relax the chip curbs on Chinese companies," Ji said, adding that his firm has begun sourcing some parts from Chinese firms this year. Some analysts agreed that the Chinese technology sector should be a little more optimistic if Biden comes into office, after the unprecedentedly hostile approach taken by the Trump administration, which has created hurdles to not just the Chinese companies, but also those in the US who view China as a very important part of their supply chain. "Chinese technology companies may gain some opportunities and breathing time as a result," said Sun Yuzhong, a researcher at the Institute of Computing Technology under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He predicted that Trump's ban on WeChat and TikTok would be lifted under the incoming Biden administration. However, he added that technology rivalry between the two nations is inevitable, especially when China's technology level is advancing and becoming more competitive in the global market. In the face of the latest results from the US presidential election, some Chinese companies have exhibited calmness. Some told the Global Times that they will focus on improving their own tech capability, regardless of how the external environment evolves. "The new US presidency won't change the overall trend of that government cracking down on Chinese high-tech firms, although there may be a different approach," an employee of a drone-maker based in Shenzhen, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the Global Times on Sunday. He predicted that it is very likely that Washington will continue to target China "to cover up its internal issues, like its social divide." A source with a leading state-owned technology company also told the Global Times on Sunday that Biden's stance over the trade and technology sector could take a similar tune to that of Trump. "Biden said on several occasion while running for president that he will resist foreigners' coveting of America's intellectual property rights, which is explicitly pointing at China, and therefore, he is likely to tighten licensing of intellectual property rights to Chinese companies," said the source. Biden in the past days has repeatedly talked about restoring the US' ability to produce and innovate, which means more competition in high technology, he said. "From our point of view, we ought to keep cautious, and it would be better to throw away the fantasy and step up our own efforts to innovate," said the source, noting that in any case, China will remain committed to self-reliance and independent innovation.

Photo: PSLV-C31 rocket of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) carrying IRNSS-1E satellite lifts off from the Satish Dhawan Space Center in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh, India, Jan. 20, 2016. (Xinhua/ISRO)

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is scheduled to launch an earth observation satellite that has all-weather and day-and-night capabilities on Saturday, with some Indian media outlets reporting that it will help Indian troops "keep a hawk eye" on the China-India border amid the stand-off. But Chinese analysts said its advantages in border tactics would be very limited as the country does not have many reconnaissance satellites with coordination capabilities, which would affect the resolution of the satellite. The earth observation satellite EOS-01 and nine international customer spacecraft will be launched from the spaceport of Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh, media reports said. It will be the first launch by the ISRO since the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted its missions. The EOS-01 is intended for applications such as agriculture, forestry and disaster management support, the ISRO said. But some Indian media reports said that the satellite could increase the Indian military's "surveillance capabilities" from outer space. Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times that at the tactical level, the satellite would only play a limited role as India lacks enough reconnaissance satellites to coordinate, affecting time and location accuracy. But India's ambitions are greater than that: The country has signed an agreement with the US on sharing space information, meaning that India may acquire intelligence on China's military deployment from the US, which has stronger space capabilities, Song said on Friday. These attempts to understand the Chinese military's border tactics are aimed at increasing India's bargaining chips in the border talks, Song said. China and India held the 8th round of commander-level border talks on Friday, Indian media reports said. The two countries' previous commander-level talks were held on October 12.

The 20th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be held virtually on Tuesday, and is expected to solidify member states' consensus on coping with regional and global challenges amid the COVID-19 pandemic. It could also serve as a turning point for escalating China-India tensions due to border issue and deteriorating economic and trade relations soured by India's decoupling moves. Driven by excessive reaction to irrational anti-China sentiment in India after the border conflict, India has been making moves to decouple its economic and trade relations with China this year. This is in sharp contrast to the fact that trade between China and India has increased over the past months. Trade data shows that India's economy simply cannot decouple from China. First, India has rigid requirements for many of China's cost-effective goods, so it must increase imports from China. Meanwhile, demand for imports in foreign markets has declined this year. Currently only China has beaten back the epidemic, and realized economic recovery. Therefore, India's exports increasingly depend on Chinese market. In terms of production, India can't become totally independent of the current industrial chain, which China serves as a key link. China is indispensable to India's manufacturing, equipment, raw materials, engineering technology, and capital. Indian industries such as pharmaceuticals and mobile phones will continue to rely on China in the short term. As long as India still seeks economic development, especially the development of its manufacturing, it cannot do without economic ties with China. Until India develops its large-scale manufacturing industry, it will need closer ties with China in terms of trade, investment and other aspects, and during this process will become more dependent on China. If India faces China with a positive and healthy mindset, its economic development will benefit. If India continues to let irrational anti-China sentiment take its toll, it will undoubtedly lose development opportunities. Facing the new round of industrial globalization, the adjustment of industrial structure and the transfer of industries provide opportunities for India. If India does not seize these opportunities and refuses to improve cooperation, production capacity will be transferred to other countries, such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. If India wants to develop manufacturing, it also needs to improve its infrastructure. India alone cannot efficiently make these improvements in a short period of time. China also has a very strong ability to improve infrastructure, so the two sides still have a lot of room for cooperation in the field of infrastructure. China can increase the development of India's manufacturing industry. The upcoming SCO summit provides a good opportunity for India to show good will and repair the bilateral ties with China and improve economic cooperation. Once China and India reverse the downward spiraling of bilateral relationships, economic cooperation will pick up from its current low point. During last week's virtual meeting between SCO economic and trade ministers, the member states reached consensus that they will strengthen solidarity and cooperation in response to fallout from the pandemic on socioeconomic development in the region, jointly uphold the stability of supply chains and the market and safeguard the multilateral trading system. China continues to make open and positive gestures to increase economic cooperation with India, It's crucial for India to return to the rational and abandon extreme anti-China sentiments and catch opportunities for its virus-hit economy and overcome current difficulties. China and India should establish more dialogue mechanisms for economic and trade cooperation. In addition to the macro-level strategic dialogue mechanism, China and India can establish corresponding dialogue mechanisms in investment, trade, and finance. Such efforts will create more opportunities for China-India economic cooperation. The growing room for industrial transfers and cooperation between China and India is vast. It depends on how the two sides promote it and make it a reality. (The article was compiled based on an interview with Long Xingchun, president of the Chengdu Institute of World Affairs.)

New Delhi and Kathmandu have maintained close exchanges in terms of politics, diplomacy, defense, military cooperation, culture, and people-to-people relations. Seeing itself as a "big brother" in South Asia, India is accustomed to bossing regional countries around. In recent years, Nepal has raised awareness to promote its independence and sovereignty. It has also begun to resist India over certain issues. Furthermore, the recent border row has triggered Nepalese nationalist sentiments against India. The Nepalese government also emphasizes the importance of safeguarding sovereignty and security. These factors have led to strained ties between the two countries. Currently, tensions on the China-India border have not yet eased. India is also facing considerable security pressure due to border disputes with Pakistan. Against this backdrop, New Delhi is aware that it may have to deal with a two-front challenge in the future. India's peripheral situation will be more complicated if its border row with Nepal is not handled smoothly. As a result, New Delhi is proactively mending its ties with Kathmandu in a bid to focus on tensions with both Beijing and Islamabad. Naravane's visit signals India's willingness to improve bilateral ties with Nepal. The trip might ease the tension between the two countries. This is because the Nepalese military has maintained close ties with the Indian troops. A dialogue between their militaries will play a big role to fix their bilateral relationship. Additionally, when reporting Naravane's visit, some Indian media outlets have hyped up "China's influence." For example, India Today said that China makes attempts to ramp up its influence in Nepal amid the ongoing military tussle between the People's Liberation Army and Indian Army in the Galwan Valley. The newspaper also noted that China's "land grab" of Nepalese territory and India's border guarding cooperation are likely to be a key agenda for armies of India and Nepal. PTI said New Delhi's decision to send its army chief to Nepal to reset the ties is regarded as part of its larger exercise to rejuvenate relations with Myanmar, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan "in the wake of greater efforts by China to expand its influence in the region." India now has border disputes with Pakistan and Nepal. Its relations with other South Asian neighbors seem to be strained as well. India has long behaved in a condescending manner toward these regional countries. This arrogance has triggered their dissatisfaction. Historically, India tends to provoke these countries first, and then tries to mend ties after triggering strong dissatisfaction among others. Yet New Delhi will act arrogantly with domineering actions again soon after relations are repaired - causing new rounds of boycotts. On Tuesday, when commenting about the hype over Chinese soldiers allegedly "annexing" land in Nepal, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbing articulated that it is "a completely unfounded rumor." Nepalese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Sewa Lamsal also claimed, "It is not true." India has been trying to drive a wedge between China and Nepal by emphasizing the so-called China's growing influence over South Asian countries. This is mainly because India fears China - especially the influence of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia, which New Delhi considers its back yard. India regards itself as the dominant power in South Asia. It hopes to hold absolute influence over the region and does not wish to see other major powers step into its "turf." Otherwise, New Delhi believes its periphery security, status in the region, and the process to realize its dream to become a major power will be affected. When China strengthens its ties with South Asian countries, including Nepal, to promote the BRI, India holds the belief that China is weakening India's sphere of influence. It perceives this as an attempt to gang up on India economically and strategically. Therefore, it is viewing the BRI and every relevant move from China with extreme caution. The author is director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University.

The first phase of the Malabar naval exercises that include the US, Japan, India and Australia kicked off on Tuesday. According to Indian media reports, the purpose of the exercise is to "counter Chinese military and political influence in the region."

As India invited Australia this year, the Malabar exercises are becoming a pillar of the "Asian version of NATO" that the US has been advocating. The Asian NATO would be a US-centered military alliance that serves US hegemonic ambitions with an eye on containing the rise of China. If the US wants to turn the idea into reality, it has to rope in the so-called like-minded partners. All the four players of the Malabar exercises are also members of QUAD, who the US is trying to turn into founding states of the Asian NATO. In the foreseeable future, the US is likely to draw other regional countries into its military orbit. The Malabar exercises claim to counter China's influence, but China will not slow its development because of external turbulence. China's influence is determined by its own development level. It's doubtful whether checking China's rise by QUAD members with their joint exercises in the waters can be realized. However, the risks are increasing that the Indo-Pacific region will become a geopolitical hot spot. Even Germany wants to get involved in the Indo-Pacific region. Germany is anticipated to join the Australian Navy and patrol the Indian Ocean. Media reports say Berlin wants to manage China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. When a region has gotten too many external powers involved, the region is bound to face geopolitical rivalry and see more uncertainties. Rivalry and uncertainties do no good to regional development, and heightening regional tensions will give external powers another excuse to step in, placing the region in a vicious circle. India is actively promoting such regional geopolitical rivalry that only brings uncertainties. It will eventually realize that its action is a crooked one. By doing so, India will not empower itself as it has always been wishing, but can easily turn itself into a chess piece played by external powers. Against the current geopolitical context in the Indo-Pacific region, India's purpose of enhancing its ties with the US is simple: countering China. India pins high hopes on strengthening its ties with external powers like the US to impose geopolitical pressure on China in the oceans. But this will only consume India's strength. The US will not become the spokesman of India's interests in the region, and its ultimate aim is to exploit India's interests to serve its own. Disturbance from external powers will complicate India's choices. A criterion to measure China's strength is that it can peacefully manage the frictions with other countries during the process of its development. It firmly safeguards its interests. The geopolitical games by the four players of the Malabar exercises cannot hinder China's own development.

German defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald that a German naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region would help safeguard the rules-based international order, and "hopes to be able to deploy next year". In the article, the Australian media outlet also mentioned, "German officers are expected to be deployed with the Australian Navy, and a German frigate will patrol the India Ocean under Berlin's plan to manage China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region."

The German government on September 2 released policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region. It was the first time Germany endorsed the notion of the "Indo-Pacific." Several factors have led Germany, a country outside the region, to meddle in the Indo-Pacific region. First, Germany hopes to become a great power and guide the EU's Indo-Pacific policy. The guidelines list eight German interests, and seven principles in its policy on the Indo-Pacific region, ranging from open markets and free trade to multilateralism. Second, it also shows Germany is adjusting its policy on Asia, shifting from a China-centric Asia policy to diversifying its relations with more regional countries. Third, Germany has paid close attention to its interests in this region. Many of its prominent trade partners lie in the Indo-Pacific region, where this European country has enormous economic benefits. Fourth, with US engagement, the regional security situation has changed. To safeguard its economic interests, Germany wants a military presence in the region. On the other hand, instead of insisting on its previous Asia policy, Germany embraces the controversial, security-oriented Indo-Pacific policy, showing its intention to cooperate with the US. Washington has been piling pressure on Berlin to coordinate its hard-line policy against China. Germany's rhetoric can be seen as a response to US pressure. Berlin also has its own calculations, such as deepening its relations with Tokyo and New Delhi. It is consistent with Germany's interests to strengthen its investment in security in this region. China should be vigilant toward Germany's potential deployment in the Indo-Pacific region. As the US Indo-Pacific Strategy is directed at China, Germany's intention to deploy in the Indo-Pacific region is clear. The Sydney Morning Herald said that "a German frigate will patrol the India Ocean." This potential move will be less sensitive than patrolling the South China Sea, but still deserves China's attention. Germany's constant emphasis on the Indo-Pacific Strategy includes the adjustment of its China policy. This shows that Germany believes cooperation and confrontation may coexist in its future relations with China. Germany's position toward China - an economic partner, a competitor in technology and an opponent in social system - is basically the same as that of the EU. The call to reduce dependence on China has never stopped in Germany. Cooperation still dominates Germany's China policy, but competition is constantly increasing. How Germany's intervention in the Indo-Pacific issue will affect China-Germany relations depends on the country's further action. If Germany acts provocatively in the military field, it will have a relatively large impact. Kramp-Karrenbauer said in the interview, "What will be crucial, regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, is whether the West can be more unified in its dealings with Beijing." German foreign minister Heiko Maas has also said the future of transatlantic relations will be "determined by the right way of dealing with Beijing." Their similar statements show that Germany is eager to form a unified China policy between the US and EU. This is also worthy of vigilance. The US, regarding China as its main competitor, is now tough on China. As the EU and the US coordinate, Germany and some other European countries are bound to tilt toward the US in their China policy, which may be tougher than before. On the other hand, completely confronting China is notin the interests of Germany or the EU. Thus, these countries may somehow dissuade the US from containing China too hard. It is almost impossible for Germany and the US, or the EU and the US, to form a unified China policy because the basis of their China policy is different. It's hard to tell which side will dominate the process, the US or the EU. Cooperation and disputes coexist in the China policy of the US and the EU, and they may not reach a consensus. Within the EU, Germany has been committed to forming a unified China policy, trying to add greater pressure on China and strive for more negotiation conditions with the strength of 27 EU member states. But this could be hard as well. EU members have huge disputes on many issues. Some countries are tough on China and some are friendly. It is difficult to reach a consensus, but Germany has hoped to work in this direction. The author is a research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

Amid the border tension between China and India, infrastructure construction on both sides of the disputed border has become one of the focal points of public attention.

Specifically, India has significantly stepped up the construction of roads and bridges along its border with China, with its work on critical infrastructure surging nearly 75 percent in regions sharing borders with China and Pakistan in the past two years, according to a report from The Print on Tuesday. If all these projects were intended for civilian use to improve connectivity in remote areas of western, northern and northeastern India, it would be a welcome development for local economic growth and border stability. However, media reports indicated that new infrastructure facilities like roads and bridges on the Indian side are aimed at the "faster deployment of the military when required," which is obviously not conducive to the easing of the regional situation and may even become a cause of continuing tensions. According to recent remarks by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian on this topic, China "opposes infrastructure building aimed at military contention in disputed border areas. Based on the consensus reached by the two sides recently, neither side should take any action that might complicate the situation at the border region, so that bilateral efforts to ease tension will not be undermined." Some observers have claimed that there is a "new arms race" between China and India, in terms of infrastructure construction along the disputed border. It is true that China has been strengthening infrastructure progress in its northwestern area. But China's border infrastructure efforts are aimed at accelerating and enhancing overall economic development of the Tibet region. This is because when the local economy is well developed, social stability will naturally contribute to border stability. Infrastructure construction may illustrate the different mindsets of India and China toward economic development along the border. While China has already recognized the importance of economic development to regional stability, it is regrettable to see that some in India still lack the pragmatic view on improving living standards. One expert in India even claimed that China's poverty reduction in some border villages is a worrisome development to India's defenses. We sincerely hope that India's border infrastructure push boosts economic development in backward regions instead of escalating tensions. In the long run, if enhanced infrastructure connectivity contributes to a closer economic connection between India's border states and China's Tibet Autonomous Region, it will be beneficial to the development of border trade and supply-chain cooperation, and conducive to stability in the border region and bilateral relations generally.

The US State Department agreed to amend its version of Indian Defense Minister's comments at the "2+2" Indo-US meeting on October 27 after days of protests by the Indian government, reported The Hindu, an Indian newspaper. In the original transcript released by the US, the minister was reportedly quoted as saying that India is challenged by "reckless aggression on our northern borders." This is an implicit reference to China. New Delhi later denied that the minister had used the words, but Washington claims that the transcript was prepared from an audio recording of the Indian side interpreter's English-language delivery to the US. Washington has eventually changed the controversial line to simply note the "challenges" India is facing. In the face of American wordplay, New Delhi's insistence to change the wording and Indian media's exposure of the matter reflects two concerns that the country holds. Firstly, India aims to backtrack after making two moves forward to the US by signing the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and reaching a consensus on some other issues with the current US administration during the "2+2" meeting. By insisting on revising the controversial rhetoric which alludes to China, India was taking a step back for China - and perhaps for the next US administration. This is India's strategy. Secondly, India has more or less stuck to the principle of limiting the border issue with China. It is invoking a bilateral scope and not letting any third party get involved. So far, India has not taken the initiative to pull the US into the China-India conflict on border in a certain sense. This is also an established policy in India. This is not the first time that the US juggles words. Trump in May claimed that that he had spoken to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi about the standoff between the People's Liberation Army and the Indian Army at the LAC - further saying that Modi was not "in a good mood" about it. But Indian Ministry of External Affairs denied that any such conversation had taken place, according to Indian media reports. Washington has been hoping to drive a wedge between Beijing and New Delhi. India has been reluctant to be pushed into the frontline by the US to counter China. That is why India rushed to clarify the conversation in May and US' misunderstanding of India defense minister's address this time. However, India released this information by its media outlets instead of making an official statement. This shows its prudent stance. It also signals India's consistent stance on China-US relations. India endorses the US' anti-China position, yet it is unwilling to be pushed into the frontline by the US to check and balance China. New Delhi is willing to negotiate with Beijing on the border issues, but does not need Washington to pile pressure on it. What India needs most from the US is pragmatic benefits. Signing the BECA with the US and purchasing US' advanced weaponry will help India enhance its national power. Even so, India is still reluctant to provoke China in rhetoric with the US in a bid to avoid misunderstandings in Beijing. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said on Saturday that India's relations with China had remained for three decades, "but as the pandemic unfolded, the relationship has come under severe stress." He also said, "To restore normalcy, agreements between the two countries must be respected scrupulously in their entirety." As the China-India border deadlock persists, it is difficult to predict where the bilateral ties will head in the future. Three weeks has passed since the 7th round of China-India military commanders' talks. From the perspective of Indian media outlets, India disapproves of the scenario proposed by China to ease the border conflicts. Meanwhile, India hopes to exploit closer relations with US to ramp up its bargaining chips with China. Against the backdrop of closer India-US ties, China will not make any concessions. It will make more considerations on the border issue with India. The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Wan Lin based on an interview with Lin Minwang, a research fellow with the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.

The Voice of America published an article on Saturday titled "Vietnam gets boost from Western allies in its defense against China," in which it said Vietnam's leadership this year of ASEAN has opened a door to bolster the country's defense against "longtime rival China" through strong relations with the West. It also quoted experts who declared that Vietnam was one of the "bulwarks against China." The views in this article represent most American political elites' wishful thinking that Vietnam and other ASEAN members would abandon their reciprocal cooperation with China, and devote themselves to the US' anti-China camp. Washington has underestimated these countries' political wisdom. US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said in August that the US wants to see Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand eventually join an expanded Quad, according to Asia Times. This shows the US ambition to form an "Asian NATO." And US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently concluded his Asia tour after completing his surprise trip to Vietnam. Pompeo told Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, "We have enormous respect for the Vietnamese people and your country's sovereignty." However, the series of US moves are destined to be in vain. In 2018, Vietnam overtook Malaysia as China's largest trade partner in ASEAN, and China has been Vietnam's largest trade partner for 15 consecutive years. Vietnam is an important country for China to promote the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and Vietnam's economy also benefits from the BRI. Under such circumstances, all countries will consider their own interests instead of abandoning mutually beneficial cooperation and acting as the "bulwark" against China. China and Vietnam are socialist countries. The US has been suppressing the rise of China, a major socialist power, and Pompeo even called the Communist Party of China a "new tyranny." This would more or less trigger Vietnam's vigilance. After all, for some American political elites, ideological disputes have been deeply engraved into their minds, and their prejudice against socialist countries is difficult to change. To suppress China, Washington prefers to temporarily downplay such prejudice and try to win over Hanoi. But in the long run, people are also aware that once Vietnam completely turns to the US, ideological factors will be a thorn in their relationship. The article also mentioned that Vietnam wants "powerful friends as backup" to fend off China's "expansion" in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam have maritime territorial disputes, but this is not the whole picture of their bilateral relationship. The two countries have the ability to manage this dispute and prevent it from becoming a dominant aspect of their relations. But some American politicians continue to instigate Vietnam in an attempt to arouse extreme nationalism in the country. Vietnam will come to realize that geopolitical tools will not help reduce maritime disputes. Exercising restraint on the South China Sea issue and peaceful negotiations are the best option. Under US coercion, Vietnam and some other Asian countries face increasing pressure to take sides. However, no matter how the US tries to lobby, maintaining cooperative relations with China and the US will still be these countries' first choice. The US tries to continuously expand its sphere of influence and stir up trouble in Asia, and it will only get itself trapped in the end.

Washington and New Delhi on Tuesday signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation, which will allow New Delhi access to crucial intelligence that will have implications in any potential military conflict, after their 2+2 high-level talks. This signals that military cooperation between the two countries has taken a step forward. As the two countries that have been worst affected by the coronavirus pandemic, why did they take the risk of holding face-to-face discussions? Getting tough on China has become a bipartisan consensus in Washington. With the election approaching, it was the last diplomatic meeting for the current administration of US President Donald Trump to exploit its hard-line stances against China to win more votes. Therefore, the US further peddled its Indo-Pacific Strategy, and made extra efforts to rope in India to counter China. From the perspective of India, as little progress has been made in its border conflicts with China, India intends to use the enhanced military cooperation with the US to pressure China to make concessions. As the two countries move closer, many media outlets and analysts argue whether India is already a "quasi-ally" of the US. Qian Feng, director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times on Sunday, "US-India ties can be described as being upgraded to, at best, a 'quasi-alliance' only in terms of the military, but it is far from reaching a 'quasi-alliance.' This is because the two countries' latest cooperation has mainly focused on military and defense, yet they have repeated discords and frictions in fields such as economy and diplomacy." In an editorial published on Wednesday by the Hindu, a Chennai-based Indian media outlet, it argues that, "While strengthening its US ties, India must not let this interfere in the dispute with China." At the end of the article, it said, "The conspicuous silence from External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in response to Mr. [US Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo's comments on China is also a sobering reminder that while India appreciates support from the US, it retains its strategic autonomy in dealing with threats and troubles with its biggest neighbor." Against the backdrop of deteriorated China-India ties due to their border conflicts, as well as the rising nationalism in India, many Indian politicians, strategists, and media outlets are calling to boost cooperation with the US, in a bid to counter China. However, there are still many Indians who disapprove of this strategy. Since Trump took office in 2016, his administration has been cranking up the "America First" policy, repeatedly underlining the significance of safeguarding its national interests. It has also urged its allies to share more obligations and has withdrawn from a series of international organizations to shed its responsibility. China, on the other hand, has maintained close economic exchanges with most countries, and has engaged in increasing international cooperation, which embodies its image as a responsible power. The international community is clearly aware of these moves by the US and China. To check and balance China's development, the US has spared no effort to build a "global anti-China alliance," hoping its allies and partners will stand with it rather than with China. Most countries, including India, are reluctant to take sides between the two giants. The core of every country's foreign policy is to safeguard its own national interests. In the context of deteriorating China-US relations and no easy and quick solution to the China-India border conflicts, India is carefully considering how to deal with the two great powers. When it comes to geography, the US lies far away from India, while China is its close neighbor that cannot be moved away. Even though India is tough on border issues against China, it will go against India's national interest if India ties itself to Washington's anti-China chariot. Qian said, "If China-US relations cannot turn positive, the US will continue to woo India. New Delhi will continue to move closer to Washington. However, India, which harbors a great-power dream, will just be inclined to the US, rather than being dependent or becoming a little brother of the US. India will continue to retain its independence in terms of diplomacy."

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's five-nation anti-China tour of Asia ended in Vietnam on Friday, which was seen as having little effect. Faced with Pompeo's attempts to gang up against China, Sri Lanka said it will remain neutral and will not get entangled in struggles between power blocs, while other countries, apart from India, have not made an active response to Pompeo's anti-China comments and implicit move to drive a wedge between China and them.

Pompeo's ambitious trip to Asia was doomed to fail in achieving its anti-China goal. Why? Because the purpose of the trip is unstable in nature: to persuade the countries who have long been China's solid partners to start seeing China as a threat. Years of economic cooperation and political and cultural links between China and South and Southeast Asia will only prove that friends will not become enemies just due to others' efforts to sow discord in between. The cooperation between China and the South Asia region has long been progressing steadily, especially on the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative. From the perspectives of history and recent economic data, the trade between China and South Asia has been developing and deepening across the century. In this context, they have been treating China not as an enemy but as an important partner in win-win cooperation for a long time, which is the reason why they will not accept the zero-sum game advocated by the US. Pompeo accused China of being a "predator" in smaller countries by exploiting them with loans and development projects that would benefit the Chinese more than the intended recipients. This speaks volumes about how unreasonable the US Secretary of State is when it comes to China, while Sri Lanka's dismissive response also showed a fundamental principle of inter-state relations - respect the facts, which, for Sri Lanka, is that the country has long benefited from its cooperation with China and it is the right choice to continue to do so. China has always followed the policy of good-neighborliness and friendship and has presented itself as a responsible major country by maintaining stability and prosperity in the region. Even Vietnam, a country that has territorial disputes with China, has also reached a consensus with China that small-scale disputes should not affect overall cooperation in South Asia region. In fact, the trade between China and Vietnam is growing and the cooperation in other aspects is also deepening. It is a rational and smart choice for the Vietnamese government to stay cool on US' tricks to use the South China Sea dispute to drive a wedge with China. During Pompeo's visit, the countries may be dealing with him on the surface, but fundamentally their attitude is very strong - they do not want to be labeled as "anti-China" in any way nor do they want to be held hostage by the US as a pawn of its overall regional hegemony plan. Moreover, Pompeo's anti-China trip has a strong electoral political purpose. With the US election still undecided and uncertain, their "greeting" to Pompeo might only be superficial. Everyone is well aware of the tactics used by US politicians to solicit votes before elections by hyping up the so-called China threat theory, which has long been part of its most common political farce in its  presidential elections. For Pompeo, the trip is also an evident setback for promoting US' Indo-Pacific Strategy in South Asia, and it further proves that hegemonic behaviors of the US will not be welcomed by any one. As we all know, all of its strategies that put US interests first will undoubtedly impact the stability and development of regional cooperation in South Asia. The Trump administration's vigorous pursuit of geopolitical game and Cold War mentality go against the trend of the current times. In an era of global peaceful development, building a community with a shared future for mankind should be the major focus, which is also China's advocacy in its relations with its neighbors and the whole world. The author is the director of the Asia-Pacific Research Institute at the China Institute of International Studies.

 The US looks "totally messed up", but it may still be "functioning normally". It is a sample of how resilient a country can be to "turbulence". Of course, few countries in the world dare to play like the US. Chances are, half way through the process, or even less, the country is in a mess and out of control. And whether the US will be able to maintain normal function while being in a mess this time makes many Americans feel not so sure. Many Americans are beginning to really worry that the political divide in the US is no longer an electoral game. It has gone too far and "turned the fake into the real." There are also fears that even if the US can pull through this time, political division will increasingly look like an "irreversible terminal disease" of the US liberal system. This election may not be the end. The US system clearly has its moments, or it would not have emerged as the superpower that has led the world in so many ways. But the once mighty US system went too far, and the result is the rotten system it has today. Among other things, 230,000 people have died of COVID-19 i