Journal : website guancha Date : Author : NA Page No. : NA
URL : http://www.guancha.cn/RahulMishra/2016_01_06_347040.shtml

拉胡尔·米什拉:印度大力支持亚投行,为啥反对一带一路?

 

Rahul Mishra 博士是印度外交部下属智库印度世界事务委员会的研究员,本文来自他在华盛顿东西方中心的一次讲座。

 Dr. Rahul Mishra is a research fellow in the Indian Council of World Affairs, a think tank affiliated to the Ministry for External Affairs of India. This article published by guancha.com is based on a lecture he gave in East-West Center in Washington.

印度在一系列国际事务上曾给予中国大力支持,比如亚投行、金砖银行,但是一带一路倡议却给印度带来非常深重的危机感——这主要是由中巴经济走廊带来的。

India has been a firm supporter of China on the international stage in a series of important endeavors: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank (a.k.a. BRICS Bank), etc. But the OPOR initiative has given India a profound sense of crisis  And this arises mainly from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

过去几个月,我在东西方中心研究一带一路的倡议时,有一个问题一直在我脑海中萦绕不去:中国真的是要重振古老的丝绸之路吗?一带一路这个名字真的重要吗?可能的答案是:不是。因为,相比古老的丝绸之路,一带一路有完全不同的概念。古代的丝绸之路其实是贸易的自由流动,本质上是由西方对来自东方的物品的需求驱动的。但是,如果你看现在的一带一路,中国是在驾驶员的位置上,坐在舞台中心的。中国表示:我们打算提供你们需要的公共必需品、基础设施。而且,中国打算建立、强化这种机制。

In last few months, when I was doing research on the strategy of OBOR in the East-West Center, one question kept haunting me in the entire process: is China really striving to revitalize the ancient Silk Road? And is the name OBOR really important to China? The answer is perhaps NO. In my opinion, OBOR is an utterly different notion compared with the ancient Silk Road. Silk Road was there for the free mobilization of commercial activities, and in its essence, was driven by the need of the West for the exotic goods of the East. But now China plays the role of driver in the blueprint of OBOR, and is seated center  stage. China’s stance is to provide necessities of public services and basic infrastructure for those countries concerned, and is she is planning to establish and consolidate this mechanism.

从印度人的角度而言,中巴经济走廊让他们产生了顾虑。

Looked at from India’s standpoint, the source of apprehension is nothing but the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

在接下来的半个小时,我将试图回答:发起一带一路倡议背后的原因;以及它发起的时机:为什么是现在?为什么不是在2009、2011年?这个问题非常重要,不管中国是做什么,总是有时机的因素在这里,这也是所谓的中国特色吧。然后,我们要看看沿线国家的反应,他们是如何看待一带一路的倡议的。

In light of that, I’m trying to answer the following questions: what’s driving China to proclaim the strategy of OBOR, and why she is doing that NOW? Why didn’t the strategy come in 2009 or in 2011? It’s a question of vital importance, as you have to understand the significance of the “right timing” of China’s big move – a “Chinese characteristic”, if I may say so. After thar, we shall look into the responses of countries along the line, and their remarks upon China’s strategy.

首先,非常清楚,新丝绸之路,也就是丝绸之路经济带的倡议,是习近平在2013年9月访问哈萨克斯坦时提出来的。它背后的理念是,加强与所有中亚国家的联系,包括蒙古等国家,很多“走廊”的概念因此被提出来,包括中国、蒙古、俄罗斯等。在南亚,有两个具体的“走廊”概念初现端倪。一是中国与巴基斯坦经济走廊;另一个是BCIM经济走廊,包括孟加拉、中国、印度、缅甸。由于很多有趣的原因,这两条走廊的战略受到了更多的关注。这些走廊的规划,打通东南亚的道路与港口,通达印度洋,最终连接到非洲。我们已经看到,中国和不少国家签署类似的协议,包括泰国、吉布提、毛里求斯等。

First of all, it is clearly reported that the proposal of New Silk Road (a.k.a. Silk Road Economic Belt) was started by President Xi Jinping in September of 2013, when he was paying an official visit to Kazakhstan. On that occasion, Xi Jinping was intending to strengthen ties between China and Central Asian counties and Mongolia. Then the notion of “corridor” was put on the table, and China, Mongolia and Russia were to be connected thanks to the “corridor”. Soon we found two “corridors” in South Asia as well: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the  BCIM Economic Corridor, connecting Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar. The two corridors soon caught public attention with their strategic significance, and for a series of very interesting reasons. The corridors would open up the roads and harbors of South Asia, get (China) through to the vast Indian Ocean, and finally reach the continent of Africa. China has already signed similar agreements with several countries concerned, like Thailand, Djibouti and Mauritius.

让我们回到最初的问题上,中国为什么要提出一带一路的倡议?首先是中国经济的发展不平衡。大部分发达省份集中在东部沿海地区,而不发达的省份则集中在西部。所以两者之间的差距不断拉大。所以,中国一直有意在西部投入更多的精力。丝绸之路在某种意义上是要解决产能过剩和地区发展不平衡的问题。从国内的问题着眼,他们提出了这个倡议。

Let’s get back to the first question: what’s driving China to proclaim the OBOR strategy ? The first reason is the uneven development of Chinese national economy domestically, as most developed provinces and municipalities are concentrated in the Eastern coastal regions, and those in Western China. are less developed ones mostly  The gap between them is widening. As a result, China has been exerting itself to develop her Western regions. In this sense, OBOR is intended to resolve the problems of production capacity surplus and disparate regional development. The strategy is intended for domestic problems in the initial stage.

第二点更加重要,关于海上丝绸之路的,也关系所谓的国际孤立(international isolation)。我们知道,美国提出了“重返亚洲”、“亚太再平衡”以及TPP。外界据此认为,考虑到中国在南海问题上的强硬,他们已经走到一定的边缘。在我看来,这并非国际孤立,在更大的图景上,这是国际统治)秩序的变化。一带一路倡议的目标,中国是想在世界上扮演某种角色。所谓邓小平韬光养晦的时代结束了,新的中国更加坚定自信、更渴望在世界舞台上发挥作用。我想,这只是中国挑战世界秩序的开端。当然,并不一定就是负面的,但是对国际规则、秩序肯定会有挑战。

The second reason – which I think is more important – concerns the “Maritime Silk Road” strategy and is also related to the so-called international isolation (of China). As is known to all, US is toying with the idea of “returning to Asia”, “ rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific” and TPP (The Trans-Pacific Partnership). Many think that China and US are on the edge of a military confrontations, considering China’s hard line on the South China Sea issue. But in my opinion, it cannot be concluded as “international isolation” in the larger scheme of things. it’s a major shift in the international hegemonic order. By proclaiming OBOR to the world, China is intending to play even greater role on the international stage. The era of “keeping a low profile”– as enunciated by Deng Xiaoping – is gone for China is now  more confident and becoming assertive, eager to  make a major impact on international issues. In my opinion, China’s challenge to the international order has just begun. Of course, the challenge is not necessarily a negative thing, but it is clear that it will without doubt affect the current international order and scheme of things. , .

如果我们看看其他方面,在过去二十年,中国海军的能力大大提高,这给他们获得在海上的影响力, 比如说,他们在印度洋的活动。因为中国的能源供应安全依靠陆海之间的联系通道,因此,他们在印度洋活动也是可以理解的。当然,不管出于何种原因,中国在印度洋还只是新兴的力量。这也是未来的很大的挑战。

Let’s try to look from a different perspective. In the past two decades, Chinese naval forces have witnessed very rapid progress, and resulted in its gaining influence on maritime issues. Take, for instance. its activities in the Indian Ocean region. These moves seem totally understandable, as China’s energy supplies are largely dependent on land and sea channels. Of course, for whatever reason, it is clear that China is still only a budding power in the Indian Ocean region, This is a big challenge for the future.

另外,中国只有东部地区靠海,所以他们面临着这种所谓的“马六甲困境”——某天,如果对中国的供给在马六甲被切断,中国将无法应对这种局面。一带一路的倡议也是要应对这个问题,比如说连接瓜达尔港等。所以,中国一带一路的倡议,一半是出于经济原因,一半是出于国家安全的考量。我的判读是,丝绸之路经济带和海上丝绸之路存在不同的战略目的。前者更多是出于基础设施建设,与欧亚大陆国家、中亚以及西亚互联互通;而海上丝绸之路,更多是中国想在国际上扮演更重要的角色。

Besides, the coastal regions are concentrated in the Eastern part of China, and she has to worry about the dire result of the “Malacca dilemma”. If China’s energy supplies are cut off in Malacca one day, it would become a troublesome situation to handle. The strategy of OBOR is trying to answer that relevant questions, for example, by linking China with Gwadar Port. In a word, China’s intention is two-fold: partly for considerations of the national economy, and partly for considerations of national security. My explanation is that“Silk Road Economic Belt” and “Maritime Silk Road”are designed with different strategic goals in mind. The key to “Silk Road Economic Belt” is infrastructure construction, with which China intends to connect herself with Eurasia, Central Asia and West Asian countries. And “Maritime Silk Road” heralds China’s more important role on the international stage.

接下来,我们看看各国的反应。如果你看看邻近的中亚国家,他们是坚定支持一带一路计划的。有三个原因,第一,中亚国家缺乏基础设施。第二,他们试图从中国获得更多的发展机会,比如能源供应。南亚国家,一些国家比较积极,一些消极。比如印度,还没有表态支持一带一路的倡议。斯里兰卡的话,政府更换之后,一切都变了。缅甸,如果把它纳入南亚,它其实也不支持。孟加拉,它对加入BCIM(孟加拉、中国、印度、缅甸)走廊感兴趣,但是没有表态支持一带一路,这符合我们的预期,尤其在印度与孟加拉的关系改善后。

Now let us assess the responses of the countries concerned. The Central Asian counties are invariably firm supporter of OBOR. There are two major reasons: first,  Central Asian counties lack infrastructure; secondly, they look to gaining more opportunities from China’s economic development, for example, energy supplies.On the contrary, while some South Asian countries are responding positively, others seem reluctant. India, for example, has not yet announced public support for the strategy of OBOR. Things in Sri Lanka have become unpredictable, as there is now a brand new government. Myanmar– call it a South Asian country – is not supportive either. Bangladesh is all for joining BCIM Economic Corridor, but has no clear approach to OBOR. Actually Bangladesh’s reaction is understandable, considering her recent improvement in its relationship with India.

东南亚国家的反应也是很不一样。因为南海问题,越南、菲律宾反对倡议,印度尼西亚对一带一路带来的经济机遇感兴趣,但对中国在南海问题上的强硬立场很警惕。泰国、老挝、柬埔寨在过去几年,和中国走得非常近,他们支持一带一路的倡议。中国也成立了亚投行和丝路基金,来支持这个计划。

Southeast Asian countries also have very diverse responses. Vietnam and Philippines are strongly opposed to the proposal, owing to their disputes with China in South China Sea issue. Indonesia expresses interest in the economic opportunities brought by OBOR, but is alert to China’s hard line stance in South China Sea issue. Thailand, Laos and Cambodia have been close to China in recent years, and they are of course firm supporters of OBOR. China also founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Silk Road Fund to support the entire plan.

美国目前还没有针对一带一路有全面的回应。有些学者认为,重返亚洲、TPP等计划,美国给中国出了难题,一带一路正是中国的回应。我不同意,因为一带一路是一个跨越洲际的方案,它不仅仅有对海上的反馈,也对陆路提出挑战。惊讶的是,欧洲并没有拒绝这个计划,而对此特别主动、乐观,不仅仅是英国,包括德国、西班牙、希腊、荷兰等。印度,还不知道如何应对,如何说“yes”。

At present, the US has no clear counter to the OBOR. Some scholars claim that US is raising a tough question to China by ushering the strategies of “Returning to Asia” and TPP, and China is responding strongly with OBOR. But I disagree with their viewpoint, as OBOR is a trans-continental plan, by which China is not only responding to US by sea, but also posing challenge to US by land. Much to our surprise, European countries are not opposed to OBOR, and some of them even hold positive and optimistic views of the strategy. UK is one of them, joined by Germany, Spain, Greece and Netherland. Under such circumstances, India does not know how to respond, how to say “YES”.

俄罗斯支持这个计划。俄罗斯和巴基斯坦很有意思。本质上,他们不是盯着一带一路这个方案而决定是否加入,也不是从经济和基础设施的角度来考虑的,而纯粹是战略的考量。对于俄罗斯,这是个零和游戏,一带一路类似一场运动,有其潜在合理性。巴基斯坦以同样的眼光来看待南亚,比如说,巴基斯坦国内对中巴经济走廊存在争议,尤其在外交部门,对此有不同的理解。

Russia is all for OBOR. The responses of Russia and Pakistan are interesting, as they are not considering from the perspectives of economic cooperation or infrastructure constructions; they become firm supporters of China out of sheer strategic consideration. For Russia it’s a zero-sum game, similar to the OBOR campaign. Pakistan likewise  eyes  South Asia, and I would say there are quite different opinions of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan domestically, especially within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

印度在一系列国际事务上曾给予中国大力支持,比如亚投行、金砖银行,但是一带一路倡议却给印度带来非常深重的危机感——这主要是由中巴经济走廊带来的。

India has been a firm supporter of China on the international stage in a series of important endeavors: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank (a.k.a. BRICS Bank), etc. But the OPOR initiative has given India a profound sense of crisis  And this arises mainly from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

让我们从印度还有其他国家的角度看看一带一路面临的挑战。在一带一路倡议之前,中巴经济走廊的概念就提出来了,不是因为其不可行,也不是因为其有战略考量。原因很简单,中巴两国的领导上对这个计划期望甚高。但是,如果你看看巴基斯坦媒体最近的报道,有四篇报道是关于其争议的——中巴经济走廊的路线到底该怎么走?旁遮普省还是开伯尔普什图省,所以造成两省领导人之间的裂隙。

Trying to stand in the shoes of India and other countries concerned, let’s look at the challenges faced by OBOR. The notion of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was proposed before OBOR, not because of the infeasibility (of the latter) or out of strategic considerations. The reason is simple: the paramount leaders of both China and Pakistan had very high expectations of this corridor. But if you read recent reports by Pakistani media, you can easily notice that most of them are about “disputes”. What’s the road ahead for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? Should the corridor include the Province of Punjab or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? There are also rifts between the Chief Ministers of the two provinces.

能的方案是走旁遮普,因为巴基斯坦绝大多数领导人都来自旁遮普省。现在,很多希望寄托在中巴经济走廊上。

The province of Punjab might be a more favored choice, as most political leaders of Pakistan come from this region. Many of them place high hopes on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

对中巴经济走廊而言,极端势力的抬头、不稳定的社会局面和落后的经济发展水平,都构成了很大的挑战。

But the road ahead (for the corridor) might not be smooth.  There are several chalenges: the rise of extremist forces, unstable social conditions and less developed regional economy, etc.

如果这些因素全部实现,那么可能随时对中国形成挑战,你必须投入大量的经费来保证中巴经济走廊的安全。有人认为,中巴经济走廊只是一个交易,完全是为了迎合中国的利益。如果只是一笔交易,那么会让许多巴基斯坦高层领导人失望。但是战略上,还是对巴基斯坦有益的。另一重隐患是中国西北的局面。人员的自由流动会导致新观念的产生。中国与巴基斯坦接壤的地带现在就像一个封闭的盒子,对西亚、中亚开放,你就不得不面临来自那里的挑战。

The challenges are grave if China has to deal with all factors mentioned above all at once; that is to say, the costs of  keeping the corridor safe will be extremely high. Some claim that the corridor is no more than a “business” that caters for the interest of China, and it might down many Pakistani senior leaders in the end. But the corridor is beneficial for Pakistan from a strategic perspective. China is also alert to the potential riots in the northwest part, as  free movement of people is likely to lead to new ideas and ways of thinking.  The border area of China and Pakistan is like a sealed box at present, and both countries have to be aware of the challenges that opening up to Central and West Asia will bring in its wake.

另一个问题是,不管中国的领导人到哪里出访,不管那里有什么样的风险或者有人反对他们,他们试图将这个出访地纳入一带一路的方案里。所以,一带一路的计划变得如此庞大,以至于你不能确定,他们到底要准备怎么做。

Here’s another question: wherever Chinese leaders visit, they’re trying to include the countries/regions into the plan of OBOR, regardless of the risks and oppositions of local opinions. In the end, the entire map of OBOR becomes bloated, and no one has clear ideas of China’s next step.

现在,日本强烈地感受到了一带一路释放出来的信号。在2015年,日本因此提出了应对方案:高质量基础设施合作伙伴计划(Partnership with Quality Infrastructure)。很明显,这就是针对中国的一带一路,日本推出了1100亿美元的基础设施投资计划。请注意他们的用词,是高质量的投资,因此,不会是便宜的、质量低下的投资,而是高质量、品质有长期保证的投资。你会强烈的感觉到,这个高质量基础设施合作伙伴计划就完全是冲着一带一路的倡议而去的。日本为此也改善了与越南、菲律宾和缅甸的关系,他们在东南亚变得非常活跃。

Now, Japan has already detected the strong signal sent by OBOR. In 2015, Japan responded with her own version of Partnership with Quality Infrastructure. Clearly in answer for China’s OBOR, Japan announced an investment plan that includes 11o billion US dollars for infrastructure constructions. Please notice that Japan used “Quality Infrastructure” to name the plan, so as to ensure that their investments boast high qualities and long-term, stable returns, in contrast of those cheap, low-quality ones. You can get a strong feeling that Japan’s Partnership with Quality Infrastructure is directly targeted at the OBOR. Thanks to the partnership, Japan has improved her relationship with Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar, thus becoming an active force in Southeast Asia.

那么,印度人是如何回应一带一路的?首先,印度最大的担忧是,一带一路方案完全没有透明度。这个方案包括65个国家,但是我们没有看到公开的政府文件,所有的方案和协议都是双边的,中国逐个与各个国家签署。这怎样会是“亚洲是亚洲人的亚洲。”?所有的亚洲国家并没有邀请坐到同一张桌子上,去公开讨论这个方案。完全是中国与各国的双边协议,我压根没看到任何三边的协议。如果你和日本的(PQI)比较,他们完全是公开的,你可以找到相应的文件和细节。而且,日本还和印度、缅甸、泰国一起讨论过PQI。

How are Indians responding to OBOR? The primary concern of India is the lack of transparency in OBOR. The strategy now includes 65 countries, but we fail to see any official documents from Chinese government up till now. All the plans and agreements are bilateral, signed between China and other countries concerned. How can we believe that it’s an “Asia for Asians” initiative? China has never invited all the Asian countries concerned to discuss the concrete plans of OBOR together, openly and frankly. Now there are only somr bilateral agreements signed by China and other countries concerned, and we fail we see any trilateral or multilateral agreements. On the contrary, Japan’s PQI is completely open, and all documents and details can be referred to accordingly. Besides, Japan has had very fruitful discussions with India, Myanmar and Thailand before PQI was officially born.

其次,印度担心的是,这只是你自己的方案,还是准备惠及他国?或者,你中国是轮轴的轴心,而印度只是轴条。当然,印度是不想当这样轴条的角色的。当然,印度的回应不是因为安全的考虑,因此,他们为应对一带一路,提出了两个战略。第一个是很关心中巴经济走廊,我们并不支持这个方案。c。印度正感觉到,一带一路已经是个近在眉睫的挑战,或者一场在基础设施领域的战争。印度已经有印度次大陆国家的经济合作协议(BBIN, 不丹、孟加拉、印度、尼泊尔,也包括将来的马尔代夫、斯里兰卡)。

India is also apprehensive that OBOR is merely a plan of China’s own, and it remains a question whether OBOR is beneficial for other participants. To put it simply: China is the axis of OBOR, and India is one of the shafts for China. It is not a role that India is willing to take. In answer to the OBOR, India has put forward two strategies. First of all, India is deeply concerned with China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and cannot support it. However, gretaer attention is being given to the BCIM corridor. India correctly understands that OBOR poses an urgent challenge for her, akin to a war on the infrastructure construction. Before that, India has already signed agreements of economic cooperation with her South Asian neighbors with the name of BBIN (Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal, and Maldives and Sri Lank might be included in the future.)

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中巴经济走廊示意图 A map of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

此外,印度的另一个倡议是东进计划,莫迪政府非常重视。印度东部的很多岛屿,比如尼科巴-安达曼群岛都没有开发,现在我们准备从大战略着眼,提高他们的经济发展水平,这也与莫迪的蓝色经济计划联系在一起。印度在访问斯里兰卡和其他海洋国家爱时,呼吁一起发展蓝色经济。像斯里兰卡、毛里求斯,这些都是印度的传统友好国家,他们期望印度扮演某种角色,也考虑基础设施建设的前景,像毛里求斯建设机场,印度提供了支持。

Besides, India is responding strongly with her “Look East” policy, to which Modi government attaches much importance. Many islands on the east of India – like Andaman and Nicobar Islands– remain unexploited. Modi is considering boosting regional economy for these islands as part of the comprehensive strategic plan. The plan is also tightly associated with “blue economy”, a notion Modi continuously stressed when he visited Sri Lanka, Mauritius and other countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka and Mauritius have long history of traditional friendship with India, and they expect India to play vital roles beneficial to them. India has provided support for infrastructure construction in these countries, like the airport of Mauritius.

这些因素都推动印度做出反应,尤其是中巴经济走廊。c

However, India is still reluctant to share with China her official opinion of the OBOR, with China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as her primary concern. Speaking of national security, China and Pakistan are considered two major potential threats for India, and so we have to be doubly cautious.

另一重因素是,一带一路,特别是海上丝绸之路,有可能会招来中国在印度洋区域建设自己的军事基地,这对印度度是另一大挑战。至少印度军事部门的人认为,这已经发生在斯里兰卡和吉布提。

India is also aware that OBOR (especially Maritime Silk Road) might include China’s own military bases binge built in the Indian Ocean region, and an even greater challenge lies if that happens. Ar least Indian officials from military departments believe that this has already happened in Sri Lanka and Djibouti.

就海上丝绸之路而言,印度的挑战是,一直以来,印度是这一地区海上安全的提供者。在2008年缅甸发生的纳尔吉斯旋风就可以看到,印度是第一个反应的国家,帮助过东南亚国家,如泰国、缅甸、马来西亚。就远洋运输的安全而言,印度为美国、日本、新加坡、马来西亚、印度尼西亚等国的轮船提供了安全保障。就打击海盗行为来说,印度也扮演着主角,这得到一致公认。过去这么多年,印度和日本一直在这方面合作。日本依靠印度来保障他们货轮安全和通行安全。中国在印度洋的参与,我们不知道会给现在的局面带来多大的挑战,或者机遇。

Talking of the Maritime Silk Route, the Indian  position is that it has been a security provider in the region. When tropical storm Nargis broke out in Myanmar in 2008, India was the first country to come up with an emergency response, and provided adequate assistance for South East Asian countries, including Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia. India is also playing a vital role in combating piracy, which is well recognized by the world. The joint efforts of India and Japan have lasted for years, and Japan is in need of India’s help to secure the cargo ships and navigation in the Indian Ocean region. It remains unclear whether China’s involvement in the Indian Ocean region will mean greater challenges or opportunities for India.

还有,印度与中国还存在边境争议。只要边境争议继续存在,我不认为两国的高层关系会变得非常紧密。

Not to mention the border disputes between China and India. So long as the border dispute is not settled properly, I don’t think the top leaders of China and India will have a very close relationship.

此外,一带一路所覆盖的区域——东南亚、中亚、巴基斯坦,这些地区印度十分关切,也有利益所在。尤其是东南亚,是印度东进外交政策实施最成功的地区。中亚在历史上就与印度联系很深,无论文化背景、制度还是其他因素。在苏联时期,这些国家与我们的领导人关系就非常好。即便今天,这些联系还是很深。

The regions included in OBOR for now – Southeast Asia, Middle Asia and Pakistan – all have very vital association with India, as far as fundamental interests of India are concerned. Modi’s “Look East” policy is most successfully implemented in South East Asian countries. Central Asian countries have close historical ties with India, and they do share something in common in cultural background, political institution and other factors. Before 1991, Central  Asian countries (as Union Republics of Soviet Union) had established sound relationships with Indian leaders of the previous generation. After the radicals changes in the world order in the last few decades, their relationship has remained intact.

另一个因素是,传统上,印度被视为美国及其盟友的被动合作伙伴。然而,美国一直在要求印度向东看、向东行动,而不是向西看。所以印度实际上在阿富汗没有什么动作。从印度安全部门看来,考虑到印度在阿富汗的利益,这并不公平。实际上,印度一直在向西看。看起来,这像是对美国说“不、不。”c

Let’s continue to discuss the role of US. Traditionally, India is seen as a “passive partner” of US and her allies. However, US prefers that India keeps looking ahead Eastwards, rather than Westwards. It is not surprising that India has made no big moves in Afghanistan. But Indian officials in charge of national security maintain that it is unfair, in light of India’s practical interests in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, India is also entertaining the idea of looking ahead Westwards, which sounds like a “NO” to the US. But troubles also come from China, and not only because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. These influence matters, and India and Japan are advancing forward together, displeasing the Chinese. It was quite different when Modi assumed Prime Ministership. Initially, Modi maintained sound relationship with China, and people from both countries believed that China-Indian relationship will witness giant leaps with Modi as the top leader. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

对印度而言,应对中国的一带一路,将发挥以下机制:第一是继续推进BBIN,还有其他的区域协作,另一个是孟加拉湾倡议,提高东部尼科巴-安达曼群岛的战略地位。以及加快湄公河-印度经济走廊建设,修建从印度的加尔各答、到缅甸、泰国、老挝,最终抵达越南胡志明市的公路,打通印度到太平洋的通道。

In answer to China’s OBOR, India should bring her own strategic mechanisms into full play: first of all, BBIN, then other regional cooperative frameworks; India may also rely on Bay of Bengal Initiative, so as to activate the strategic status of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Besides, India should keep pushing the construction of Mekong River-India Economic Corridor, and the highways that connect Calcutta, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Ho Chi Minh City. Those efforts should aim at (carving out) a passage) through India and the Pacific Ocean.

在东北部的基础设施建设而言,合作伙伴技术和资金的资助尤其重要。PQI,从日本人的角度来看,将是游戏规则改变者。这已有先例,譬如德里的地铁,德里-孟买经济走廊,以及未来印度到越南的走廊。所以就基础设施建设而言,印度和日本的合作将是游戏规则改变者。我相信,美国也将会帮助我们,不管是正面的还是负面的,来应对一带一路带来的挑战。

Speaking of infrastructure construction in the northeast part of India, India is craving for technological and financial assistance from her partners, especially PQI. In the eyes of Japan, PQI will br a game changer. We can find precedents: the subway of Delhi, Delhi-Mumbai Economic Corridor, and the ongoing construction that connects India and Vietnam. India and Japan, combined as one force, will play the role of a game-changer at least in the field of infrastructure construction. I believe that US will help us and exert her influence – positive or negative – in the foreseeable future to cope with the challenges of OBOR

确实,一带一路计划影响了印度,还有孟加拉以及缅甸的安全和经济利益,甚至是巴基斯坦。从印度人的角度而言,中国人犯的错误是在时机的选择上,具体说是在中巴经济走廊的问题上。几乎是在顷刻之间,印度的自由派的也不支持这个玩法了,印度安全部门的人说,看,这就是中国人和巴基斯坦人打算要干的——中巴经济走廊才是他们的头等大事,而这和我们没有任何关系。所以,即便是莫迪,也不得不听他们的。

Without doubt, the OBOR exerts a great influence on India and the economic interests and national security of Bangladesh and Myanmar, and even Pakistan. In the eyes of Indians, China makes a colossal mistake of choosing the “right time” to announce OBOR, right after the notion of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In a twinkling, even the liberals in India are not in favor of OBOR. The officials in charge of national security would say: “Look, that’s exactly what China and Pakistan are up to – China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is on top of their agenda, and we have nothing to do with it”. Then what else choice does Modi have ?

你再看看过去,印度几乎是亚投行的第一个支持者,支持还有我们支持中国的BCIM走廊,甚至中国海军在印度洋巡航,印度政府都表示了支持。但是巴基斯坦人进来后,一切回到了起点。

Let’s look into the past – India is literally the first supporter of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and BCIM Economic Corridor is also warmly embraced by India. The Indian government even accorded its consent to the Chinese navy to cruise in the Indian Ocean. But everything is back to square one as soon as Pakistanis come into the picture.

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