Journal : Global Times (Chinese) Date : Author : NA Page No. : 13
URL : http://www.jdqu.com/read-814025-13.html

1962年中印战争背后的美国身影

1961年尼赫鲁访美与肯尼迪举行会谈,当时外界认为两国关系已步入“蜜月期”。

In 1961, Jawaharlal Nehru visited US as the Indian Prime Minister, and had official meetings with John Kennedy, then President of US. All the world believed that US-India bilateral relation was ready to celebrate the honeymoon.

经过长达12年的谈判,印度和美国近日宣布在共享军事后勤系统方面已接近达成协议,不少媒体将此举视为在当前中国国力大幅增强的背景下,美国试图拉拢印度牵制中国的最新举措。回顾数十年来始终磕碰不断的美印关系,两国上次在军事合作方面走得如此之近,同样也是举着“针对中国”的幌子。

After prolonged negotiations that lasted for 12 years, India and US recently announced that they are close to an agreement of sharing military logistics with each other. Most media see that as US’s latest attempt to form a closer ally with India, so as to contain the military influence of China under the circumstance of China’s ever growing comprehensive national strengths. In retrospect to the bittersweet US-India bilateral relationship in the last decade, the two countries were actually targeting China the last time they were so close to each other with military cooperation.

 第一次合作试探戛然而止 The abrupt end of the first attempt

尽管美印互以全球“最强的民主国家”和“最大的民主国家”相称,但印度独立60多年来,两国关系一直在冷暖交替中曲折发展,甚至长期在低谷驻足不前。美国有名的“亲印派”代表人物、曾担任过驻印度大使及助理国务卿的罗伯特·布莱克干脆以“两个城市在几乎所有事情上都不能取得一致意见”来描述华盛顿和新德里的关系。

Although US and India refers to each other as “the strongest democracy” and “the largest democracy”, but their bilateral relationship has proceeded amid twists and turns since India gained independence more than 6 decades ago. In some critical points, US-India relationship was even trapped in stagnation. Robert Blake, Robert O. Blake, Jr., a famous pro-India politician who used to serve as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission in New Delhi, India, and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, once described the relationship between Washington and New Delhi as such: “The two cities can barely reach agreement with any issue.”

1947年独立后,印度一直坚持奉行不结盟中立政策,让美国十分不满。而美国很快将巴基斯坦拉入盟国体系,也让印度对此不快。但随着上世纪50年代后期,苏联在南亚次大陆影响力的不断增大以及中印关系的升温,美国开始担心“失去印度”。1957年美国艾森豪威尔政府通过NSC-5703号文件,明确提出“一个强大的印度在亚洲背景下,可能是替代共产主义的成功典范。”

Since India declared independence in 1947, she has been sticking to the neutral foreign policy of non-alignment, which obviously upset US. US soon included Pakistan as her close ally in South Asia, which irritated India without doubt. However, with the expansion of Soviet Union’s influence in the subcontinent of South Asia in late 1950s, US started to apprehend that she might lose India one day. In 1957, the Eisenhower Administration passed the NSC-5703 document, presenting the clear statement that “a powerful India can be a successful paradigm to replace communism with the entire Asia as the background.”

1960年肯尼迪政府上台后,越发希望通过拉拢印度,在南亚地区打赢冷战。此时正值中印关系因西藏暴乱、边界摩擦而恶化之际,印度总理尼赫鲁向来访的美国官员公然表示,他对中国的“侵略态度”非常不安,相信“对世界的危险来自北京而不是莫斯科”。美国副总统林登·约翰逊1961年5月访问印度后备受鼓舞,他甚至建议美国应帮助印度实现军事现代化,使印度可以把军队从克什米尔抽调出来威慑中国,而不是同巴基斯坦对峙。

After John Kennedy took office as US President in 1960, the government entertained with the growing desire of joining hands with India, so as to win the Cold War in South Asia. At that moment, China-India relationship was down to the historical low after the riots in Tibet, and the military conflicts along the national border. Prime Minister Nehru even confessed to the US officials who were visiting India that he was very upset with China’s “aggressive attitude”, and reiterated that “the threat to the world comes from Beijing, rather than Moscow”. Linton Johnson, then Vice President of US, was so encouraged after he visited India in May of 1961 that he suggested to the government that US provide assistance to India with the process of military modernization. By doing that, India could extract the armies from the disputed areas of Kashmir and pose substantial threat to China, instead of being trapped in a stalemate with Pakistan.

此时美印关系似乎“形势一片大好”,肯尼迪政府还决定向印度提供数十亿美元的经济和军事援助,促使印度成为美国遏制中国的战略伙伴。然而当年12月,尼赫鲁刚访问美国后不久,印度就出动大军收复了被葡萄牙长期殖民的果阿地区。作为北约成员国之一的葡萄牙一直声称,果阿受到北约的“保护”,因此北约“老大”美国多次反对印度在此问题上动用武力。

It seemed to be the best of times for US-India relationship. The Kennedy Administration even decided to provide 1 billion US dollars for India as assistance of her economic and military efforts, so that India could become US’s most reliable partner to contain China’s growth. Nevertheless, shortly after Prime Minister Nehru finished his US trip in December of 1961, India surprised the world by reclaiming Goa – which was under Portuguese colonial rule – with prompt military actions. As a member state of NATO, Portugal claimed that Goa was under the “protection” of NATO, and US (actually the “Big Brother” of NATO) had always been opposed to India’s military measures with this sensitive issue.

印度“不听话”的举动,自然令美国恼怒不已,两国关系急转直下。美国驻联合国大使史蒂文森公开谴责印度,声称联合国不能饶恕在该问题上使用武力,会为在其他冲突中使用武力铺平道路。美国甚至在联合国安理会试图通过对印度不利的提议,只是由于苏联的反对,该提议未能通过。

This time, US was greatly irritated by the “disobedient” moves of India, without doubt, and US-India relationship was down to a historical low. Adlai Stevenson, then US Ambassador to UN, criticized India in public. He proclaimed that although UN should not tolerate India’s military actions with this issue, or the military actions taken in other regional conflicts would be easily justified. US even initiated some proposals against India in UN Security Council, but later failed to pass with the veto of Soviet Union.

美国军援也无济于事 The military assistance of US did no good

不过美印关系的转机很快就到来了。上世纪60年代初,中国发生严重的经济困难,美国自作聪明地以为中国政府可能将垮台。目前美印披露的史料表明,这一错误判断,某种程度上间接地鼓动了尼赫鲁政府在中印边界问题上的军事冒险政策。

Shortly after the crisis, US-India relationship was turning for better again. China was troubled with serious economic crisis in 1960s, and the smarty-pants of US believed that the Chinese government was soon to be doomed. According to the historical documents decoded by US and India, the colossal misjudgment urged the Nehru Administration to take risk with military actions to settle the border disputes of China and India.

在“联手对付中国”的幌子下,美印关系迅速回暖。1962年3月,美国副国务卿鲍尔斯访问印度期间,与鼓吹“前进政策”的印军陆军参谋局长考尔中将会谈。考尔问鲍尔斯,在中国“公开入侵”的情况下,美国是否会向印度提供军事援助?鲍尔斯回答说,他个人认为会这样做。在决定采取军事行动后,印度多次要求美国尽快提供美制军用运输机的零配件及运输通讯装备,这也得到美国军方的积极回应。中印武装冲突发生后,美国驻印度大使加尔布雷思在给肯尼迪的信中承认,“我们的估计可能影响了印度。”

 

With the common ideal of containing China, US and India immediately resumed their warm, close bilateral relationship. In March of 1962, Chester Bowles, then Assistant Secret of State of US, visited India and had extensive discussions with Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul, a ferment supporter of “Forward Policy”. Kaul asked Bowles, would US provide necessary military assistance to India in case of a “public invasion” of China? Bowles responded by saying that he was incline to that personally. After the decision of the Indian government to take military actions, India had more than once urged US to provide the accessories of military transport aircrafts and transportation and communication facilities as soon as possible, and was responded by the US army in a positive way. After the military confrontations of China and India along the border, John Kenneth Galbraith, then US Ambassador to India, confessed in a letter to President Kennedy: “Our estimations have some influences on India.”

1962年10月20日,中国军队开始自卫反击作战,印军接连溃败。美国中央情报局原来认为“印度军队的战斗效率在自由亚洲是最高的”,但战争的结果却完全出乎美国的预料。从11月3日起,美国动用运输机向印度紧急空运数十架次的武器弹药及通讯装备,并提供了大量有关中国的军事情报。为减少印度的压力,肯尼迪甚至还亲自写信给巴基斯坦总统,要求巴方向印度做出不采取军事行动的保证。

On October 20th, 1962, the Chinese army started to counterattack, and the Indian army suffered several consecutive defeats. CIA used to believe that “the combat effectiveness of the India army finds no rivalries in the free part of Asia”, but the results of batters totally contradicted US’s prior assumptions. Since November 3rd, US had assisted the Indian army with additional arms, ammunitions and telecommunication facilities with air freighters in over 10 sorties, together with large amount of valuable military intelligence of India. In order to ease the pressure of India, President Kennedy even wrote to Pakistani President by hand, warning him against any military actions towards India at that critical moment.

然而美国的这些努力并未能挽救战局,“有限的军援”在印军的全线溃败面前可谓是“杯水车薪”。震惊中的尼赫鲁几乎丧失了判断大局的能力,11月19日,他在未同内阁磋商的情况下两次致信肯尼迪,呼吁美国紧急向印度派遣12个中队的超音速战斗机,并提供雷达和通讯设备。由于印度空军飞行员并不熟悉美制战机,他干脆要求由美国飞行员驾驶这些飞机作战,以保卫印度的城市。尼赫鲁还寻求支援两个中队的B-47轰炸机,袭击中国的基地和机场,这等同于要求美国派空军到印度与中国直接交战。

In spite of the strenuous efforts made by US, the Indian army failed to turn things around. The limited military assistance was like a drop in the bucket in light of the total devastation of India’s military actions. Prime Minister Nehru, obviously in shock, almost lost the capacity of maintaining the direction as the paramount leader. On November 19th, he wrote two consecutive letters to President Kennedy (without even consulting his cabinet members), urging US to dispatch 12 squadrons of supersonic fighter jets, radars and communication facilities to India. However, the Indian pilots were not familiar with US-made fighter jets, and Nehru even demanded that US pilots fly the fighter jets and guard the cities in India! Besides, Nehru made excessive requests that US dispatch 2 squadrons of B-47 bombers to attack the military bases and airports in China. Well, it’s like forcing US to declare war against China on the subcontinent of India.

尽管此时美国已将“企业”号航母调至孟加拉湾,但美国国务卿腊斯克认为,在印度没有公开澄清它的不结盟政策之前,美国不可能直接参战。为弄清尼赫鲁的想法,肯尼迪决定先让助理国务卿哈里曼赶赴新德里。然而等到11月22日哈里曼到达印度时,中国已宣布单方面停火,并声明将把军队撤回至1959年实际控制线。这一行动打破了美国使战争长期拖延下去的幻想。

Although US had already moved USS Enterprise out for the Bay of Bengal, Dean Rusk, then US Secretary of State, believed that the direct participation of US in the war was impossible before the Indian government clarified its non-alignment foreign policies. In order to get a thorough understanding of Prime Minister Nehru’s blueprint, President Kennedy decided to dispatch Pamela Harriman, then Assistant Secretary of State, to visit New Delhi first. When Harriman arrived in India on November 22nd, China had already declared unilateral ceasefire, and promised to withdraw the troops back to the Line of Actual Control designated in 1959. China’s move undoubtedly broke US’s dream of extending the period of the war infinitely.

后续情报合作还延续数年 The cooperation of intelligent ran for a few more years subsequently

随着中印边界形势的逐渐平静,美国不仅失去了向印度提供军事援助的兴趣,而且降低对印度战略地位的评估。危机时期,印度曾提出10亿美元的军事援助要求,美国应付了一阵后就没了下文;印度希望美国提供空中保护,却只得到少数雷达。但两国还是进行了连续几年的联合情报侦察活动。

With the troops along the border of China and India remaining in peace, US gradually lost her interest in providing India with military assistance, and also lowered the assessment of India’s strategic significance. During the crisis of war, India used to demand that US provide 1 billion US dollars as military assistance, and US did respond actively at first but soon went without any follow-ups. India was craving for US’s protection with air forces, but was given a small number of radars at last. Despite that, US and India did carry on joint intelligence and surveillance operations for a few years subsequently.

近年来解密的中情局文件披露,美国利用中印边境武装冲突让印度恐慌的机会,提出使用印度空军基地为中情局的U-2侦察机补充燃料,深入中国境内执行任务,帮助提供中国军队“入侵”情报,得到尼赫鲁的同意。1963年6月,美印同意让U-2使用印度奥里萨邦被遗弃的沙尔巴迪亚空军基地。1964年初,印度沙尔巴迪亚基地启用后,也先后执行过多次对华侦察任务。后因印国内政局变化,该基地于1967年7月被关闭,双方相关合作告一段落。

The confidential documents (which were later decoded) of CIA reveal that US required to use the military bases of India to fuel up the U-2 surveillance aircrafts of CIA, at a critical moment that India was still in horror with the escalated military conflicts between China and India along the border. After that, they went deep into the territory of China and performed special tasks, providing India with the crucial intelligent of China’s “invasion”, and all US’s moves were given consent by Prime Minister Nehru. In June of 1963, US and India agreed that U-2 surveillance aircrafts used the deserted air force base in Charbatia, in Orissa, India. Charbatia air force base also performed several reconnaissance missions targeting China after it was officially put into use in early 1964. Years later, the base was shut down in July of 1967 with the turbulences of India’s domestic politics, calling a stop to the cooperation of US and India.

此后几年,美印情报机构还联合搜集过中国的核信息。1965年,美印派出一支由登山者组成的联合团队,赴位于印度北部北阿坎德邦境内喜马拉雅山脉的楠达德维山峰,安装一个核探测仪器,期望监测中国的核武器试验。由于天气因素等原因,该行动未能成功。

In the next few years, the intelligence agencies of US and India also jointly performed reconnaissance missions to collect information of China’s nuclear power. In 1965, US and India dispatched a joint group made up with mountaineers towards the destination of Nanda Devi, part of the Garhwal Himalayas, located in the state of Uttarakhand in the north of India. They were actually performing the task of installing a nuclear detection instrument there, in hope of monitoring the nuclear weapon tests within the territory of China. However, their efforts proved unsuccessful because of “weather factors”.

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